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ABSTRACT
The debate on rural transformation dates back to the school o f neo-classical 
political economy. Its modem version has focused on the role o f agriculture 
in economic development in the 1960s and 1970s, and has then moved on to 
local livelihoods and micro-economics in the 1980s. Recently, a new debate 
has emerged between the ‘neo-populists’ and the ‘agro-pessimists' on the 
role o f small-scale farms in economic development and poverty alleviation. 
This thesis develops a framework, which helps analysis o f the process o f 
mral transformation in the age o f globalization. Testing the hypothesis in 
Turkey illustrates a common dilemma faced by many developing countries 
where the role o f agriculture in economic development has been diminishing 
without leading to a substantial movement o f labour out o f agriculture. 
Since this trend is accompanied by a stagnant agricultural economy failing 
to integrate into global markets, millions o f small farmers have been left out 
o f the process o f economic development over the last 25 years.
This thesis analyzes longitudinal village studies from three different regions 
o f Turkey. The first case exemplifies the damaging impact o f the trade 
distorting policies o f developed countries on small-scale cotton producers in 
developing countries. The second case illustrates the crucial role that non- 
agricultural activities play in rural economies, especially in unfavourable 
agro-ecologies. The third shows that inequality arising from social and 
political factors hinders the efficient allocation o f resources, constituting a 
big obstacle for rural development. Hence, combining assessment o f the 
processes o f agricultural and labour transition at the country level with 
thematic case studies, the thesis argues that the overall state o f small-scale 
agriculture has generally been pessimistic over the last 25 years. 
Nevertheless, i f  facilitated by a new institutional framework, such as the new 
social democracy, designed to take advantage o f new opportunities arising 
from globalization, a realistic policy approach would provide an optimistic 
prospect fo r future progress in rural transformation.
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Chapter I - Rural Transformation: Concepts, Questions and
Methodology
Development, in an historical sense, is a process of the economic, spatial, 
demographic, social and political transformation of rural societies. It involves an 
economic transformation from the predominance of agricultural activities, hunting 
and gathering to manufacturing and services activities of higher productivity. It is a 
process of evolution from environmental dependency, which is a stage where 
economic activities are closely linked to the local natural resource base, to a stage 
where people are de-linked from, or have greater control over, ecological constraints. 
It also represents a demographic transition from higher to lower fertility and 
mortality rates along with rural-to-urban migration. It involves a social, cultural and 
political transition from traditionally pre-determined communal relations into 
democratically defined individualistic rules of social interaction. Therefore, 
development, broadly defined, is essentially an historical process of transformation 
of rural societies in various dimensions.
This thesis focuses on the economic dimension of rural transformation and defines it
primarily as a process in which labour and land productivity in agriculture rises, and,
ideally, the gap between agriculture and the rest of the economy narrows. It refrains
from shallow definitions describing the process as a mere decline in the share of
agriculture in total output. The approach developed here focuses on the process of
transformation both from  and within agriculture. This approach suggests that
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structural transformation takes place either through a continuous decline in the actual 
size of the rural labour force (transformation from agriculture) and/or through a 
rapid increase in land productivity (transformation within agriculture). If these two 
processes overlap -  as Kuznets (1966) illustrated in some classic cases -  rural 
transformation can be considered as a process moving towards ‘completion’ 
(Timmer, 1998, pp. 116-120).
The way rural transformation has been completed (i.e. achieving the stage of 
‘developed’), and the way it has remained incomplete (i.e. continuing to be 
‘developing’) is crucial for understanding the world in which we live. For developed 
societies, by definition, the question of rural transformation no longer exists, but it 
has not disappeared for the large majority of the world. Yet the economic, spatial, 
social and political contexts determining the scope of the transformation have 
continuously changed. Thus, the scientific treatment of the question of rural 
transformation is an historical task arising and re-arising in different contexts until it 
has been successfully completed.
Today’s developed countries followed different trajectories of rural transformation, 
although the outcome of each case was essentially similar. The earliest example took 
place in England from the 16th century onwards through the industrial revolution. 
France’s transformation came in the 18th century in the period of political 
revolutions. Prussia’s rural space, under Junker dominance, was transformed late in 
the 19th century. On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States underwent a very 
different process led by a technological revolution in agriculture dominated by 
family farms. Almost one century later, Japan’s experience was initiated under
imperial rule and continued in the early 20th century. Then, after the two world wars, 
the Asian Tigers, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, emerged and encouraged by 
radical land reforms, underwent rapid rural transformations in the era of ‘import 
substitution industrialization’.1 All these examples were fundamentally distinct from 
each other, yet they were all successful in completing the rural transformation.
Since the Asian Tigers, there has not been any case of ‘completed’ transformation 
over the last quarter of a century, in an era defined as economic globalization. More 
than 2.3 billion Asians (60 per cent of Asia’s population), more than 550 million 
Africans (60 per cent of Africa’s population), in total more than half of the world’s 
population -  around 3.2 billion people -  still live in rural areas and the vast majority 
of them work in the agricultural sector (UNPD, 2006). Hence, the main objective of 
this thesis is to shed light on the questions of why there has not been any case of 
‘completed’ rural transformation over the last 25 years, and how such a process of 
successful ‘completion’ may take place in today’s developing countries in the era of 
globalization.
1.1 Transformation from agriculture
In his seminal work, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies o f Labour, W. 
Arthur Lewis (1954) argued that the traditional rural sector constituted a perfectly 
elastic labour source that would be the engine of growth in the modem urban 
economy. More productive manufacturing and services sectors would grow by 
absorbing surplus mral labour at a minimal cost, until the surplus disappeared.
1 Byres (1991) analyzed six historical paths (English, Prussian, French, American, Japanese, 
Taiwanese/South Korean).
10
Today, however, in the vast majority of developing countries, although the modem 
manufacturing and services sectors have grown substantially, the size of agricultural 
labour force has not seen any significant decline over the past 25 years. On the 
contrary, the size of agricultural labour force has actually risen. Hence, this thesis 
first focuses on the question of why the ultimate goal of rural transformation -  
transformation from agriculture -  has been slow in developing countries over the 
recent decades.
Although a significant extent of rural-to-urban migration has taken place, lading to a 
decline in the share of rural population, the world’s rural population has continued to 
grow. During 1975-2005, the urban population of developing countries grew by an 
annual rate of 3.4 per cent. Given that total population growth in developing countries 
was 1.8 per cent per annum, and rural population growth was 1 per cent per annum 
(UNPD, 2005, p. 9). As a result, the size of world’s rural population of working age 
(whether economically active or not) has grown. From the United Nations Population 
Division database (UNPD, 2006), we can see that Asia experienced the biggest 
growth in total, from 1.1 billion people in 1980 to 1.5 billion in 2005. In Asia, India 
saw the most rapid expansion in its mral population of working-age, from 290 
million to 470 million. In Africa, it almost doubled from 173 to 291 million. Latin 
America and the Caribbean saw a relatively small rise of only 11 million from 1980 
to 2005 (see Figure 1.1 below).
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Figure 1-1 Rural population of working age (15-59) by major regions, 1980-2005
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Source: Author’s calculation based on World Population Prospects: The 2004 Population 
Revision Population Database (UNPD, 2006).
*Due to the unavailability o f time series data on age distribution in rural areas, the 
calculation is based on the assumption that the age composition o f rural and urban 
population is identical. This assumption may slightly overestimate the size o f  rural 
population o f working age.
Similarly, the actual size of economically active population in agriculture has risen 
substantially over the last 25 years. According to the FAO database (FAOSTAT, 
2006), in developing countries in Asia, it has increased by 200 million since 1980, 
from around 800 million to slightly more than 1 billion. It has risen by approximately 
75 million in Africa while staying relatively stable in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (FAOSTAT, 2006). Looking at the world’s total, the size of economically 
active population in agriculture increased from 1.07 billion in 1980 to 1.35 billion in 
2004 (FAO, 2007).
There are only a few exceptions to the trend of increasing size of agricultural labour 
force. China, is one of the few countries that has managed to reversed the trend in 
recent years. The size of its economically active agricultural population increased 
from 408 million in 1979-1981 to 511 million in 1999-2001 (see Table 1.1) (FAO,
12
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2007), but then it began to fall slowly. Apart from China, Malaysia is another Asian 
country where the process of labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities appears to be underway. Here, both the share and size of agricultural labour 
force has been declining consistently over the last 25 years. In Latin America, Brazil 
has shown some progress - as the share of agricultural labour force declined from 37 
per cent in 1979-81 to 15 per cent in 2004, and the size of its agricultural labour 
force decreased by around 5 million in the same period (see Table 1,1 below) (FAO, 
2007).
Between 1980 and 2004, the developing world’s GDP increased by almost 230 per 
cent (IMF, 2006), mainly through the growth of the services and manufacturing 
sectors. However, even those countries, which have made some progress in their 
labour transitions over the recent years, are still close to the economic development 
levels (measured by GDP per capita) that late-developer countries, such as South 
Korea, achieved 25 years ago. In 2004, GDP per capita was US$ 1440 in China, US$ 
3640 in Brazil and US$ 4280 in Malaysia; South Korea’s GDP per capita was about 
US$ 4000 in 1979-1981 (FAO, 2007). For the majority of other developing 
countries, the process of labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities has been slow or stagnant, despite experiencing economic growth, in other 
sectors (see Table 1.1).
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Table 1-1 The share and size of economically active population in agriculture 
and GDP per capita in selected countries, 2004 vs. 1979-81
2004 1979-1981
Economically
active
population in 
agriculture 
(1000)
Share of 
economically 
active 
agricultural 
population in 
total 
(%)
GDP per 
capita 
($US)
Economically
active
population in 
agriculture 
(1000)
Share of 
economically 
active 
agricultural 
population in 
total 
(%)
GDP per 
capita 
($US)
USA 2791 2 36352 3888 3 22361
Japan 2172 3 39184 6383 11 23909
France 745 3 22987 1985 8 15788
Korea (Republic) 1944 8 12793 5725 37 3305
Uruguay 189 12 5759 192 17 5064
Brazil 12134 15 3636 17426 37 3116
Malaysia 1740 16 4277 2155 41 1847
Mexico 8453 19 5903 7988 36 5088
Tunisia 974 23 2332 851 39 1328
Syria 1636 26 1122 992 39 978
Egypt 8594 31 1558 8429 57 854
Philippines 12942 37 1100 9613 52 985
World 1347283 43 5505 1068168 52 3973
Turkey 14854 43 3171 11540 61 1873
Benin 1583 50 387 1122 68 317
Thailand 20185 53 2359 17336 71 807
India 276687 58 538 208341 69 222
China 510010 64 1441 407728 74 238
Angola 4521 71 880 2669 76 926
Kenya 12570 74 343 6367 82 361
Mali 4920 79 232 3242 89 218
Burkina Faso 5747 92 238 3343 92 187
Source: FAO Statistical Yearbook 2004 (FAO, 2007).
1.2 Transformation within agriculture
... the earliest archaeological settlement in the Middle Euphrates 
region (Rakka Govemorate, Syria) at which the cultivation of 
domesticated naked wheat has been reported. Productivity, 
calculated from A of wheat grains found at this site, was 
relatively high, with an average (mean ± s.d.) of 1.56±0.28 Mg 
ha-1 (1.56 tons per hectare, B.K.)... they are higher than those 
achieved for wheat under the current rainfed conditions of this 
semi-arid region (1.05 Mg ha’1). (Araus, et. al, 2001. p 341)2
2 The productivity estimates are based on the highly sophisticated analysis of carbon isotope 
discrimination (A) in crop seeds from the archaeological site.
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Basic food plants were domesticated first in the Fertile Crescent in around 8,000 
B.C. (Diamond, 1999, p. 97), so it is striking that current cereal yields in that region 
and, in fact, in many developing countries, are at par with those 10,000 years ago. If 
the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent had some initial advantages -  ecological, 
social and economic etc. -  to become the first farmers of human history, what has 
prevented them from further exploiting those advantages to improve their 
productivity over the last 10,000 years? Many of today’s developed regions, such as 
North America, where domesticated cereals were only adopted thousands of years 
after they were first domesticated, have become one the most productive cereal 
producers of the present time. If their inhabitants had such severe disadvantages that 
they had to wait another 6,000 years for their transition from the primitive stage of 
hunting and gathering to the advanced stage of farming (Diamond, 1999, p. 150), 
how have they managed to achieve such high levels of productivity in cereals over 
the span of just two centuries?
The second dimension of the rural transformation which this thesis focuses on is 
transformation within agriculture, which involves a process of agricultural 
modernization through both improvements in yields and a transition from low to 
high-value cropping patterns. However, from the outset it should be noted that the 
approach developed in this thesis is based on the recognition that there are 
fundamental constraints in that process. Marginal productivity of land gets lower as 
yields approach a certain ceiling level, determined for each crop by ecological and 
technological factors. The limitations of these constraints may vary according to the 
level of agricultural and technological progress. However, this thesis assumes that 
the ultimate constraint of the existence of a ceiling on the level of physical and hence
economic output does not disappear. Therefore, the transformation within agriculture 
is eventually an increasingly constrained process.
1.2.1 Yields and cropping patterns
Most arable land in developing countries has continued to be under cereals 
production at low yields. The share of cereals in total arable land (including 
permanent crops) has been approximately 50 per cent, with variations at regional 
level ranging from 30 per cent in Latin America and Caribbean, and 60 per cent in 
South Asia in 2003 (FAOSTAT, 2006). As is shown in Figure 1.2, cereal yields in 
developing countries have risen slowly over the last 25 years. They continued to be 
substantially below the yields in industrial countries which set the highest levels. In 
fact, the yields in South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Near East and Sub- 
Saharan Africa in 2004 were all below the level of yields in industrial countries 25 
year ago (see Figure 1.3). At the highest end in developing regions, the yields in East 
and South-east Asia (excluding China) rose from 2.3 ton per hectare in 1980 to 3.7 
ton per hectare in 2004 (FAOSTAT, 2006). At the lowest end, Sub-Saharan Africa 
saw no improvement at all, the yields stagnating around one ton per hectare during 
the entire period. With small yield improvements, cereals have continued to 
dominate agricultural production in developing countries.
China is a big exception in this picture. The proportion of cereal production in its 
cropping pattern dropped from 95 per cent of all arable land in 1980 to 50 per cent in
2003. This was possible due to its exceptional success in achieving high yields, rising 
from approximately 3 tons per hectare in 1980 to 5.2 tons per hectare in 2004, 
matching the yields in industrial countries (FAOSTAT, 2006). In turn, this has
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allowed China to reduce the area of land it devoted to cereal production (although its 
total production increased from 280 million tons to 410 million tons). The area under 
cereals dropped from approximately 95 million hectares to 80 million hectares in 
1980-2004 (FAOSTAT, 2006). Hence, among developing countries, China is an 
exception in achieving high levels of cereal yields while also reducing the dominance 
of cereal production in its cropping pattern.
Figure 1-2 Average growth in cereal yields by major regions, 1980-2004
m m i
Africa Near East Latin Amer East & South Asia China 
South of & Caribbean South East
Sahara Asia (exc.
China)
3.5 
3
2.5 
2
1.5 
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
■ 1980-1989 ■ 1990-2004
Source: FAOSTAT, 2006.
Figure 1-3 Trends in cereal yields by major region and country, 1980-2004
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There has been some transition from low to high-value cropping patterns in some 
developing regions, such as the East and South-east Asia and in Latin America. For 
instance, the total size of primary oil crops increased by 80 percent in eastern South­
east Asia, from 11 million hectares in 1980 to 20 million hectares in 2004 
(FAOSTAT, 2006). This region has also managed to reach by far the highest yields 
in primary oil crops. The yields rose from 0.6 ton per hectare to 1.8 t/ha in 1980-
2004. Combining increased size and higher productivity, total production increased 
by 400 per cent in the same period. The size of the area under oil crops grew by 
almost 100 per cent n Latin America, from 23 million hectares in 1980 to 46 million 
hectares in 2004, bringing a total production growth of 220 percent (FAOSTAT, 
2006). The transition from cereals to higher value cropping patterns has been 
stagnant in other developing regions.
As for growth trends in the agricultural sector, there have been marked variations 
between different regions. As is shown in Figure 1.4, in low and middle income 
developing countries, the sector grew by an annual average rate of around 3 per cent 
in the 1980s, before it slowed down to slightly above 2 per cent in 1990-2003 (World 
Bank, 2005a). Latin America and the Caribbean showed the poorest performance 
among the developing regions. The sector grew at approximately 2 per cent a year in 
1980-2003. Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa’s performance was very poor with 2.3 per 
cent a year in the 1980s, and 3.3 per cent a year in 1990-2003. On the other hand, 
East Asia and Pacific illustrated the highest growth rates with 5 per cent a year in the 
1980s, and 3 per cent a year between 1990 and 2003 (World Bank, 2005a). 
Therefore, except for East and South-east Asia, the growth performance of the 
agricultural sector has been poor.
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Figure 1-4 Average annual growth rates in the agricultural sector by region, 
1980-2003.
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005a).
1.2.2 Limited Globalization in Agriculture
The process of economic globalization in the agricultural sector, measured here as 
the share of international trade in total output, has been far from truly global. There 
has been limited progress in the extent of trade liberalization achieved through 
multilateral negotiations. Compared to manufacturing and services, the share and the 
volume of agricultural exports in global trade have remained low. More importantly, 
developed countries have continued to dominate global agricultural trade, not only 
by maintaining their high shares but also by shaping the international trade system 
through their trade policies.
Between 1980 and 2004, the volume of trade in manufactures grew at a substantially
higher rate than agricultural commodities. As is shown in Figure 1.5, the annual
average growth in trade in manufactures was six per cent, doubling its average
growth as a sector (WTO, 2005). On the other hand, the volume of trade in
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agricultural goods increased by only less than three per cent on average, which was 
close to the sector’s annual growth rate. In 2004, the value of agricultural exports 
amounted to US$ 780 billion, representing a share of slightly less than nine per cent 
of total global trade (WTO, 2006a). Hence, the process of globalization has been 
relatively limited in the agricultural sector as a whole over the past 25 years.
Figure 1-5 Annual average change in world trade by product volume, 1980-2004
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Moreover, the bulk of agricultural trade has been carried out by a small number of 
developed countries. In 2004, European exports constituted almost half of world’s 
total. North America accounted for another 17 per cent. The combined value of the 
two regions was almost US$ 500 billion (see Figure 1.6) (WTO, 2006a). The 
remaining amount, which constituted 35 per cent of global agricultural exports, was 
undertaken by developing countries. As is shown in Figure 1.7 below, the share of 
Asia was slightly less than 20 per cent, while South and Central America accounted 
for 10 per cent of the total. The value of Africa’s exports was less than US$ 28 
billion, representing three per cent of the total. The share of the Middle East was 
even lower with one per cent (WTO, 2006a). As such, developed countries have
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maintained the lion’s share of global trade in agricultural commodities while 
developing countries were only involved in small proportions.
Figure 1-6 Value of world agricultural exports by major regions, 2004
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Figure 1-7 Share of world agricultural exports by major regions, 2004
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1.2.3 WTO Negotiations: One Way Street?
The Uruguay Round of the GATT/WTO initiated negotiations on agricultural trade 
policies at the multilateral level. Reducing protectionism and subsidies, thereby 
increasing trade volumes in agriculture were the main objectives of the negotiations.3 
However, both the Uruguay Round and the following Doha Round have not led to 
substantial reductions in various forms of applied protection. Average tariffs in 
agriculture in developed countries, for instance, remained two to four times higher 
than those in manufacturing (Aksoy, 2005, p. 52). More importantly, domestic 
support and export subsidy policies of developed countries, which were singled out 
as major trade disturbing practices, have remained almost intact.
During the WTO negotiations, the most heated debates took place on the issue of 
trade disturbing practices, in the form of domestic support and export subsidies, 
pursued by developed countries, which have a direct effect on developing country 
producers. Between 1986 and 2004, total agricultural subsidies for farmers in OECD 
countries amounted to an annual average of US$ 335 billion. It remained above US$ 
300 billion over the entire period, before reaching US$ 380 billion in 2004 (see 
Figure 1.8) (OECD, 2006a). This amount was about US$ 100 billion higher than the 
value of total agricultural exports by developing countries in 2004.
3 For a comprehensive review of the law o f international trade in agriculture, see Desta (2002).
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Figure 1-8 OECD countries total (agricultural) support estimate*, 1986-2004
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support in a given year.
Such high levels of domestic support, including export subsidies,4 create an 
extremely unfair trade ground where the farmers of developing countries have 
limited power to compete, although they often have outstanding cost effectiveness. 
In West Africa, for instance, the cost of production for cotton was less than one third 
of the cost of production in the US which is even higher than world prices (FAO, 
2003, p. 20). Nevertheless, US farmers were still able to control the largest share in 
global cotton markets, which led to an estimated loss of US $ 260 million for 22 
cotton producing, least developed countries in the 2002/03 season (Goreux, 2004, p. 
16). Likewise, sugar producers of the EU continued production, until recently, with 
the help of US$ 2.3 billion subsidies, although their production costs were well 
above world prices and double the costs of production in developing countries (FAO,
4 Among 27 countries reported to have export subsidies 17 of them were developed countries. In 
particular, the EU was responsible for the bulk of export subsidies (Matthews, 2001, p. 81; Ataman, 
2005, p. 50).
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2003, p. 21). Therefore, global trade in agriculture has been fundamentally biased 
against the farmers of developing countries.
In sum, the process of rural transformation has been stagnant in the vast majority of 
developing countries. Most arable land has continued to be under low-value cereals 
at low yields. The transition from low to high-value cropping patterns has been slow 
too (except in East Asia and Latin America). As a result, the growth performance of 
the sector generally has been low, and its share of GDP has declined. However, it has 
continued to employ large proportions of the labour force since the labour transition 
away from the agricultural sector has been stagnant. A combination of stagnant or 
slow transformation both from and within agriculture suggests that the agricultural 
sector has become a labour trap for millions of rural workers undertaking low- 
productivity and low-income activities. Moreover, since the bulk of global 
agricultural trade has been undertaken by developed countries, and they have 
continued to maintain their trade distorting policies creating an unfair trade ground, 
the vast majority of agricultural producers in developing countries have been left out 
of the process of economic globalization.
1.3 Small-farm differentiation
Small-scale farming has continued to be the main economic activity for the bulk of
the rural labour force -  as the agricultural sector is dominated by around 500 million
farms across the developing world. Based on FAO’s database, 85 per cent of these
farms are small scale, operating less than 2 hectares (Nagayets, 2005, p.356). Asia is
home to almost 90 per cent of these small farms, while the biggest proportion is
located in China and India. Over the last couple of decades, average farm size has
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been getting smaller in the majority of developing regions. For instance, in China it 
fell from 0.56 hectares in 1980 to 0.4 hectares in 1999 (Nagayets, 2005, p.361).5 In 
India, it has followed a similar trend by decreasing from 2.2 hectares in 1950 to 1.4 
hectares in 1995-96. Countries like DR Congo, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Philippines 
experienced trends of increasing number of small farms and decreasing average farm 
size (Nagayets, 2005, p. 361).
Since the process of labour movement from agriculture to higher productivity sectors 
has been slow or non-existent, which has also been accompanied by stagnation in the 
agricultural sectors, small farmers have faced increasing impoverishment. This is 
indicated by the fact that more than 70 per cent of the world’s poor -  some 900 
million people -  live in rural areas, a majority of them relying on small-scale farming 
for their livelihoods (IFAD, 2001, p. 18). Demographic trends in relation to the size 
of rural labour force, low labour demand from non-agricultural sectors combined by 
a slow progress in agricultural modernisation leads to a situation whereby poverty 
inevitably prevails amongst small farm households.
1.4 An historical account of rural transformation
The question of rural transformation is an old one going back to the school of neo­
classical political economy. It was studied widely from the 1950s and 1960s until the 
early 1980s, reflecting the political economic realities of each period. In the 1950s, 
agriculture was assumed to have a passive role in economic development, and labour 
transition from agriculture to the industry was the primary focus. In the 1960s, it was
5 Cited from (Fan and Chan-Kang, 2003).
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considered to be an active driver of growth along the path of economic development 
through its labour, capital, food, exchange and market linkages with industrial 
sectors. In that period, leftist political economy literature dealt with the political 
dimensions of rural transformation and the distribution of resources and power 
(Harriss, 1982, pp. 15-16; Timmer, 1998, p.118). Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
research and policy focus on labour and agricultural transformation almost 
disappeared. The grand visions of structural transformation gave way to the new 
wave of micro level studies championing the ‘local’. However, there has been a 
recent resurrection of the question of economic transformation, in a renewed debate 
on the role of agriculture and the future viability of small family farms in the context 
of globalization.
1.4.1 The role of agriculture
In the 1950s, heavy industrialization was the primary focus of academic and policy 
thinking, and agriculture -  its traditional form -  was said to have a passive role in 
economic development. Its main purpose was to provide an unlimited supply of 
labour to the modem sector. W. Arthur Lewis (1954) developed a dual economy 
model focusing on the mechanism through which large pools of rural labour -  whose 
marginal productivity was approaching zero -  could be transferred to higher 
productivity activities in the capitalist sector. He argued that the modem sector 
would enjoy high profits and expand through reinvestments, as existing wage rates 
would not increase until it absorbed all the ‘surplus’ labour. As such, the primary 
role of the traditional agricultural sector was to provide cheap labour to the modem 
sector.
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The concept of ‘disguised’ unemployment in the traditional sector was one of the 
fundamental pillars of Lewis’s model. He argued that if a part of the labour force was 
removed from the traditional sector to the modem sector, the total amount of output 
produced in the traditional sector would not change (Lewis, 1954, p. 141). In 
particular, he used the example of small family farms, arguing that because farm 
sizes were so small, if some members of the household found employment in other 
sectors, the remaining members could continue to produce the same amount of 
output (Lewis, 1954, p. 141). Expanding on the same concept, Sen argued that this 
would be the case when the remaining labour force would raise the amount of work 
they do, that is to say, if they increase their labour productivity (Sen, 1966, p. 429).6 
Therefore, the transfer of labour would create economy-wide efficiencies as the 
existing level of output produced in the traditional sector could be produced with a 
smaller labour force, while the total output produced in the entire economy would 
increase with the same total labour force. Hence, Lewis’s model was based on the 
process of transformation from agriculture driven by labour demand from the modem 
urban industry.
In that period, having analyzed the available time-series data from the 19th century 
United Kingdom, United States, Japan and early 20th century USSR, Kuznets (1966) 
illustrated the mechanisms through which the rural transformation would take place. 
He argued with these cases that both the share of agricultural labour and its 
contribution to total output had declined rapidly, although at different paces in
6 Sen (1966, p. 431) also argued that even if the marginal productivity o f labour in the agricultural 
sector was not zero, but positive, i.e. that the transfer of labour would affect the total output, it does 
not mean that there is no surplus labour, especially when productivity is measured in terms of hours of 
work rather than the number of labourers. For him, what mattered was not the existence of labour 
surplus, but the size of the surplus and the response that the agricultural sector would give to the 
removal of the surplus labour (the elasticity o f output with respect to labour size) (Sen, 1966, p. 432).
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different countries. More importantly, in most of the cases, the share of agricultural 
labour declined faster than the share of agriculture in total output (Timmer, 1998, 
p. 120), which had the effect of increasing labour productivity in the agricultural 
sector. As a result, labour productivity in agriculture increased more rapidly than in 
non-agriculture, which narrowed the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural 
productivity (Timmer, 1998, p.120). Hence, the process of labour transition was the 
driving force of the rural transformation.
By the 1960s, agriculture was attributed a more active role in economic 
transformation through its backward and forward linkages with the non-agricultural 
sectors. For instance, Johnston and Mellor specified five mechanisms through which 
agricultural growth contributed to overall economic development (Johnston and 
Mellor, 1961, p. 571). First, it would supply food for the growing non-agricultural 
sector. Food supplies growing at a pace that matches rising demand, would keep food 
prices stable. This would keep wages down, increasing profits, investments and 
further economic growth (Johnston and Mellor, 1961, p. 573). Second, it would 
contribute to foreign exchange earnings, which was considered vital especially in the 
early stages of development.7 Third, it would supply a cheap labour force to the 
manufacturing and to other non-agricultural sectors.8 Fourth, agricultural growth 
would provide capital for investments which was scarce in many developing 
countries. Finally, lack of purchasing power in the countryside was considered to be
7 Nevertheless, Johnston and Mellor (1961, p. 575) warned against the possibility of substantial price 
declines in export crops, if a number of countries expand their production altogether. Therefore, they 
stressed the importance of diversification in export commodities.
8 However, Johnston and Mellor (1961, pp. 575-576) argued that the labour transfer might not be as 
easy as Lewis had envisaged. This is due to the availability of good potential for expansion in the 
agricultural sector itself, and investment constraints in the modern sector. Nevertheless, they argued 
that there would be no significant labour supply constraint so long as agricultural productivity is 
enhanced (Johnston and Mellor, 1961, p. 576).
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a major constraint on the expansion of the manufacturing sector, so agricultural 
growth would increase the income base of rural consumers, which would in turn 
stimulate the market for industrial goods (Johnston and Mellor, 1961, pp. 571-572).9 
It was a model giving prominence to agriculture in economic transformation.
1.4.2 The role of small farming
In the 1960s and 1970s, understanding the process of agricultural growth itself was 
of great importance in understanding its role in economic development in general 
(Staatz and Eicher, 1998, p. 11). This required the structural analysis of the 
agricultural sector which was characterized by the widespread existence of small- 
scale farms in developing countries. Accordingly, there were heated debates on the 
role of small farms in agricultural growth and in economic development, between 
those who argued that small farms are economically and socially backward, and 
those who believed that they are efficient and hence can play a key role in economic 
development. It was actually a reinvention of an old debate dating back to the school 
of classical political economy which analyzed small-scale farming in the context of 
the emergence of capitalism in the late 19th century. That debate between the 
populists (and neo-populists) and the orthodox socialists had substantial impact on 
development thinking in the 1960s and 1970s.
1.4.3 The populist vs. the socialist orthodoxy
The populist and neo-populist school emerged at the end of the 19th century in 
Russia, and it extended its intellectual influence throughout the following century.
9 They argued that investment decisions were not only influenced by the availability of capital, as 
Lewis had envisaged, but also by demand conditions in the market (Johnston and Mellor, 1961, p. 
580).
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The theoretical foundation of neo-populism was established by Chayanov in the 
1910s. It was based on the idealization of the dual character of small-scale farming. 
Combining the features of both entrepreneur and labourer, it was argued that small- 
scale family production was the most efficient form in agriculture. The idea of an 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity was one of the fundamental 
backbones of this theory. It was argued that family producers had the ability to 
reduce their consumption, increase their productivity and re-allocate their land and 
labour endowments whenever necessary. For instance, when/if farm size gets 
smaller, the household would have the ability to increase its labour productivity 
through over-exploiting its family labour without incurring any marginal costs.10 The 
equilibrium points between ‘social demand satisfaction and the drudgery of family 
labour’ would define the upper and lower limits of its volume of economic activity 
(Chayanov, 1966, p. 53).11 Such an assumed flexibility in production, cost and factor 
allocation inevitably led to the analytical isolation of small-scale family farming 
from its historical context.
Kautsky’s The Agrarian Question (1988), on the other hand, was fundamental in 
terms of the evolution of the socialist orthodoxy and the German social democracy. 
In his book, he began by taking an evolutionist approach arguing for the elimination 
of small farming. He argued that like petty commodity production in manufacturing, 
the demise of small-scale farming in agriculture was inevitable in the process of
10 Later, this was also explained by Sen (1964) who argued that the fact that the opportunity cost o f  
family labour was low led to productivity growth. It was assumed that marginal productivity of labour 
was equal to wage rate, which was also equal to the opportunity cost o f family labour. Accordingly, as 
long as the chance of finding a wage work was equal to 1, the productivity o f family labourer would 
be equal to the productivity o f wage labour (given the formula of ‘productivity = wage rate * 
probability of getting job’). However, because the probability was lower than 1 in most cases, the 
productivity o f family labourer was to be above that o f wage labourer.
1 That is to say, the point(s) where the marginal utility and marginal labour functions meet 
(Chayanov, 1966, p. 81).
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capital accumulation.12 A differentiation process would take place through the 
dissolution of many middle-class peasants into rural wage labourers, and the 
transformation of a few into capitalist farmers. However, in the following chapters, 
Kautsky’s investigation of Prussian agricultural censuses -  empirically indicating the 
persistence of small farms -  forced him to modify his views on the differentiation 
process. Then, he began to explain why the small farms might have persisted. He 
mostly attributed it to the ‘peasant art of starving’ rather than to their efficiency and 
flexibility (Kautsky, 1988, p. 114). What made them tied to their lands was over­
exploitation of family labour (which he called ‘drudgery’) through the under­
consumption and overwork of children and women.13 As such, he made a clear 
causal linkage between small-scale farming and mass poverty.
In the politically polarized period of the 1960s and 1970s, the debate between the 
neo-populist and the ‘leftist’ political economy schools was renewed. Lipton (1977) 
politicized the small-farm orthodoxy through his ‘urban bias’ metaphor. He argued 
that intrinsically efficient family farms were left to poverty as a result of the 
alignment among urban capitalists and labourers, large-scale farmers and the state. 
For Lipton, the fallacious belief that small-scale farming was backward had made 
urban dwellers favour large-scale farming.14 For orthodox socialists, on the other 
hand, the demise of small-scale farming was inevitable through the socio-economic 
differentiation process as envisaged by the early socialists. For instance, looking at 
the context of political economic relationships among the state, external actors and
12 He was following the line of argument proposed by Lenin (1977).
13 He stressed the existence o f a ‘poverty trap’ by emphasising the extent of child labour: ‘child-labour 
often begins as soon as the children can walk’ (Kautsky 1988, p. 115). His gender sensitivity at that 
time also deserves attention.
14 The argument against those who considered small farms as backward goes back to Schultz (1964) 
who argued that small farms use their limited resources efficiently.
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domestic capital in post-colonial Africa, Bernstein (1979, 1988) defined small-scale 
family production as a by-product of the commoditization initiated by colonial 
powers for particular economic and ideological reasons. As such, the leftist literature 
dealt directly with the political dimensions of agricultural development within the 
broader concept of rural development (Harriss, 1982, pp. 15-16; Timmer, 1998, 
p.118).15 The central focus of their analysis was on the ownership and control of 
resources and power (Harriss, 1982, p. 22).
1.4.4 The 1980s: micro is beautiful
In the 1980s and 1990s, the grand visions and overarching themes of economic 
transformation gave way to micro-level studies with ‘post-modern’ themes. The 
policy and research focus on the role of agriculture in economic development almost 
disappeared. While the dominant ‘Washington Consensus’ was paying no particular 
attention to agricultural development in policy formation (de Janvry, et al., 1997), 
and exclusively concentrating on market-driven growth, academia lost its interest in 
the big questions of agricultural and rural transformation. Instead, a new form of 
micro level ‘participatory’ models, and ‘rapid appraisal’ studies championing the 
‘local’ became fashionable (Ellis and Biggs, 2001, p. 443). This approach led by, 
among others, Chambers (1997, pp. 54-55) opposed macro level quantitative 
approaches, and argued for participatory approaches, emphasizing the norms and 
knowledge of local people (Chambers, 1997, pp. 238-40).16 The economic dimension 
of this approach appeared in studies of livelihoods and their diversification (Ellis and
15 The leftist school dealt with the issue as part o f broader and historical themes such as the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, and the emergence o f capitalism in agriculture: see, for instance, the 
Brenner debate in (Aston and Philpin, 1985).
16 Chambers (1993, p. 8) considered the perceptions of ‘outsider’ professionals as biased because of 
their ‘power, wealth and knowledge’.
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Biggs, 2001, p. 444-5). As such, over the 1980s and 1990s, the old political 
economic debate on the rural transformation was replaced by a new wave of 
apolitical studies championing local identity, culture and micro-economics.17
1.4.5 The 2000s: agro pessimism vs. neo-populism
The debate on agriculture is now regaining its much-deserved momentum at a more 
appropriate macro level. During the last five years, there has been a fresh debate on 
the role of agriculture and small farms in economic development and poverty 
eradication in the context of globalization. It seems to be taking place between two 
competing camps: the ‘neo-populist small-farm orthodoxy’ school versus the agro­
pessimist ‘rethinking rural development’ school. The former relies on the old 
paradigm of small-farm efficiency in arguing that pro-poor growth depends on 
family farms, while the latter takes a sceptical view on the future viability of small 
farms, emphasizing the role of non-agricultural activities in poverty alleviation and 
economic development.
The ‘small-farm’ school led by Lipton argues that since small farms dominate the 
rural space in terms of the proportion of agricultural value-added, area and 
workforce, their resilience and persistence can be taken as an indication of their 
present and future viability (Lipton, 2005, p.l). The members of this school of 
thought have long argued that small farms are advantageous in the early stages of 
development, since their labour-related transaction costs are low (Lipton, 2005, p. 4). 
The so-called inverse relationship between farm size and productivity constitutes the
17 On micro-economics, important studies were carried out on the ‘rationality’ o f peasant behaviour at 
the individual level, see for example Bardhan (1989, 1999) and Stiglitz (1989).
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theoretical foundation of this argument. The neo-populist school takes an optimistic 
approach in relation to the future viability of small farms and envisages that they can 
still play a major role in economic development and poverty alleviation (Hazell and 
Diao, 2005, p. 33).
The ‘rethinking rural development’ school, on the other hand, offers a pessimistic 
view on the role of agriculture in economic development in the context of 
globalization. In particular, writers of this persuasion question the economic viability 
of small-scale farming. They stress that due to the continuous decline of agricultural 
commodity prices and the removal of input subsidies in developing countries, the 
profitability of the sector as a whole has shrunk over the past 30 years, putting 
pressure on small-farms (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, p. 404). They also look at 
global food chains, and claim that small-farms are not competitive at the global level. 
Higher transaction costs and institutional development failures disconnecting small 
farms from dynamic markets constitute major disadvantages for small farms (Kydd, 
2002, p. 2; Kydd and Dorward, 2001, p. 471). Therefore, agro-pessimists suggest that 
diversification from agricultural to non-agricultural activities would play the major 
role in rural economic development (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, p. 404).
This thesis takes a position in the new debate between the neo-populists and the 
agro-pessimists on the role of agriculture and small-scale farming in poverty 
alleviation and economic development. It distances itself from any deterministically 
pessimistic or optimistic position reflecting the ideological backdrop of the debate 
dating back to the 19th century. It argues that the neo-populist paradigm of small- 
farm efficiency envisaging that small-scale farming can still play a major role in
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economic development is questionable for a large number of small farms in 
developing countries. Similarly, the thesis positions itself away from the 
deterministically pessimistic view of the ‘rethinking rural development’ school on 
the future viability of small farms. Hence, rather than subscribing fully to either 
school’s line of argument the thesis develops a realistic and pragmatic approach, 
informed by local and regional variations, and aimed at synthesising the strong points 
of the two schools.
1.5 Research themes and questions
Is there any case in the developing world where the question of rural transformation 
has been completed over the last quarter of a century? The answer is ‘no’. Then, ‘is 
the question of rural transformation the same’ must follow, for which the answer is 
again negative. The economic, political, social and demographic factors that affected 
the process have changed. In other words, the variables determining the process of 
rural transformation have changed, interacted with others and multiplied in number. 
Therefore, the simple replication of any historical path that today’s developed 
countries had followed cannot be envisaged for today’s developing countries. Hence, 
there is a challenging need for a renewed treatment of the question against the new 
background of economic globalization.
This thesis deals with four major themes and subsequent research questions which 
will be probed in the name o f Turkey:
• First, the thesis attempts to answer the questions of why the transformation
from agriculture has been slow. What are the major factors affecting the
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process of labour transition from the agricultural to the manufacturing and 
service sectors? How do these factors interact?
• Second, it focuses on the process of transformation within agriculture and 
investigates why it has been stagnant. It analyzes the major factors affecting 
land productivity and the transition from low to high-value cropping patters. 
How do ecological, technological, social, market-related and political factors 
affect the transformation within agriculture?
• Third, the thesis focuses on the process of small-farm differentiation. What 
are the factors that determine the predominance of small farms and how do 
they affect the process of scale differentiation?
• Fourth, it investigates the future viability of small farms and the potential 
likelihood of the completion of rural transformation in the era of increasing 
economic globalization. What would be the necessary conditions within 
which the major factors affecting the transformation both from and within 
agriculture operate to make the process move towards completion?
1.5.1 Hypotheses
Based on these research themes and questions, the major causal hypotheses are as 
follows:
The process of transformation from agriculture has been slow. The size of rural
labour force has been growing.
(i) A combination of rural and urban population growth and limited 
absorption capacity of non-agricultural sectoral growth slows down the
36
process of labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities.
(ii) The low level of educational attainment of the rural labour force 
constitutes a major obstacle in the labour transition from the rural to the 
urban sectors -  as the urban demand for low-skilled labour is declining.
(iii) Within the realm of the rural economy, the transition to non-agricultural 
activities takes place through forward and backward linkages between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Improved commuting and 
transportation infrastructure reduces the physical and communicational 
isolation of rural areas and eases the occupational transition within the 
rural space.
The process of transformation within agriculture has been stagnant -  as low
yield staple food production dominates the sector and the transition to high-value
cropping patterns is slow:
(iv) Due to the lack of substantial progress in technology, agro-ecological 
circumstances constraint yields and cropping patterns at the local level. 
Agro-ecological variations constitute the major factor determining 
variations in agricultural productivity.
(v) Since agricultural prices, at the global and national levels, have been 
falling over the last three decades, the terms of trade have been 
unfavourable for agricultural commodities; there is a significant 
profitability constraint on the sector as a whole.
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(vi) The low income elasticity of demand for staple foods and demand 
restrictions for higher value agricultural commodities discourages 
agricultural growth and transition to higher value cropping patterns.
(vii) ‘Ascribed’ inequality (inequity based on social and political factors) in 
the distribution of income-generating assets has a negative impact on 
agricultural growth -  as it creates serious inefficiencies in the allocation 
of resources.
(viii) The ‘structural adjustment’ programs and the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
have weakened institutional capacities that are vital for the process of 
agricultural development. Through the impact of their tight public 
policies, the neo-liberal doctrine has created a macro-economic 
environment which is not conducive for the transformation within 
agriculture.
(ix) The extent of economic globalization in the agricultural sector has been 
limited. The share of agricultural goods in total trade has been relatively 
small. The further integration of small farms is hampered by the lack of 
institutional development at the domestic level and by continuous market 
access restrictions, domestic support and export subsidy policies of 
developed countries at the global level.
Small farms have continued to dominate the agricultural sector:
(x) Due to low land and labour productivity in the agricultural sector and the 
lack of labour transition, small farming has become a huge labour trap 
with massive unemployment and under-employment. If a large part of the
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rural labour force is removed from the agricultural sector to the non- 
agricultural sectors, the total amount of agricultural output would not 
change (Lewis’s ‘disguised unemployment’). As such, there is a huge 
potential for economy-wide Pareto efficiency gains.
(xi) The importance of small-scale agriculture as a major provider of capital 
and foreign exchange, and as a market for non-agricultural consumables 
has been diminishing. The agricultural sector dominated by small farms 
no longer plays a central role in overall economic development at the 
national level. However, it continues to play a crucial role in local 
economic development through its production, consumption and 
investment linkages.
(xii) Due to a combination of weak non-agricultural demand for rural labour 
failing to reduce the size of rural labour force and weak sectoral growth in 
agriculture failing to create substantial stimulation for competitive farms 
to expand their operational capacity, the process of scale-differentiation 
through land concentration does not take place.
1.5.2 The position of Turkey
This thesis tests the above hypotheses on Turkey. As a middle income developing 
country, it is an excellent illustration of how rural transformation has been slow over 
the recent decades. One-third of the total population continues to live and work in the 
agricultural sector which highlights a situation where the share of agriculture in total 
output is diminishing without this leading to a labour shift the non-agricultural 
sectors. It also offers a case where the factors leading to the poor performance of the 
agricultural sector can be assessed effectively. Since the sector is dominated by
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around four million small farms (less than six hectare on average), it allows for the 
investigations of the future of small farms too.
The contribution of agriculture to Turkey’s GDP steadily dropped from 26 per cent 
in 1980 to 17.5 per cent in 1990 and to 11.2 per cent at in 2004 (SPO, 2006). 
However, more than 35 per cent of the total population, namely 22 million out of 70 
million, currently lives and works in rural areas. There has not been any significant 
decline in the absolute number of 22-23 million people living in rural areas for the 
last three decades (SIS, 1984a; 1991; 2003c). Meanwhile, the size of agricultural 
population has actually risen. On the other hand, the process of agricultural 
development has been stagnant. Between 1980 and 2003, while the country’s GDP 
increased by an annual rate of 3.7 per cent, the average growth rate of the agricultural 
sector was only one per cent (SPO, 2006).
1.5.3 Turkish debate
Similar to Latin America and India, the mid-1960s witnessed a vigorous debate
amongst the Turkish intelligentsia, especially among its leftist contingent, on
‘developmentalism’ and the question of rural transformation. The controversial issue
of land distribution and its socio-political ramifications was the main focus of
analysis. Although the major arguments were based on a few anthropological studies,
land censuses of poor reliability, they constituted a base for further debate and 
1research. A particular debate between Boratav and Erdost on agrarian social 
structures was one of the departure points. While Boratav (1969a; 1969b) argued for
18 Among others, Karpat (1960), Yasa (1965), Kolars (1967), Kiray and Hinderink (1970) provided 
important early contributions to the field of rural studies in Turkey. More recent studies include those 
referred to in the text. Aksit (1985; 1988; 1993) summarizes the general trends in that literature 
between 1950 and 1990.
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the predominance of family-farm production under the banner of market relations, 
Erdost (1969a; 1969b) based his argument on the historical dominance of feudal 
landlords over the peasantry.19 This debate continued throughout the 1960s and the 
1970s (Boratav 1969a, 1969b, 1970, 1980; Culhaoglu 1970; Erdost 1969a, 1969b, 
1969c, 1969d, 1970, 1984; Kutlay 1970a, 1970b; Selik 1969).
New actors began to take part in the debate at the end of the 1970s. Along the lines 
of the neo-populist school, some scholars, such as Keyder, argued that small-scale 
family production dominated the rural space, and they were the most efficient and 
stable form of production in agriculture (Keyder, 1983, p. 46). Having studied the 
data collected through a research undertaken between 1978 and 1981, Keyder argued 
that small-scale family production in Turkish agriculture could be analysed through 
three distinct village ‘transformation paths’ in addition to ‘capitalist farming’ 
(Keyder, 1983, p. 34).20 Based on the predominance of small-scale farming, he 
specified a typology which was evaluated through five village cases reflecting these 
‘distinct’ transformation trajectories.
The first village represented the ‘production for subsistence’ type. It was suggested 
that this type would eventually become extinct. Since there was no substantial 
potential for surplus production, the village was expected to be abandoned through 
rural-to-urban migration (Keyder, 1983, pp. 37-38). The second village represented 
the ‘subordinate commercialisation’ type. In this case, it was argued that the
19 For a substantial review of the debate, see Seddon and Margulies (1984), Margulies (1985) and 
Aydin (1987).
20 Keyder’s (1983) article was originally written as an interim report o f the research project called 
‘Rural Transformation in Turkey and Seasonal Migration’ funded by the Population Council. The 
project was undertaken by A. Akcay, B. Aksit, T. Arcanli, H. Inan, N. Kalaycioglu, C. Keyder, A. 
Saktanber, D. Seddon, and N. Sirman-Eralp.
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availability of supplementary income through seasonal employment would postpone 
the dissolution of small-scale family production (Keyder, 1983, p. 40). The next two 
villages represented the ‘petty commodity production with accumulation’ type. It 
was considered to be the most stable form of production, since small-scale family 
farms could produce surplus without relying on external labour. The low supervision 
costs of family labour were seen as the fundamental pillar of the process of the 
reproduction of the family farm (Keyder, 1983, pp. 40-42). The fifth village was 
located in South-eastern Anatolia. Since its production structure was polarised 
between landless peasants and a landlord enclosing the land, it was considered to be 
a historically exceptional case, confined to the region. Because of the management 
difficulties and high monitoring costs of large-scale production, it was argued that 
this type would eventually dissolve into small-scale family units (Keyder, 1983, 
p.46).
The methodological framework of this approach was re-appraised critically by Aksit 
(1993, p.200) -  who had been involved in the ‘paths of rural transformation’ project - 
on the basis that it took villages as an entity, ignoring variations and the process of 
differentiation within the village. It also received criticism for not having 
investigated the villages in their regional contexts (Hann, 1985, p. 108). It provided a 
descriptive analysis of certain patterns (‘paths’) of rural transitions, yet it did not 
account for many important factors such as the role of the state, national policy 
environment, local resource base, technology, market mechanisms (those affecting 
prices, demand, supply, productivity, profitability etc.). Hence, it was argued to be 
abstract and simplistic, failing to capture high levels of variation and complexity in 
rural areas (Stirling, 1993, p. 14).
42
On the other hand, scholars such as Cinar and Silier (1979) followed the orthodox 
socialist line, outlined earlier in the 1960s by Erdost and others, arguing for the 
ultimate differentiation of small farms through land concentration leading to a 
structure that would be based on landless workers dominated by capitalist farmers. 
They analysed official land censuses and argued that there had been a trend of 
increasing land inequality in rural areas, indicating that the process of differentiation 
had been underway.
With the beginnings of the 1980s, while the Turkish political economy was 
experiencing a turning point from ‘import substitution industrialization’ to export-led 
‘neo-liberalism’, these debates suddenly vanished, and studying agricultural and rural 
development has become a passi fashion. Academic interests, following 
international trends, moved to micro level studies addressing sociological issues such 
as migration, identity and gender.
For instance, Abadan-Unat (1993), examined the socio-political aspects of external 
migration in rural Turkey. She portrayed ‘a chain reaction of social change’, ranging 
from technological innovation to social stratification and political participation, 
caused by external migration in Turkish villages. In a more specific regional context, 
a group of scholars examined temporary and seasonal population movements in 
South-eastern Anatolia (Aksit, et al., 1996). The trends of migration along with their 
major pull and push factors were investigated in an empirical study. Again, in the 
same regional settings, the socio-economic implications of the GAP irrigation 
project, were studied by Aksit and Akcay (1997). The subject of gender relations in
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rural Turkey, at the village and household levels, was also a point of interest. While 
Incirlioglu (1993) was studying marriage and gender relations with respect to the 
general level of rural transformation in Central Anatolia, Hann (1985; 1990; 1993) 
examined it in a tea-producing village in North-eastern Anatolia with respect to 
gender division of labour. However rare, some ethnic and religious identity studies 
were also undertaken. Tribe and kinship among the Kurds in Eastern Turkey (Yalcin- 
Heckmann, 1991) and the impact of religious identities, namely of the sects of Alevi 
and Sunni (Shankland, 1993), was linked with social change in rural Turkey.
Turkish agriculture from economic and policy perspectives have recently become a 
point of some interest again after Turkey started its accession negotiations with the 
European Union in 2005. Since the negotiations on agriculture are expected to be the 
toughest part of the entire negotiation process, the agricultural sector, albeit to a large 
extent from a technical and bureaucratic point of view, has been regaining some 
scholarly attention.21 Nevertheless, there is still a large gap of knowledge and 
analysis on the various dimensions of rural transformation. In particular, the role of 
agriculture and small-scale farming in the country’s economic development has been 
neglected. Therefore, this thesis aims at filling a ‘gap’ in rural development literature 
and policy thinking by (re)studying rural transformation in Turkey in the context of 
globalization.
21 For examples, see (Akder, et al, 1990), (Akder, et al, 2000), (Cakmak, et al., 1999), (Cakmak and 
Kasnakoglu, 2002), (Cakmak and Akder, 2005), (Grethe, 2004), (European Commission, 2003), 
(European Commission, 2004).
44
1.5.4 Methodology: longitudinal approach
The analytical boundaries of research in this thesis have been drawn at the global and 
national levels. However, there is a need for testing the research hypotheses at the 
local level too. Therefore, this thesis seeks to expand its explanatory power by 
combining its analysis at the country level with case studies at the local level.22 It is 
envisaged that the micro-level village case studies would strengthen the study by 
providing some in-depth analysis. For macro-level trends, the thesis relies on official 
surveys and censuses that have been undertaken over the last three decades. For 
micro analysis, since the subject studied here is essentially about social change, this 
research is designed to use the longitudinal tool in order to capture the actual 
mechanisms of rural transformation over the last 25 years.23
The selection of particular cases was based on a combination of theoretical, 
methodological and practical considerations. The primary criterion was that potential 
cases had to have been studied before, so that they would be taken as the first wave 
of the longitudinal study. Since this research is investigating rural transformation 
over the last two to three decades, case studies had to have been undertaken around 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. They were also required to have some content
22 Macro level surveys are more quantifiable, representative, comparable, but they suffer from the lack 
of sociological relational links and in turn being ‘sterile’ (Appadurai, 1989, p. 252). Even if they offer 
generalised trends and causal relationships, they do so at the risk o f reflecting occurrences rather than 
‘realities’. Hence, they are likely to miss alternative causal forces (Harriss, 1989, p. 139). They are 
informative in terms o f extension but deficient in terms o f depth. On the other hand, micro-level 
ethnographical approaches have the ability to perform reliable in-depth investigations. Yet, their 
credibility is weakened because of their unknown representativeness at broader levels. Consequently, 
if both levels o f analyses are considered simultaneously, it appears that the plausibility of one analysis 
can be enhanced by the supplementation of the other (Collins, 1981, p. 94).
23 The longitudinal method offers a dynamic tool enhancing the analysis o f the magnitude and speed 
of social change by comparing measurements at two different points in time. It improves the 
description of intra- and inter- unit (individual, household, community) transitions overtime by 
highlighting differences occurring in the period between these points. It also provides valuable 
information about the ‘temporal order of events’ in time (Taris, 2000, p. 4). For more on longitudinal 
research, see (Ruspini, 2002).
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equivalence with this research and provide comparable information in relation to 
economic, social, environmental, demographic and political dimensions of the rural 
space. In addition, given that the research hypotheses are based on multiple variables, 
the cases must have been selected to enable the isolation of certain independent 
variables that make possible any measurement of the effect of others. In sum, case 
selection considered independent variables and methodological relevance. After a 
pilot study covering 12 villages that had been studied in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
three cases were selected.
The field research was designed to be mainly quantitative and comparable to the 
previous researches conducted in these villages. For each case, a formal 
questionnaire covering household demographics, labour force, occupational 
compositions, production and market relations (prices, productivity, costs and trade 
etc.) and land distribution was canvassed. On the other hand, since the field research 
was conducted by staying in each village around two months, it involved a 
participatory dimension, which allowed for an enhanced understanding of the 
underlying processes of social change. Although it was not the primary focus of the 
research, some qualitative information about village histories, life course narratives, 
political attitudes was also gathered which enriched the interpretation of the 
quantitative data. As such, the field research was mainly quantitative, while also 
having some implicit qualitative facets.
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Figure 1-9 Map of Turkey and location of case studies
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First case: Tuz
Tuz is located in western Anatolia (see Figure 1.9 for its location). The 
anthropological study that Sirman (1988) undertook in this village between 1978 and 
1984 is taken as the first w ave o f  this longitudinal study.24 In her research, Sirman 
primarily investigated the state-society relationship at the local level and female 
labour in family farms. She undertook a rigorous analysis o f  the village econom y. In 
particular, she investigated the various dim ensions o f  sm all-scale fam ily farming, 
and provided insightful information about labour-intensive cotton production in 
Turkey (Sirman-Eralp, 1988). The village o f  Tuz had the follow ing characteristics in 
the early 1980s:
(i) Its population growth rate had been natural w ith no significant rural-to- 
urban migration.
(ii) It enjoyed a favourable ecology, providing high natural potential for 
agricultural development; it had partial irrigation infrastructure;
24 Sirman’s research in the village was the fieldwork of her doctorate thesis, Peasant and Family 
Farms: the Positions o f  Households in Cotton Production in a Village o f  Western Turkey (Simian, 
1988).
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(iii) It had a vibrant agricultural economy based on high-value cotton 
production;
(iv) Input and output markets were fully operational; its economy was well 
integrated with the local and regional markets;
(v) Distribution of land and water resources was relatively equal. Small farms 
dominated the village’s agricultural economy;
In a preliminary field study in 2000, it appeared that Tuz’s agricultural economy had 
been integrated into global trade after Turkey liberalized its cotton markets. 
Similarly, it had fully encountered the local impact of new domestic policies that had 
been recently adopted. The population of the village had continued to grow at a 
natural pace without considerable out-migration. In 2003, Tuz was chosen to be 
restudied in order to investigate the process of rural transformation in a context 
where the impact of ecological, infrastructural conditions and unequal distribution of 
land can be isolated relative to the other cases (see Table 1.2 below). It allows for the 
analysis of market-related factors in relation to prices, costs and trade on the process 
of transformation within agriculture.
Second case: Sakai
Sakai is in central Anatolia (see Figure 1.9 for its location). It was first studied by 
Stirling at the beginning of the 1950s (Stirling, 1965). His study was one of the 
earliest examples of anthropological village studies in Turkey. He revisited Sakai in 
the 1970s and in the 1980s and investigated trends of change from a multi­
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dimensional perspective (Stirling, 1974, 1993). During the course of his study, 
Stirling examined a broad range of social, cultural, political and economic issues 
including small-scale family production in agriculture, income diversification and 
market integration. The village had the following characteristics in the early 1980s:
(i) Its population had been declining due to seasonal and permanent outward 
migration, national and international;
(ii) It had a severely unfavourable ecology for agricultural development. The 
climate was dry, hot in summer, cold and frosty in winter; its soil quality 
was poor and there was no irrigation infrastructure;
(iii) Its agricultural economy had been stagnant. It was based on low-value staple 
food production with extremely low yields;
(iv) The relative importance of agriculture had been diminishing, and there has 
been substantial labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural and 
non-rural activities;
(v) Relatively equally distributed small farms had always predominated in its 
socio-economic structure.
By 2000, agricultural production had continued to stagnate, and there had been no 
change in cropping patterns. There had been no investments in productivity 
enhancing infrastructure, such as irrigation. However, the majority of households 
gradually had developed non-agricultural and non-rural income activities, such as
25 Stirling’s publications on this village along with an extensive photo-gallery and video footage have 
been collected and are being posted on a web archive, ‘45 Years in Turkish Village’, 
http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/Tvillage (Stirling, 2006).
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carpet weaving and working in the construction sector in urban areas. It was also 
observed that the village population had been in decline for the last two decades as a 
result of rural-to-urban and transnational migration. In 2003, Sakai was chosen to 
investigate the impact of unfavourable agro-ecology on transformation within 
agriculture. The case is also relevant for analysing the various dimensions of 
diversification from agricultural to non-agricultural activities within rural areas.
Third case: Sinan
Sinan is in south-eastern Anatolia (see Figure 1.9 for its location). It was first studied 
by a team of researchers in 1979 and 1981 as a part of a wider project on agricultural 
development and seasonal migration in Turkey. Some of the research findings on 
Sinan have been published in various articles by Akcay, Aksit and Keyder.27 The 
most detailed information on the village appeared in Akcay’s master’s thesis (Akcay, 
1985). For the consistency of the longitudinal assessment of the political and 
economic development that the village has experienced over the past 25 years, this 
research draws mainly on Akcay (1985). Akcay investigated the transformation of 
the traditional large-scale land ownership that had prevailed in Sinan. The timing of 
his study is almost the same as that of Sirman. The village had the following 
characteristics in 1980:
(i) Its population had been increasing (with some rural-to-urban migration);
(ii) It had a moderately favourable ecology for agriculture, enjoying mild 
climatic characteristics;
26 In this village, Ayata (1982) investigated carpet weaving within the framework of small-scale 
family production; Incirlioglu (1993) conducted research on marriage and gender relations with an 
emphasis on the intra-household division of labour.
27 See Akcay (1985, 1999), Aksit (1988, 1993) and Keyder (1983).
50
(iii) The entire land of the village had been under the control of a single 
landlord family. Peasants had no ownership rights, and they had access to 
land only through custom;
(iv) Its agricultural economy directly depended upon the landlord’s operation. 
The family’s own production, consumption and investments were the 
village’s only linkages to regional and national economies. The peasants 
had no significant market orientation;
(v) The nature of the politics of state-society relationships had been 
historically decisive; the landlord family managed to acquire the control 
of the entire land through political means, and state policies had always 
been pro-landlord at the expense of the peasantry.
By 2000, the extreme inequality in Sinan had not changed -  as the landlord family 
had continued to control the entire land and water resources. However, there had 
been substantial developments in its agricultural economy. Public investments in 
irrigation infrastructure in the early 1980s had generated a big growth potential. The 
size of irrigated land increased, and there had been a transition from low productivity 
cereals production to high-value cotton production. The landlord had reduced the 
size of his own large-scale operation and moved out of the village. In 2003, Sinan 
was chosen to be restudied in order to investigate the process of rural transformation 
in a context where the impacts of ecological, infrastructural and market-related 
conditions can be fairly isolated (relative to other cases). It offers a case for 
investigating the impact of extreme inequality on rural transformation.
Variable matrix
Table 1.2 provides a matrix showing the combination of factors that the three cases
offer as a basis for the measurement of others. Each case would exemplify the impact
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of some isolated variables on selected dimensions. Rather than claiming 
representativeness, which would be impossible in a country where there are more 
than 30,000 villages, the cases provide thematic analyses that are also relevant 
beyond these villages in Turkey. Although, one can expect to find other villages 
experiencing similar trends, the objective is not to typify a certain trajectory of rural 
transformation. The aim is to investigate the impact of major factors (such as price 
trends and macro-economic policy environment in Tuz, unfavourable ecology and 
non-farm activities in Sakai, inequality and power relations in Sinan) on the various 
aspects of the process of transformation from and within agriculture at the village 
level. This would also make the research relevant beyond these cases (and possibly 
beyond Turkey) where these major factors operate. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
micro-level longitudinal case studies is not to prove/disprove the central research 
hypotheses, but to improve the explanatory power of the arguments made at the 
aggregate level.
Table 1-2 Variable m atrix for case selection
Tuz (Case I) Sakai (Case II) Sinan (Case III)
Demography Low rural-to-urban 
migration
High rural-to-urban 
migration
Moderate rural-to-urban 
migration
Ecology Highly favourable 
ecology
Unfavourable ecology Moderately favourable 
ecology
Cropping Full transition to high- No transition to high- Partial transition to
Patterns value cropping patters value cropping patters high-value cropping 
patters
Agricultural Full integration into Low integration into Moderate integration
market national and national markets into national and
integration international markets No integration into 
international markets
international markets
Small-farm
dominance
Small farm dominated Small farm dominated Landlord dominated
Inequality Moderate inequality Low inequality High inequality
52
Other villages, besides these three, were studied several decades ago, and have been 
considered in the overall analysis. For example, Kiray and Hinderink (1970) studied 
two cotton producing villages, Yunusoglu and Sakiz, in Adana (in the 
Mediterranean region) in the 1960s. They observed that as the villages were 
integrating into national markets through high-value cotton production, they had 
experienced a process of small farm differentiation. Aksit (1967, 1982) studied a 
cotton-producing village, Ilusu, in Antalya, where his follow-up study proved later 
that small farms had not followed a trend of differentiation but that they had 
persisted. Yesildumlupinar in Central Anatolia, studied by the group of researchers 
working on ‘Rural Transformation in Turkey and Seasonal Migration’, was a village 
located in an unfavourable ecology like Sakai. It was also similar in other features 
such as its cropping patters, market integration and the distribution of natural 
resources. Elbasi, investigated extensively by Stirling (1965), was located in the 
province of Kayseri where Sakai is located. In south-eastern Anatolia, one of the 
villages Aydin (1986) studied, Kalhana, was similar to Sinan in terms of the extent of 
land equality. It was dominated by two landlord families entering into sharecropping 
and rental arrangements with peasants. The village Hann (1990) investigated, Sumer, 
was located in a different regional context where tea-production was undertaken by 
small family farms in the north-eastern Black Sea region. His study underlined the 
various dimensions of the commodification process that the village economy had 
undergone.
The previous studies undertaken in the three villages - Tuz, Sakai, Sinan- selected for 
this analysis and also the majority of other studies listed above, investigated the
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various social, cultural aspects of rural transformation as well as economic and 
political aspects. From sociological and anthropological perspectives, they provided 
an in-depth description and analysis of particular set of social relationships and their 
implications at the local level. The present study, however, as underlined at the 
beginning of the thesis, focuses almost exclusively on the economic aspects of rural 
transformation. For that purpose, it takes the cases that have been studied as a 
platform to undertake the longitudinal analysis of economic developments rather 
than to attempt any all-embracing sociological follow-up. Although, it investigates 
local socio-historical relations in one particular case, Sinan, and other sociological 
issues such as gender relations in Sakai, the boundaries of this research are drawn to 
define in the realm of the economic aspects of rural transformation as the focus of 
study and analysis.
1.6 Research relevance
The economic dimension of rural transformation is an historical process which is
completed when previously rural societies achieve a ‘modem’ stage of development
in which the vast majority of their labour force engages in high-productivity
manufacturing and service activities while a small minority undertakes high-
productivity and high-value agricultural activities. Today’s developed countries have
undergone various rural transformation paths to achieve that stage. However, there
has not been any case of a ‘completed’ transformation over the last quarter of a
century since a couple of successful examples in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. On the
other hand, today’s ‘developing’ countries, the ones that have not completed their
rural transformation, have been going through a new economic era, defined as
globalization. It brings into play new factors and variables that make any previous
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trajectories impossible to replicate. There arises the scientific task of restudying rural 
transformation in this new historical context.
The main concern of this thesis is the question of why the ultimate goal of rural 
transformation -  transformation from agriculture -  has been missing or slow and 
why the process of transformation within agriculture has been stagnant over the past 
25 years. The actual size of the rural population of working-age has increased in 
major developing regions, especially in South Asia and Africa. Apart from some 
small decline in the size of labour force in China, the rural sector, and mainly 
agriculture, has continued to employ the majority of the labour force in the 
developing world. However, the process of agricultural modernization through 
improvements in yields and a transition from low to high-value cropping patterns has 
also been slow, albeit with significant variations at the regional level. Apart from 
East and South-east Asia, the majority of arable land in developing countries has 
continued to be under cereals production at low yields. Similarly, the process of 
globalization through trade has not played a significant role in the modernization 
process. The share of developing countries in global agricultural trade has remained 
small. The trade distorting policies of developed countries have excluded the vast 
majority of developing country farmers from participating in economic globalization.
The agricultural sector has been dominated by an increasing number of small farms 
in the developing world. Apart from Latin America, small-scale farming has 
continued to be the main economic activity for the bulk of the rural labour force in 
major developing regions. Especially in India and China, a large number of farms has 
been operating increasingly smaller land. The predominance of small farms is
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directly linked to the issue of global poverty -  given that the majority of the world’s 
poor relies on small-scale farming for a livelihood. Hence, the future of small farms 
and rural poverty are major themes that this thesis investigates.
This takes the analysis into the historic debate on the role of agriculture and small- 
scale farming in economic development. After a period of academic neglect in the 
1980s and 1990s, there has been a fresh debate between two schools of thought: a 
‘neo-populist’ school which relies on the old paradigm of small-farm efficiency in 
arguing that pro-poor growth depends on small farms, versus the ‘agro-pessimist’ 
school which takes a sceptical view of the future viability of small farms in economic 
development and poverty alleviation. This thesis proposes a new approach which 
positions itself between the ‘neo-populist’ and ‘agro-pessimist.’
This thesis tests its hypotheses on Turkey which is a developing country where one- 
third of its population lives and works in rural areas. The country exemplifies how 
the process of rural transformation has been slow over the last 25 years. The size of 
its rural labour force has been growing while the agricultural sector has been 
stagnant, leading to the effect that the majority of 20 million people working on four 
million small farms have been almost left out of the process of economic 
development. Turkey was one of the first to experience the ‘structural adjustment’ 
programmes, so it illustrates how the ‘Washington Consensus’ has affected 
agricultural and rural development since the late 1990s. Therefore, it is expected that 
investigating Turkey’s rural transformation would be relevant for other developing 
countries that have been experiencing similar challenges in their rural 
transformations.
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The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter II analyses major trends in rural transformation in Turkey at the country and 
regional levels over the last 25 years. It first analyzes trends in labour transition from 
agriculture and looks into the question why there has not been any substantial labour 
transition. Second, it investigates the process of the transformation within agriculture 
and carries out a factor analysis assessing why it has been stagnant. Then, from a 
theoretical perspective, it focuses on the process of small farm transformation 
defined as the differentiation of small farms within agriculture at the household level. 
Hence, this chapter aims at providing an overall analysis of trends in rural 
transformation in Turkey, setting up a background framework for the following 
chapters.
Chapter III takes the village of Tuz in western Anatolian which exemplifies the 
impact of a combination of global market trends and the ‘Washington Consensus’ on 
the rural transformation at the village level. The chapter first focuses on the 
enormous progress that the farmers of Tuz have achieved in their agricultural 
transformation. Next, it takes the analysis beyond the village level and investigates 
price trends in cotton and assesses major economic and political factors affecting 
prices in global and domestic markets. Then, the chapter assesses the trends of output 
productivity and the cost of production in cotton. Later, it turns back to the village 
and analyses trends in profitability at the local level. Finally, it investigates the 
question of small-farm differentiation through land concentration over the recent 
decades.
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Chapter IV focuses on the case of Sakai in central Anatolia. It exemplifies the impact 
of unfavourable ecology on the transformation within and from agriculture. First, it 
examines trends of circular and permanent migration from rural to urban areas. Then, 
it provides a short history of the process of transition to non-agricultural activities 
within the village. In particular, it focuses on major factors, both of rural and urban 
origin, that have affected the process. It also highlights the challenges and increasing 
competition that non-agricultural activities face. Finally, it illustrates the major roles 
that non-agricultural activities play in rural economies. The chapter demonstrates the 
importance of labour, production and consumption linkages between and within the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
Chapter V takes the case of Sinan to analyse the impact of ‘ascribed’ inequality on 
the rural transformation at the village level. Political, economic and social relations 
between the state, landlords and peasants constitute the core of the analysis. The 
chapter first investigates regional trends in inequality in landownership over the last 
half a century. Here, it explores the effects of inequality on rural-to-urban migration 
and on economic development from a huge regional development project, the GAP, 
since 1980. In the second part, it presents Sinan, and discusses the political and 
economic transitions that the village has been through. It also explores a recent 
grassroots movement that has been initiated by the peasants. Third, in the light of the 
fieldwork and the recent empirical evidence, the chapter assesses the validity of some 
arguments about the process of scale-differentiation in the context of high inequality.
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Chapter VI is the final chapter that builds up on the case studies and defines the 
boundaries of the agro-realist approach proposed in this thesis. It reflects on new 
opportunities and hopes for achieving a progress towards the completion of the rural 
transformation. The revolutionary biotechnological innovations with the potential of 
reducing ecological dependencies, new market opportunities for labour-intensive 
small farms, emerging developing country coalitions pursuing for a fairer global 
trade regime are some of the major opportunities that the chapter addresses. Then it 
attempts to incorporate the agro-realist approach into the framework of new social 
democracy. In so doing, it aims at contributing to the development of an institutional 
framework through which a new realistic policy approach to agricultural and rural 
development and the new social democracy could envisage rural transformation in 
the age of globalization.
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Chapter II - Rural Transformation in Turkey: Labour Trap in
Stagnant Agriculture
The share of the agricultural sector in Turkey’s GDP has been falling steadily over 
the last three decades. This might have been considered as a process of structural 
transformation, if it had induced a substantial labour transition away from the 
agricultural sector. However, the actual size of the rural population in working age 
(15-60), the majority of whom engaged in agriculture, has increased (UNPD, 2006). 
This has resulted in an enormous problem of under-employment in rural areas. At the 
same time, since both land and labour productivity have not seen significant growth, 
the agricultural sector suffers from severe under-productivity. Hence, there are 
serious concerns regarding the vast majority of Turkey’s rural population that seem 
to have been left out of the processes of economic development over the past 25 
years.
The country’s agricultural sector is dominated by small farms with an average size 
that has not changed significantly over the recent decades. Such predominance is 
directly related to the process of labour transition from the agricultural to non- 
agricultural sectors. Since it has been accompanied by the absence of any substantial 
growth in the agricultural sector, the income gap between agricultural and non- 
agricultural activities has been widening. This is reflected in the fact that more than 
one third of those employed in the agricultural sector are below the national poverty 
line, representing by far the highest rate of poverty among all sectors (World Bank,
61
2005b, p. 98). Hence, the future of small farms, around four million, poses a 
fundamental challenge for Turkey’s overall economic development.
This chapter attempts to analyze why the dual process of transformation both from  
and within agriculture has been stagnant in Turkey. What are the factors operating at 
the macro level that have prevented the country making progress in its rural 
transformation? Why has it experienced an asymmetrical path whereby the structure 
of its economy moved away from agriculture without this leading to labour transition 
from the sector and scale differentiation within the sector? The chapter assesses the 
impact of various factors operating at different dimensions. Factors in relation to 
demography, sectoral labour absorption capacities, human capital, ecology, 
technology, commodity markets and politics and policies have affected the different 
dimensions of the process at the national, regional and local levels.
This chapter is organized as follows. It first analyses the trends in the transformation 
from agriculture at the country level over the past 25 years. It investigates the major 
factors that have affected the process of labour transition. Second, it goes into the 
assessment of the process of the transformation within agriculture, and carries out a 
factor analysis analyzing why it has been stagnant. Then, from empirical and 
theoretical perspectives, it focuses on the dominance of small farms and the level of 
scale differentiation in Turkish agriculture. This introduction would provide an 
analysis of trends in rural transformation in Turkey which would set up a background 
for subsequent chapters.
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2.1 Transformation from agriculture
Similar to the vast majority of developing countries, although manufacturing and 
services sectors have continuously grown, the size of the rural labour force in Turkey 
has not seen any substantial decline. As is shown in Figure 2.1, between 1980 and 
2004, the contribution of the services sector to Turkey’s GDP rose from US$ 34 
billion to US$ 87 billion, while the manufacturing sector’s tripled, from US$ 13 
billion to US$ 47 billion (SPO, 2006). However, the level of labour transition from 
agriculture to non-agricultural sectors has not been considerable.
The rural population has seen a marginal decline, although the size of rural 
population of working-age (15-59) has actually increased. In 1980, approximately 26 
million people lived in rural areas (out of 46 million in total). By 2000, it had slightly 
decreased to 24 million, and has remained stable since then (FAOSTAT, 2006). 
Meanwhile, the size of economically active population in agriculture grew from 11.5 
million in 1979-81 to 14.8 million in 2004 (see Figure 2.2) (FAO, 2007). Due to 
fertility and mortality decline, the share of rural population below the age of 15 
dropped from 42 per cent in 1980 to 32 per cent in 2000, leading to an increase in the 
share of population of working age (SIS, 1984a; SIS, 2003c). This in turn has 
resulted in a trend whereby the rural population slightly decreased while the size of 
population in agriculture has actually risen. Although, modem sectors have grown 
significantly, this has not led to a fall in the absolute size of agricultural labour.
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Figure 2-1 Net GDP growth in Turkey by sector at fixed prices,* 1980-2004
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Source: State Planning Organization (SPO, 2006). 
* US $ (1987 prices, 1 US $ = 855.69 TL)
Figure 2-2 Economically active population in Turkey, agricultural vs. non- 
agricultural, 1979-1981 - 2004
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Source: FAO Statistical Yearbook 2004 (FAO, 2007).
The process of urbanization has continued, resulting in a rapid increase in the size of 
the urban labour force. Urban population increased from 20 million in 1980 to 47 
million in 2003, while the population of working age increased even more rapidly,
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from 11 million in 1980 to 31 million in 2005 (UNPD, 2006).1 This process has been 
increasingly driven by urban population growth itself. The contribution to 
urbanization of rural-to-urban migration has become relatively smaller. As the urban 
population grew, its marginal contribution to urbanization has increased while, at the 
same time, the pace of rural-to-urban migration slowed down over the last 15 years 
(see Figure 2.3). The level of net migration decreased from 1 million people per year 
in the early 1980s to 300,000 by the early 1990s (see Figure 2.4). The enormous rise 
in the urban labour force (mainly due to urban population growth itself) has 
inevitably diminished the urban demand for labour from rural areas.
Figure 2-3 Sources of urbanisation in Turkey, 1980-2003
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Source: Author’s calculation based on (FAOSTAT, 2006).
'The data in relation to the size o f rural population o f working-age are derived from the total 
population o f  working-age proportioned by the share of rural population. It should be noted that this 
practice slightly overestimates the size o f rural population o f working-age. This is due to the fact that 
the rural fertility rate is slightly higher than the urban fertility rate which lowers the proportion o f rural 
population above the age o f 15.
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Figure 2-4 Net rural to urban migration in Turkey*, 1980-2003
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*The net amount o f rural-to-urban migration is based on an arithmetic calculation. For each 
year (from 1980 to 2003), the country’s total population growth is calculated. Then it is 
applied to that particular year’s rural population as if  there would not be migration. The 
difference between the actual size and the size based on the no-migration scenario is 
considered to be the net migration. This practice slightly underestimates the amount o f  
migration, due to the fact that the natural growth rate o f the rural population (i.e. without 
migration) is higher than the growth rate o f total population.
2.1.1 Low absorption capacity in non-agricultural growth
The economic factors that affect the process of labour transition have not been 
favourable either. The employment elasticity of non-agricultural growth has been 
low, leading to substantially low levels of labour participation and high 
unemployment. Between 1988 and 2004, although the manufacturing and services 
sectors’ contribution to GDP almost doubled, they created 4.5 million jobs, 
representing an increase of 50 per cent in total (SIS, 2006a). The size of the labour 
force in the services sector rose from around 6 million in 1988 to 9.3 million in 2004. 
The number of labourers in the manufacturing sector increased from 2.8 million to 4 
million (SIS, 2006a). In the same period, however, the size of population above the 
age of 15 increased by 13.5 million in urban areas and 2.5 million in rural areas, 16 
million in total. As Figure 2.5 below indicates, the pace of employment creation in 
the non-agricultural sector was even below the level at which it could absorb the
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extra urban population entering the labour force, let alone absorbing the ‘surplus’ 
labour from the agricultural sector.
Figure 2-5 Non-agricultural Employment Trends in Turkey, 1988-2004
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Source: State Institute of Statistics, Household Labour Force Survey (SIS, 2006a)
* 1988 is the first year that sectoral employment data are available based on the 
measurement method that is currently used. The construction sector is included into the 
service sector.
Employment elasticity of the services sector has been higher than that of 
manufacturing. Every additional US $ 1 billion contribution to GDP created around
94,000 jobs in services, 50,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector.2 The difference was 
mainly due to the fact that labour productivity in the manufacturing sector grew at a 
relatively higher rate compared to the services sector. Nevertheless, the difference 
between their labour productivity is smaller than the difference between their 
employment elasticity. Therefore, the growth in the services sector has absorbed 
more additional labour than the growth in the manufacturing sector.
2 Based on author’s calculations on the sectors’ marginal contribution to GDP and net increase in the 
labour size for each sector between 1988 and 2004. Similar labour elasticity differences between the 
two sectors hold for smaller intervals within the period.
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The obvious consequences of the huge mismatch between population growth and 
limited absorption capacity of the non-agricultural sector are unemployment and low 
labour participation. According to official data, the number of unemployed rose from
1.1 million in 1988 to 1.8 million in 2004, representing a tiny increase of 0.7 million 
people (SIS, 2006a). Apparently, this increased the unemployment rate from 13.3 per 
cent to 13.6 per cent. However, the number of people above the age of 15 who are 
not officially participating in the labour force has risen enormously. As is shown in 
Figure 2.6 below, the number of people not included in the urban labour force -  
mainly women and those with low educational background - increased by 8 million 
(from 9 million to 17 million) in the same period (SIS, 2006a). The mismatch 
between population growth and limited employment creation has resulted in low 
levels of labour participation -  disguised unemployment -  in urban areas which is 
masked by the official unemployment data.
Figure 2-6 Unemployment and labour participation in urban areas in Turkey, 
1988-2004
18 000
16 000
14 000
T3 12 000Cro 10 000to3o 8 000£ 6 000
4 000
2 000
■ — N u m ber of  
Officially 
U n em p lo y ed
Klii■■ N u m ber ot 
P e o p le  (ab o v e  
1 5 ) Not 
Participating  
in the L abour  
F orcei r i—i i 'i" i ~i i i i i i i i i i O O O C M M - C D C O O C M M -
0 ) 0  0)0)010)
CM CM CM
Source: State Institute o f Statistics, Household Labour Force Survey (SIS, 2006a)
The low level of educational attainment of the rural labour force constitutes a major 
obstacle in labour transition from the rural to the urban sectors. Only 36 per cent of
the urban population (above 15) with primary education had formal employment in
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2004, indicating that the urban market for low-skilled labour is already saturated
(SIS, 2006a). This figure was 46 per cent for those having high school education.
The highest percentage of employment, with 70 per cent, was among those who had
university education (see Figure 2.7). However, the educational-base of the rural
labour force is low. As is shown in Figure 2.8, only two per cent of the rural
population (above 15) had university education while only 10 per cent had high
school education in 2004.3 This means that the vast majority of the rural labour force
has to compete in the lower segments of the urban market where there is already an
over-supply from the urban labour force itself. Therefore, the chances of finding
urban employment for an average labourer from rural areas are small.4
Figure 2-7 Percentage of employed in urban population above age 15 by 
educational background in Turkey, 1988-2004
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Source: Author’s calculation based on (SIS, 2006a).
3 In urban population (above 15), on the other hand, nine per cent had university education and 22 per 
cent had high school education in 2004 (SIS, 2006a).
4 The chances get even smaller, as the urban sector modernizes and reduces its demand for labour with 
low education (i.e. the urban sector’s modernization elasticity o f  demand for low-skilled labour is 
low.)
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Figure 2-8 Distribution of rural population (above 15) by education in Turkey, 
2004
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2.2 Transformation within agriculture
The south-eastern part of the region where Turkey is located is in the Fertile 
Crescent, where farmers have thousands of years of experience in cereal production. 
Yet, the average yields of 2.2 tons per hectare in 2004 (FAOSTAT, 2006), were only 
slightly above what it was 10,000 years ago (Araus, et. al, 2001. p 341). There are 
regions in the country, such as parts of central Anatolia, where yields may even fall 
below that level. Since the bulk of the country’s cultivable land has been devoted to 
low-value staple food production, the second dimension of the rural transformation, 
transformation within agriculture, which involves a process of agricultural 
modernization through improvements in yields and a transition from low to high 
value cropping patterns, has been stagnant in Turkey.
Since 1980, the size of arable land has remained around 26-28 million hectares, and 
half of it, around 13 million hectares, has been consistently devoted to cereals (see
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Figure 2.9). Wheat production was the most prominent among cereals, covering 
around 9 million hectares. Barley came second with around 3 million hectares; 
maize, rye and oats followed. However, as is shown in Figure 2.10, the level of 
growth in yields has been slow, amounting to 1.5 per cent per year between 1980 and 
2004 which was well below the world’s average (FAOSTAT, 2006). Hence, land 
productivity in major staple foods is historically low in Turkey, and it has risen only 
marginally over the past 25 years.
Figure 2-9 Cereals production in Turkey, 1980-2004
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Figure 2-10 Average cereal yields and growth rate, 1980-2004
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The process of transition to higher value cropping patterns has also been slow. 
Around 13 million hectares of the country’s 26 million hectares of arable land have 
been devoted to low-value cereal production. The volume of relatively high-value 
industrial crops, vegetables and fruits has been small. Industrial crops, such as 
cotton, sugar beet and tobacco covered five per cent of the total area in 2004. Fibre 
crops, mainly cotton, covered 0.6 million hectares. The area of fruits and vegetables 
has remained almost the same at around 1.5 million hectares (SIS, 2005).
Although it has been slow, the importance of the transition from cereals to high- 
value industrial crops, vegetables and fruits is evident in the sector’s output value 
trends. Although, 63 per cent of the total area under agricultural production was 
devoted to cereals, it contributed only 23 per cent of the total output value produced 
by the sector in 2003 (see Table 2. 1 below). On the other hand, vegetables 
contributed almost 25 per cent of the total output value, although they covered only 
four per cent of the land. Similarly, the share of fruits was 31 per cent, while their 
share of land was only 12 per cent (SIS, 2005). As such, one of the most fundamental 
structural problems of Turkish agriculture has been the slow pace of the transition 
from low-value cereals to fruits, vegetables and industrial crops that generate 
relatively higher output in value terms.
2.2.1 Value production
In output value terms, the growth performance of the agricultural sector has been 
poor over the past 25 years, especially since the early 1990s. The sector grew by an 
average of 1 per cent per year since 1980, and 0.9 per cent since 1990. Its
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contribution to total output has increased by only 25 per cent since 1980 and 12 per 
cent since 1990 (at fixed prices) (SPO, 2006).
Table 2-1 Agricultural area and output value in Turkey, 2003
Area harvested Output value
Area Distribution 
(Million ha) (%)
YTL
(Billions)
us$*
(Billions)
Distribution
(%)
Field Crops 17.9 84 17.9 12.0 44
Cereals 13.4 63 9.5 6.3 23
Pulses 1.5 7 1.5 1.0 4
Industrial crops 1.3 6 3.5 2.4 9
Oil seed 1.4 6 0.8 0.6 2
Tuber crops 0.3 1 2.6 1.7 6
Vegetables 0.8 4 10.2 6.8 25
Fruits 2.7 12 12.5 8.4 31
Total 21.4 100 40.6 27.2 100
Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS, 2005).
* At current prices based on monthly average exchange rate in 2003, for US$ 1 = 1.49 YTL 
(SPO, 2006).
There are huge variations at the regional level, however (see Figure 2.11 for the map 
of Turkey by agricultural regions). The value productivity -  average value produced 
on one hectare -  was approximately US$ 600 at the national level in 2001(SIS, 
2003a).5 The average at the regional level ranged between US$ 270 per hectare (in 
North-eastern Anatolia) and US$ 1200 per hectare (in the Mediterranean region). As 
is shown in the Figure 2.12 below, the variation was partly due to the differences in 
cereal yields, but mostly to variations in the contributions of fruit and vegetables. In 
regions with value productivity below the national average, cereals contributed to 
more than half of the total. On the other hand, in regions that were above the national 
average, cereals’ contribution was only around 30 per cent of the total, while the rest
5 The measure of value productivity -  value produced on a unit of land -  offers a comprehensive 
measure of productivity in agriculture. It is calculated by multiplying production quantity by price in a 
given period of production. In this way, factors like yields, fallow rates, crop patterns and price 
variations are incorporated into the productivity measure.
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came from fruits and vegetables. Hence, the regions that had achieved the transition 
from low-value cereals to higher-value crops, fruit and vegetables were performing 
substantially better than those that had not.
Figure 2-11 Map of Turkey by agricultural regions
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Figure 2-12 Output value productivity (US$/ha) in Turkey by region, 2001
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2.3 Determinants
This section analyses five major obstacles that have prevented the process of 
agricultural transformation from making substantial progress. First, there are 
ecological obstacles determining cropping patterns and yields (given the level of 
technology) at the local level. Second, there is a marketing obstacle arising from the 
fact that the income elasticity of demand for staple foods is low which discourages 
agricultural growth. The third factor is a price obstacle which is in operation at global 
and national levels. Agricultural prices have been going down over the last three 
decades, and the terms of trade have been unfavourable for agricultural commodities. 
The fourth obstacle is ‘ascribed’ inequality in relation to the distribution of income 
generating assets in rural areas, which hinders agricultural development in one 
particular region. The fifth obstacle is political and institutional at the national level. 
The performance of the sector has been severely affected by unfavourable macro- 
economic policies, and related ‘structural adjustment’ programmes that have 
weakened institutional capacities that are vital for the agricultural sector.
2.3.1 Ecological dependency
Variations in major ecological conditions largely correspond to those in output value
productivity across regions (see Figure 2.12 above). There are four key ecological
variables that need to be distinguished in analyzing Turkey’s complex ecological
system: the structure of terrain, temperatures, the level of precipitation, average
length of the growing period. In eastern Anatolia, mainly due to high altitudes (above
1500 m), low temperatures (averaging -13°C in winter, and 17°C in summer) and
cold stress, ecological conditions are not favourable. In the interior and south-eastern
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parts of the country, low precipitation (275 to 375 ml/year) is a major constraint in 
large cultivable areas. On the other hand, the coastal plains along the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Seas have large areas of low-land enjoying favourable temperatures 
(with the average of 9°C in winter, and 29°C in summer) and moderate rainfall 
(ranging between 580 and 1,300 mm/year) which in turn offer superior agricultural 
potential (TSMS, 2004).
The average length of the growing period - calculated based on the difference 
between water inflows (i.e. precipitation) and outflows (i.e. evapotranspiration) - 
reflects the variations in yields and cropping patterns across the regions. As is shown 
in Figure 2.13, the average length of growing period is below 120 days in the large 
parts of central and eastern Anatolia, where the climate is suitable for mainly cereal 
production. Yields depend on the timing and quantity of precipitation. The Black Sea 
region, South-eastern Anatolia and the western parts of central Anatolia have average 
growing periods of between 150 and 200 days. These areas are suitable for cereals 
which can be grown at relatively higher yields. The western Anatolia and south of 
the Mediterranean region enjoy the longest growing period around 200 to 240 days a 
year. These areas are most suitable for high yield cereals, industrial crops, fruits and 
vegetables. Hence, while the average length of the growing period offers high 
agricultural potential in the coastal strips and South-eastern Anatolia, it is not as 
favourable for the rest of the country.
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Figure 2-13 Map of length of growing period (days) in Turkey
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2.3.2 Technological asymmetries
The main reason why Turkey has not managed to reduce its ecological dependency 
over the past 25 years is its slow progress in technological innovation and adaptation 
and in ecology-enhancing infrastructure. However, rather than a total lack of 
progress, Turkey illustrates the case of an asymmetrical development in the different 
components of agricultural technology. It has made slow progress in chemical and 
biological technological development, while continuously mechanizing its 
agriculture (which implies over-mechanization). On the other hand, the size of 
ecology-enhancing infrastructure, i.e. irrigation, has enlarged moderately. As such, 
the Green Revolution, described as a package of high yielding crop varieties, 
sufficiently used chemical fertilizers, reliable water supply and small-scale 
mechanization has been asymmetrically implemented, which has in turn generated 
only a little progress in overcoming ecological constraints in agriculture.
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The extent of mechanical technology has grown more rapidly than any other 
components of Turkey’s ‘Green Revolution’. The total number of tractors rose from
440,000 in 1980 to almost 1 million in 2002 (FAOSTAT, 2006). This meant that for 
every 1000 hectares of arable land, there were 17 tractors in 1980 and 40 in 2002. As 
is illustrated in Figure 2.14, number of tractors per 1000 hectares is significantly 
higher in Turkey as compared to the both world’s and the developing countries’ 
averages.6 Given that the average farm size is slightly less than six hectares, there is a 
concern for over-mechanization, or to put it more accurately ‘over-tractorization’ in 
Turkish agriculture.
Figure 2-14 Number of tractors per 1000 hectares, 1980 vs. 2002
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Source: FAOSTAT, 2006
6 Between 1980-2002, the world’s average increased from 16 to 19; the developing countries’ average 
doubled from five to 10 (FAOSTAT, 2006).
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The use of chemical fertilizers, on the other hand, grew slowly, from an already low 
base of 57 kg/ha in 1980 to 73 kg/ha in 2002 (see Figure 2.15).7 As for new seed 
varieties, different types of semi-dwarf cereals have been introduced since the 1960s, 
however, the extent of research and development in bio-technology has been limited. 
On the other hand, the share of irrigated area increased from 11 per cent in 1980 to 
22 per cent in 2002. As is shown in Figure 2.16, although the pace of this growth was 
faster than in developing countries, the share of irrigated land was still below the 
average of developing countries (26 per cent) in 2002 (FAOSTAT, 2006). Hence, 
Turkey’s agricultural sector has been experiencing an asymmetrical technological 
progress through over-mechanization while seeing only a small improvement in 
fertilizer use and in the extent of irrigation, which in turn has been inadequate to 
make a significant impact in overcoming its ecological dependency.
Figure 2-15 Average fertilizer consumption* (kg/ha), 1980 vs. 2002
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Source: Author’s calculation based (FAOSTAT, 2006).
* Based on total fertilizer consumption divided by total acreage o f  arable land.
7 This was below the average of developing countries, 115 kg/ha in 2002. (author’s calculation based 
on total fertilizer consumption divided by acreage of arable land) (FAOSTAT, 2006).However, China 
which is the only country to have made remarkable progress in its yields and product diversification, 
increased its fertilizer consumption from 158 kg/ha in 1980 to 278 kg/ha in 2002.
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Figure 2-16 Share of irrigated land in total arable land, 1980 vs. 2002
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2.3.3 Low income elasticity
There is also an economic obstacle operating through the income and price elasticity 
of demand for agricultural goods, which constrains the process of transformation 
within agriculture. The negative impact of low income elasticity of demand for staple 
foods leaves the agricultural sector behind non-agricultural growth. Similarly, the 
low price elasticity of demand discourages sectoral growth. On the other hand, the 
demand for high-value (high income and price elasticity) agricultural commodities is 
determined by the level of overall economic growth and by income distribution at the 
national level. However, due to the relatively unequal distribution of income and 
moderate growth in the overall economy, the size of the country’s high-income 
consumer base has remained thin, failing to provide adequate stimulation for the 
transition from low- to high-value cropping patterns.
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The country’s GDP grew by 5.3 per cent in the 1980s and 3.1 between 1990 and 
2003 (World Bank, 2005a). As a result of the obvious effect of low income elasticity, 
the demand for cereals has grown only marginally since 1980. Annual cereal 
consumption increased from 25 million tons in 1980 to slightly less than 35 million 
tons in 2004, representing an annual growth of 1.3 per cent.8 Expectedly, this 
indicates that the demand for cereals increased significantly slower than the rate of 
economic growth. On the other hand, the demand for agricultural commodities with 
relatively higher income elasticity has grown at only a moderate but higher rate. For 
instance, the production of vegetables grew by 2.7 per cent per year between 1980 
and 2004.9 The level of non-agricultural growth has not been big enough to generate 
a high demand stimulus for agricultural growth.
The distribution of the country’s disposable income has led to a demand structure 
which is not conducive for the transformation either. Although the pattern of income 
distribution has been getting less unequal over the last 10 years, it is still relatively 
skewed (see the Lorenz curve below, Figure 2.17). In 2004, the income share of 
households in the highest income quintile was more than 45 per cent, while the share 
of those in the lowest quintile was only six per cent. The lowest three quintiles 
combined, i.e. 60 per cent of the population, had an income share of only one-third of 
the total (SIS, 2006b). This unequal distribution creates a dual demand structure: on 
the one hand, large percentages of low-income consumers provide a wide but 
shallow market for agricultural commodities, mainly for staple foods. On the other
8 Author’s calculation based on (FAOSTAT, 2006). The consumption figures are based on domestic 
production combined with the amount o f net trade.
However, the production of meat increased from 0.7 million ton in 1980 to 1.6 million ton in 2004, 
amounting to an annual growth rate of 3.6 per cent. In particular, poultry meat and egg production 
have grown rapidly, with an average annual rise of almost six per cent (based on author’s calculation 
using FAOSTAT data, 2006).
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hand, a small percentage of high-income consumers provide a deep but a small 
market for high-value (high income elasticity) goods. Therefore, the unequal 
distribution of disposable income slows down the stimulating impact of overall 
economic growth on the transformation within agriculture.
Figure 2-17 Income distribution in Turkey, 2004
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Source: State Institute o f Statistics (SIS, 2006b)
2.3.4 Low margin -  low investment -  low growth trap
Falling prices and increasing cost of production have reduced the incentive for 
growth in the sector. As is shown in Figure 2.18 below, since the second half of the 
1990s, they have fallen rapidly, although the real prices of major crops such as wheat 
cotton, tobacco increased in the 1980s. In the period between 1997 and 2003, for 
almost all major crops, prices fell below the levels of 1990, while for some of them, 
even below the levels of 1980. For instance, wheat prices dropped to almost their 
1980 level, cotton and sunflower prices fell to a level even below the level of 1980. 
This partly reflected the long-term price trends in world markets where real prices 
have declined by two per cent per year on average over the last 40 years (FAO, 2004,
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p. 12). Declining commodity prices both in domestic and world markets have put 
pressure on output value generated in the agricultural sector.
Figure 2-18 Real prices of major agricultural commodities in Turkey, 1980-2004 
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** Nominal prices have been deflated by the GNP deflator (1987=100) based on (SPO, 
2006).
The cost of major agricultural inputs has gradually increased, which has led to a 
decline in the profitability of the sector. The cost of fuel, fertilizer and pesticide often 
increased at rates above the inflation rate over the last 15 years. The rise in diesel 
prices was around 10 per cent above the inflation rate since 1990. Fertilizer prices 
fluctuated wildly while on the whole staying on average 18 per cent above the 
inflation rate between 1991 and 2001 (MARA, 2004). Hence, encountering 
increasing costs accompanied by price falls, margins have been squeezed in the 
agricultural sector in general.
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The level of private and public investments going into the sector has also been 
deteriorating. The share of agriculture in private gross fixed investments has gone 
down noticeably. It fell from 11 per cent in 1982 to 2.1 per cent in 2002, which 
clearly shows that the private sector has lost its interest in investing in the sector. On 
the other hand, the share of agriculture in public investments fell too, from 10.2 per 
cent in 1980 to 8.7 per cent in 2004 (see Figure 2.19) (SPO, 2006). The sector’s 
share in gross fixed investments has been consistently below the level of its share in 
the country’s GDP. Since low levels of investments diminish growth even further, it 
is clear that the sector has been suffering from a downward spiral of Tow margin -  
low investment -  low growth’.
Figure 2-19 Share of agriculture in gross fixed investment in Turkey, 1980-2004
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2.3.5 Marketing chains
There have been some substantial changes in the food retail sector without this 
having major structural impacts on the agricultural sector in general, small farms in 
particular. Since the 1980s, with a rapid acceleration the 1990s, the share of 
supermarkets in the total retail sector has been growing. From 1999 to 2003,
9 9supermarkets (100-2.500 m ) and hypermarkets (over 2.500 m ) increase their retail 
share from around 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the food sector (see Table 2.2 below) 
(Sirtioglu, 2004, p. 3).10 Both demand and supply-related factors have been attributed 
for the increasing diffusion of supermarkets (Reardon, et al., 2003, p. 1141). 
Urbanization, increasing size of per capita income and the middle class and rising 
demand for processed food are some of the demand-related factors, while 
technological innovations in supply logistics and knowledge transfer constituted the 
major supply-related factors (Reardon, et al., 2003, p. 1141) which have played part 
in Turkey.
Table 2-2 Retail food sector trends in Turkey
Market Share (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003*
Hypermarkets (over 2,500 m2) 6.5 8 9.5 9.6 10
All superm arkets (100-2,500 m2) 17 20 25 27.5 31
Markets (50-100 m2) 12.5 10 9.5 9.4 9
Small sto res (< 50m2) 49.5 48 42 40.5 36
Others 14.5 14 14 13 14
Source: (Sirtioglu, 2004, p. 3) cited in Van Berkum (2005, p. 119) 
* estimate
However, unlike other developing regions such as Latin America and South-east 
Asia, the food industry has not been able to attract considerable level of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Turkey. Between 1980 and 2003, the total FDI going into
10 Cited in Van Berkum (2005, p. 119).
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the agricultural sectors amounted to US$ 600 million, averaging US$ 25 million a 
year. This constituted 1.8 per cent of total FDI entering Turkey (Turkish Treasury, 
2006). Although the number of foreign companies operating in the food and 
beverages sector has been increasing in recent years, their presence has remained 
minor. There were eight foreign companies in 2001, 50 in 2004, which was only two 
per cent of all foreign companies operating in the country (Turkish Treasury, 2006). 
Thus neither the production nor the retailing dimension of the agricultural sector has 
attracted substantial amount of FDI.
Similarly, contract farming has not become widespread to have significant impact on 
the agricultural sector either (Van Berkum, 2005, p.121). This is because the 
production, processing and marketing channels are so fragmented and diverse 
supermarkets usually purchase their fruits and vegetables from local and central 
wholesale markets and shippers (Van Berkum, 2005, p. 123). The existing quality 
and safety requirements are not highly stringent in terms of both legal regulation and 
consumer choice (Codron, et al., 2004, p. 597). Hence, the backward integration of 
retailers into the farm production function through contracting has not been 
developed so as to have significant impact on small farms (Codron, et al., 2004, p. 
601).11 Therefore, although the structure of the food market has been changing due to 
the increasing diffusion of supermarkets, which has been manly driven by domestic 
investments, this has not (yet) led to a substantial structural change in the agricultural 
sector.
11 However, there are some successful producer cooperatives engaging in contracts with large 
supermarkets operating in Turkey and abroad (Codron, et al., 2004, pp 601-602).
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2.3.6 Little integration into world markets
Global agricultural trade has played a little role in Turkey’s agricultural 
transformation. Between 1990 and 2004, the total volume of agricultural exports 
increased from US$ 3.3 billion to US$ 6.5 billion, while imports rose from US$ 2.8 
billion to US$ 6.1 billion (WTO, 2006b). Hence, although its exports increased, 
Turkey’s trade surplus in agriculture diminished. The share of agricultural trade in 
the economy’s merchandise trade was small too. In 2004, the share of exports in total 
merchandise exports was 10 per cent; the share of imports was six per cent (WTO, 
2006b). Fruit and vegetables account for more than half of the exports. On the other 
hand, oil seeds, skin and cotton imports constitute more than half of the total imports.
The volume of Turkey’s exports is substantially low in relation to its comparative 
advantages in world markets. Based on ‘standard international trade classification’ 
used by the OECD, Turkey has one of the highest comparative advantages in high- 
value fruits, nuts and vegetables. In 2004, among 30 members of the OECD, it 
ranked third in edible fruits and nuts, sixth in edible vegetables (OECD, 2006b). Yet, 
its market share in OECD vegetable and fruit markets was only two and seven per 
cent, respectively. On the other hand, it has one of the lowest comparative 
advantages in cereals, ranking in the 21th position (OECD, 2006b). However, it does 
not import significant quantities of these products either. In the case of wheat, for 
instance, although domestic prices have been consistently above world prices since 
the early 1990s (except 1994 and 2001 financial crisis) -  almost twice as high in 
some periods (see Figure 2.20) -  the country has only imported small amounts of
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wheat to meet its short-term supply shortages.12 In sum, Turkey is neither utilizing its 
full potential in world export markets where it has strong comparative advantage, nor 
is it benefiting from cheaper supply opportunities in commodities where its 
comparative advantage is low.
Figure 2-20 Wheat prices (nominal), Turkey vs. World, 1980-2004
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Source: For world prices (OECD, 2006c); for domestic prices (SPO, 2006).
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Turkey’s trade policies are regulated by preferential agreements with trading partners 
and multilateral (WTO) commitments. Although the country has been in the EU 
Customs Union since 1996, this does not cover agricultural commodities, except 
highly processed food products. The country benefits from its 1963 Association 
Agreement with the European Union giving a certain degree of trade preference to 
Turkey for agricultural products. However, Turkey continues to face ad valorem 
tariffs for a range of major products such as sugar and cereals and some substantial 
seasonal ad valorem tariffs for some fruits and vegetables. Turkey determined its
Domestic Prices 
World Prices
12 It imported around 1 million tons in 2004, representing less than five per cent of domestic 
production (FAOSTAT, 2006)
agricultural tariffs on the basis of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
after it joined the WTO in 1995. As a developing country, it committed itself to 
reduce its tariffs by 24 per cent on average until 2004. Then, it gradually shuffled its 
domestic support measures towards non-trade distorting ones by shifting its amber 
box domestic support subject to reduction commitments, to the green box subsidies 
that are not subject to reduction commitments (Akder, 2007).
As for Turkey’s own trade barriers, the simple average of its bound rate is relatively
high, slightly more than 60 per cent, yet the difference between its bound rates and
applied tariff rates are relatively small. Quite a large proportion of its bound tariffs,
almost one-third of the total, are higher than 50 per cent (OECD, 2000). The highest
tariff rates, most of them three digit, are applied to major crops such as cereals, meat,
1 ^dairy products, sugar and tobacco. For instance, the bound rate is 180 per cent for 
wheat, barley and maize, 148 per cent for tobacco, 135 per cent for sugar. On the 
other hand, the lowest rates are applied to vegetable oil of which the country is a net 
importer and to raw materials, such as cotton, that are processed to be exported back 
to world markets (Cakmak and Akder, 2005, p. 109).
As for the applied rate, the average is around 40 per cent, ranging from zero per cent 
for cotton to more than 200 per cent for meat products (Cakmak and Akder, 2005, 
p. 113). However, for major cereals the gap between bound tariffs and applied rates 
are huge (for wheat, for instance, 180 per cent vs. 40 per cent) which implies that the
13On the other hand, almost 45 per cent of its bound tariff lines are between 10 and 20 per cent, and it 
does not provide any significant duty free access, while almost 20 per cent of its tariff lines are below 
10 per cent (OECD, 2000).
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government holds substantial power to control domestic markets by imposing high 
tariffs which will not be affected significantly by WTO reduction commitments.
The Undersecretary for Foreign Trade in coordination with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs decides on Turkey’s position in multilateral trade 
negotiations at the WTO. Although it does not seem to have a clear strategy and 
action plan, it has been pursuing a protectionist position. It is a member of the G-33 
countries -  42 developing countries that take a protectionist approach to agricultural 
trade liberalization. 14 The group mainly argues for establishing different levels of 
tariff thresholds and related reduction commitments for developing and developed 
countries. It put forwards the concepts of special products and a special safeguard 
mechanism. Based on concerns in relation to food security, livelihood and rural 
development, the G-33 demands more flexibility in designating special products 
which should be subject to low or no tariff reduction. It also negotiates for a special 
safeguard mechanism which would allow them to provide their farmers with some 
protection against import surges and international price fluctuations.
Turkey’s slow integration into world agricultural markets represents another low 
equilibrium point slowing its agricultural transformation. Due to low yields in staple 
food production, the large proportion of the country’s cultivable land has to be 
devoted to cereals, leaving relatively little for other crops. Since cereal production is 
undertaken by large numbers of underproductive farmers, they need protection from
14 The other members of the G-33 are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, 
China, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & the 
Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.
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competitive producers in world markets. The country’s protectionist approach 
through high trade barriers prevents agricultural consumers benefiting from low 
prices in world markets. In return, given that low-income consumer masses, both in 
rural and urban areas, spend the bulk of their income on staple foods, high food 
prices keep their real income lower than it would have been in a more open trade 
environment, which constrains their demand for higher-value commodities, slowing 
down the transition from low to higher-value cropping patterns. Therefore, Turkey 
faces a low equilibrium trap whereby the lack of transformation within agriculture 
locks it into a protectionist position in international trade which in turn slows down 
its transformation within agriculture.
2.3.7 Ascribed inequality
Turkey illustrates a relatively equal land distribution pattern where small producers 
dominate the rural structure. The Gini coefficient for land distribution was 0.55 in 
2001.15 However, at the regional level, there is a major exception to this relatively 
egalitarian picture. South-eastern Anatolia is an historical case of severely skewed 
land distribution where the majority of rural population is land-poor, while a small 
minority owns the bulk of the agricultural land. This constitutes a major constraint on 
agricultural transformation at the regional level.
15 The Gini coefficients have been calculated by the author based on the basic formula below: 
Y: Cumulative relative frequency of income 
X: Cumulative relative frequency of households
G =  |1 — J2(Xk -  X k - i ) (H  +  Yfc-OI
fc=l
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The region covers 15 per cent of the total agricultural land in Turkey, albeit, the 
country’s largest land holdings are concentrated there. According to the 2001 land 
census, around 50 per cent of holdings larger than 100 hectares and 40 per cent of 
those larger than 50 hectares were located in the region (SIS, 2003b). The land was 
concentrated in the hands of a few households. The top two per cent of households 
owned 29 per cent of the total land in 2001.16 In the most extreme case, five families 
owned around 170,000 hectares of land, six per cent of the total cultivable land. On 
the other hand, the bottom 58 per cent of households owned less than five hectares, 
which constituted only 11 per cent of the total (SIS, 2003b). Therefore, with the 
highest Gini coefficient -  0.65 in both 1980 and 2001 -  the region constitutes a 
major exception to relatively egalitarian land distribution in Turkey.
What makes the region exceptional in terms of its land distribution pattern is its 
different political economic history. State politics, dating back to Ottoman times, 
have always played a central role in the evolution of rural inequality in the region. 
Kurdish tribal chiefs enjoyed the control of large stretches of land in return for their 
alliance with the central authority. A couple of land reform attempts failed after the 
establishment of the Republic in the first half of the 20th century. Sustained by 
continuous political patronage and reinforced by local tribal relations, the level of 
land inequality remained high throughout the early modem history of Turkey.
Since the inequality in the region is ‘ascribed’ -  i.e. based on land grabbing, political 
favouring or traditional bonds (i.e. tribal relations) rather than merit, operational 
efficiency and market performance (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000, p.46) -  it hindered
16 This figure underestimates the full scale of land inequality in the region, due to the fact that the 
2001 census understated the size of large landownerships, which will be discussed in Chapter V.
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the functioning of economic mechanisms that allocate resources in a way to promote 
growth. It has limited the potential positive impacts of other factors, such as having 
relatively favourable ecology, agricultural mechanization and the government’s 
investments in infrastructure. For instance, the GAP, a massive irrigation project 
entailing an extensive irrigation scheme -  with 22 dams -  has brought in new 
opportunities for the transition from low to high-value cropping patterns. However, 
at the local level, which will be investigated in a village study in Chapter V, the 
peasant masses have limited access to land and water which prevents them utilizing 
their operational comparative advantages fully in labour intensive cotton, vegetable 
and fruits production. Therefore, the region has not achieved the potential 
agricultural development it could have achieved if its rural resources (chiefly land 
and water) were more equably distributed.
2.3.8 Political and institutional trap
Between 1980 and 2004, Turkish agricultural policy framework was shaped by two 
financial crises hitting the country at the beginning and at the end of that period and 
by electorate politics with populist incentives in between. The ‘structural adjustment’ 
programmes of the 1980s accompanied by the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s, 
emerged as limited government spending, wage repression, tight monetary policies 
and financial liberalization, in a package imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, 
brought about radical policy changes at the macro-economic level. These policies 
paid no particular attention to the agricultural sector; their main concern was to 
stabilize macro-economic indicators, mainly in relation to fiscal balance. The sector 
has been affected as an outcome of these overall ‘adjustments’ which were meant to 
be the answer to Turkey’s financial crises. Paradoxically, the more severe the
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country’s financial circumstances, the more constraints it was subjected to and the 
greater the impact on the agricultural sector.
Nevertheless, in periods of relative macro economic stability when government was 
able to support agriculture, it failed to design coherent strategies to facilitate 
agricultural growth. The level of spending on infrastructure, extension services, 
research and development has always remained small in comparison to subsidies 
maintaining the existing structural inefficiencies. Their main objective has been to 
gain electoral support from rural areas, comprising more than one-third of the 
country’s electorate, rather than formulating goals and designing new policy tools 
(Akder, 2007).These policies have placed the heavy burden of domestic support on 
consumers.
Structural Adjustment
Turkey has a long history of ‘structural adjustment’ programmes. It experienced one 
of the first examples of such policy packages in the early 1980s, after a major 
financial crisis hit the country at the end of the 1970s. It marked the turning point 
from ‘import substitution industrialization’ to export-led neo-liberalization. With the 
backing of five successive structural adjustment loans supplied by the World Bank 
between 1980 and 1984 (Onis, 2000), a new economic programme was adopted, 
which then changed the fundamentals of agricultural policies. There were sharp 
declines in agricultural subsidies. By 1985, the first programme introduced in 1980 
lifted the bulk of input subsidies, except for small amounts of fertilizer subsidies 
(Kazgan, 1999, p.33). The amount of supported commodities was gradually reduced 
from 30 to 17 (OECD, 1994. p. 64).
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Towards the end of the 1980s, the level of subsidies began to rise again as the 
economy showed signs of recovery from the crisis. There was an upward trend in all 
categories of input and output subsidies. However, they followed a fluctuating trend, 
rising in years of elections, falling thereafter. They peaked in 1998 before the country 
faced another severe financial crisis in 1999. The government had to take on an IMF 
stand-by programme which again shifted the way agricultural policies were 
undertaken. It imposed rapid reductions in all agricultural subsidies. In only three 
years following the inception of the programme, the level of input subsidies fell 
below the 1986 level, from US$ 1,700 million in 1999 to US$ 170 million in 2002, a 
tenfold decline (see Figure 2.21). The absolute value of marketing support went 
down from US$ 4.3 billion in 1999 to less than US$ 0.5 billion in 2004 (OECD, 
2006a).
Figure 2-21 Input subsidies (million US $) in Turkey, 1986-2004
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Source: OECD, PSE/CSE database 1986-2005 (OECD, 2006a).
It was the conditions set by the IMF that forced the government to take such policy 
measures restraining the agricultural sector. However, the IMF programme collapsed 
in 2001, resulting in an unprecedented economic crisis. Then, the IMF introduced a
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new bail-out plan with even tougher agricultural policies. Facing the most serious 
economic crisis in the country’s history, the government assured the IMF that it 
would implement all the ‘suggested’ agricultural policies. Through a series of ‘letters 
of intent,’ Ministry of Finance, the Treasury and the Central Bank declared a strong 
commitment to reduction or removal of agricultural subsidies and the privatization of 
state-owned agricultural enterprises. It also accepted precise conditions set by the 
standby agreement regarding how it should set prices for major agricultural 
commodities.17
The restructuring of the agricultural bank, the privatization of state-owned marketing 
and stocking boards and removal of financial support from producer associations 
were among the ‘promised’ policies that were immediately put into effect. The 
Agriculture Bank of Turkey, one of the biggest commercial banks in the country, 
underwent a radical restructuring. Its primary function of providing cheap credits to 
agricultural producers was lifted altogether. For the first time, interest rates for 
agricultural credits were above the inflation rate in 1999 (see Figure 2.22). Many 
state-owned enterprises in the agricultural sector have been put into the privatization 
portfolio, including the Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Salt and Alcohol Enterprises
1 RInc. (TEKEL) and major chemical fertilizer factories.
17 For instance, the IMF required that the purchase prices of cereals would be set according to the 
Chicago Board of Trade.
18 Two of them TUGSAS and IGSAS controlled around one-third of the fertilizer market in 1999 
(Kafaoglu, 2001, p.40), in (Ozkaya, et al., 2001, p. 18).
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Figure 2-22 Real interest rates for agricultural credits in Turkey, 1980-2003
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Source: Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs (MARA, 2004).
The IMF programme and related World Bank project also initiated a new scheme of 
direct subsidies replacing the previously implemented input and output subsidies. A 
scheme of direct income support (DIS) under the name of Agricultural Reform 
Implementation Project (ARIP) was adopted (World Bank, 2001). It granted farmers 
an annual payment to cover short-term losses associated with the removal of price 
and input- based subsidies. A payment of around US$ 110 per hectare was granted to 
all farmers, with the cap of a maximum of 50 hectares per farmer. Apart from all 
serious implementation problems, the project provided only US$ 1.25 billion in 
2002, which was substantially below compensation for the losses in input and 
marketing support that was available before the programme (OECD, 2004).
Domestic Support
The level of producer subsidies has fluctuated substantially over the last twenty 
years, following a pattern reflecting the period of financial crises and elections. This 
can be analysed in a comparative way by using common measures used by the 
OECD, namely Producer Support Estimate (PSE), and Total Support Estimate
h w b b h b b i
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(TSE).19 The average percentage PSE in Turkey was 14 per cent in 1986, meaning 
that 14 per cent of the total domestic value of production was directed to producers 
through transfers.20 Then it moved up to 27 per cent in 1991 which was a 
parliamentary election year. It then fell down to 12 per cent in 1994 when the 
country was hit by a financial crisis. Then it moved up again to 26 per cent in 1998, 
just before the general election in 1999. Then it rapidly declined to five per cent in 
2001 when the country faced another financial crisis. It recovered from that level and 
reached as high as 28 per cent in 2003 just before the municipal elections the 
following year. As such, as Figure 2.23 illustrates below, the level of agricultural 
support has always made a pendulum movement between the highs in election times 
and the lows in financial crises.
Figure 2-23 Producer subsidies (producer support estimate) in Turkey, 1986- 
2004
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Source: PSE/CSE database 1986-2005 (OECD, 2006a) and (Cakmak and Akder, 2005).
19 The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) measures the total value o f transfers made to producers from 
consumers or taxpayers in a given year. The value o f the PSE includes market price supports and non- 
market transfers (direct payments, input subsidies and other indirect supports). The percentage PSE is 
the total value o f transfers as a percentage o f the total domestic value o f production (OECD, 1994, p. 
164). It takes world prices as reference point and considers the price differential between world prices 
and domestic prices as market transfers to domestic producers. The Total Support Estimate (TSE) is 
also a related but a different estimate encompassing transfers from consumers, taxpayers and budget 
revenues.
20 Although OECD data are not available before 1986, Kasnakoglu calculates that it was 28 per cent in 
1979 before it declined to 14 per cent in 1986 (Kasnakoglu, 1992, p.325).
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The average PSE was 20 per cent in Turkey between 1986 and 2004, which was 
consistently lower than the OECD average. The percentage PSE in OECD was 40 
per cent in 1986 which then fluctuated slightly, but has always stayed over 30 per 
cent in the entire period (OECD, 2006a). On average, producers in OECD countries 
received 33 per cent of the value of their production through various forms of 
transfers. Among them, Switzerland had the highest level of support with 72 per cent 
on average, while New Zealand set the lowest with three per cent (OECD, 2006a). 
Hence, Turkey represents one of the lowest (on average) and at the same time the 
most volatile levels of producer support estimates among all OECD countries.
Figure 2-24 Composition of producer support estimate in Turkey, 1986-2004
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Source: OECD, PSE/CSE database 1986-2005 (OECD, 2006a).
The Total Support Estimate (TSE), on the other hand, has followed a slightly 
different trend over the same period in Turkey.21 Consumers shouldered a heavier
21 The TSE includes general services support in addition to producers support estimate under the 
category o f transfers from taxpayers. It is calculated by the formula: TSE= (transfers from consumers) 
+ (transfers from taxpayers) -  (budget revenues). It allows for assessing whether the actual burden o f 
agricultural subsidies is on governments or on consumers.
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burden of agricultural support as compared to governments in 15 years out of 19 in 
the 1986-2004 period (OECD, 2006a). As is indicated by the composition of the PSE 
(see Figure 2.24), the government’s subsidy policy was heavily based on market 
price support, which means that the consumer paid for the bulk of the support rather 
than the government (tax payers). Between 1986 and 1993, more than 70 per cent of 
the total transfers to producers occurred through the transfers from consumers 
(OECD, 2006a). Then the consumers’ burden decreased to 40 per cent between 1994 
and 1996. Afterwards, both transfers from the government and from consumers 
declined severely in 1999. As Figure 2.25 illustrates below, since 2001 the share of 
transfers from consumers increased tremendously, and the downward trend in 
transfers from the government has continued. In 2004, the share of transfers from 
consumers in total support to producers hit 72 per cent, one of the highest since 1986. 
This means that the government has been placing the heaviest burden of agricultural 
support on consumers.
Figure 2-25 Composition of total support estimate in Turkey, 1986-2004
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The trend of funding producers through consumers has serious socio-economic 
consequences. Especially considering that the poor spend the bulk of their income on 
agricultural commodities, high consumer prices means transferring vital resources 
from the poor consumer to the farmer. It actually means that the governments were 
effectively transferring resources from one segment of the poor to another while 
worsening the situation of consumers. On the other hand, the relatively wealthier 
segments of the society who spend a smaller proportion of their income on 
agricultural commodities are paying for a smaller proportion of the government’s 
agriculture bill, since the tax component of the subsidies is in decline. That is to say, 
the government’s policy of subsidizing producers through consumers was creating a 
regressive taxation mechanism which has been worsening income distribution.
The level of spending on major infrastructure services has always remained small in 
proportion to the Total Support Estimate (TSE). The government’s spending on 
infrastructure, research and development, agricultural schools and inspection fell 
from around three per cent of the TSE between 1986 and 1994 to 1.6 per cent on 
average between 1995 and 2004. As is shown in Figure 2.26 below, even in periods 
when the Total Support Estimate reached relatively high levels, the share of spending 
on major agricultural services remained dismally small. As such, even in periods of 
relative economic stability when governments had financial resources to invest in 
agriculture, they did not pursue policies focusing on infrastructure, research, 
development and other productivity enhancing services which would have stimulated 
agricultural growth.
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Figure 2-26 Government spending on major services vs. the total support 
estimate in Turkey, 1986-2004
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Source: OECD, PSE/CSE database 1986-2005 (OECD, 2006a).
* Includes government spending on infrastructure, research and development, agricultural 
schools and inspection services.
2.4 Small-farm transformation
Turkey’s agricultural sector is dominated by small farms, with an average size of 
around six hectares. Their number increased from 3.4 million in 1980 to 3.7 million 
in 2001 (SIS, 1982; SIS, 2004). This thesis treats the predominance of small farms as 
a question of the lack of substantial labour transition from the agricultural to the non- 
agricultural sectors at the household level. It attempts to analyze it from the 
perspective of the household as a relationship between the opportunity cost of 
staying in agriculture and the opportunity cost of leaving agriculture. It argues that 
since both of these opportunity costs have been consistently low in Turkey over the 
last 25 years, small farms have continued to dominate the sector, while facing
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relative impoverishment. By the same token, differentiation within agriculture, the 
historical process of land concentration, did not take place, mainly due to the lack of 
labour transition from the agricultural sector.
In the context of small family farms, even if large numbers of households exited the 
sector altogether, this would not put significant strain on the total output.. With 
productivity levels at the sectoral level so low in Turkey, there is ample scope for 
raising labour productivity even if some agricultural labour force exited the scene. 
So, what are the underlying factors, operating at the household level, that have 
prevented surplus labour from leaving small farming over the last 25 years?
As discussed above, a combination of low rural and urban population growth and 
concentration of people of working age (15-65), has led to the growth of potential 
labour supply. This in turn has raised the level of unemployment and 
underemployment in non-agricultural sectors. Moreover, the demand for unskilled 
rural labour has been low and getting lower as non-agricultural economies 
modernized. Hence, for an average rural labourer, the chances of finding 
employment in the urban sectors have been getting smaller, which reduces the 
opportunity cost of staying in agriculture. On the other hand, the predominance of 
low value and low productivity activities in the agricultural sector keeps the 
opportunity cost of leaving agriculture low too. Therefore, the low opportunity cost 
of both leaving and staying in agriculture means that the sector has become a labour 
trap for millions of labourers working in low-income small farms. In fact, the 
agricultural sector employs the largest proportion of those who are below the 
national poverty line (World Bank, 2005b, p. 98).
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2.4.1 Land concentration
A gradual land concentration, in term of either operation or ownership, is an integral 
part of the process of rural transformation. It involves a differentiation process 
whereby small farmers that leave agriculture would rent-out or sell their land22 while 
farms that had extra operational and financial capacity would expand the scale of 
their operation. The pull forces should be big enough to siphon labour out of the 
agricultural sector, which would encourage small and low-income farms to leave 
their land. Ideally, the sectoral growth in agriculture should also be big enough to 
create adequate surpluses for more competitive farms to expand their operational 
capacity and accumulate land.
It is, therefore, not surprising that there has not been a significant trend of 
differentiation (i.e. land concentration) in Turkey over the past 25 years. Looking at 
the results of the general agricultural census conducted every ten years between 1980 
and 2001, more than 60 per cent of households owned less than five hectares in all 
the three censuses (see Table 2.3) (SIS, 1984b; SIS, 1994; SIS, 2003b). The amount 
of land owned by households in this category constituted 20 per cent of the total (see 
Table 2.4). Around 20 per cent of households owned between 5 ha to 10 ha. About 
15 per cent of households owned between 10 ha to 50 ha, which could be considered 
as the middle-size ownership category. They owned around 35 per cent of the total 
land in the three censuses. The households in the largest category of ownership 
(more than 50 hectares) constituted less than one per cent of total households. The 
amount of land owned by this category constituted 11 to 12 per cent of the total in
22 In the early stages, renting-out is a more frequent tendency, as it allows the household/individual to 
keep the option of getting back to agriculture in case of lack of success in the non-agricultural sector.
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both 1980 and 2001. In total, between 1980-2001, there has not been significant 
change in Gini coefficient for land distribution which saw only a slight rise from 0.53 
to 0.55. Therefore, the process of scale differentiation and upward mobility in 
ownership has been stagnant.
Increasing number of small farms has continued to dominate the sector. Between 
1980-2001, the share of households owning less than five hectares increased by five 
per cent, while their share in total area increased by seven per cent (see Table 2.3 and 
2.4, last columns). This was accompanied by a decreasing share of middle-ownership 
categories. The share of households owning between 5-10 hectares declined by 
almost 10 per cent while the share of those owning between 10-20 hectares declined 
by 8 per cent. Therefore, the dominance of small farms in Turkish agriculture has 
also been strengthened by a process of land fragmentation over the recent decades.
Table 2-3 Percentage of households by land ownership category in Turkey, 
1980-1991-2001
Land
ownership
(ha) 1980
Households (%) 
1991 2001
%
1980-1991
Net change
%
1991-2001
%
1980-2001
0-4.9 62.1 68 65.4 9.5 -3.8 5.4
5-9.9 20.2 17.3 18.2 -14.4 5.3 -9.9
10-19.9 11.6 9.4 10.6 -19 13.2 -8.3
20-49.9 5.3 4.3 5 -18.9 16.2 -5.7
50+ 0.8 0.9 0.1 12.5 -92.1 -91.1
Total 100 100 100
Source: General Agricultural Censuses of 1980, 1991, 2001 (SIS, 1984b; SIS, 1994; SIS 
2003b).
23 The Gini coefficients are based on the author’s calculation using the basic formula: 
Y: Cumulative relative frequency of income 
X: Cumulative relative frequency of households
g  =  | i  — +  yfc_i)|
k=l
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Table 2-4 Percentage of total land by land ownership category in Turkey, 1980- 
1990-2001
L a n d
o w n e r s h ip
(h a )
0-4.9
1980
20
L a n d  (%)
1991
22.1
2001
21.3
%
1980-1991
10.5
N et c h a n g e
%
1991-2001
-3.5
%
1980-2001
6.7
5-9.9 21.2 19.9 20.7 -6.1 3.9 -2.4
10-19.9 23.8 21 23.8 -11.8 13.4 0
20-49.9 22.9 19.8 22.8 -13.5 15.3 -0.3
50+ 12.1 17.1 11.3 41.3 -33.6 -6.2
Total 100 100 100
Source: General Agricultural Censuses of 1980, 1991, 2001 (SIS, 1984b; SIS, 1994; SIS 
2003b).
2.5 Transition to non-farm activities in rural areas
Rural-to-urban migration, which was historically an integral part of the process of the 
transformation from agriculture, is no longer essential as a spatial dimension of the 
process. As was shown in the first part of this chapter, rural-to-urban migration has 
slowed down in Turkey since the early 1990s. It has become synonymous with 
ghettoization,24 making it less feasible for rural labourers to migrate to urban areas 
given the high levels there of unemployment and underemployment. However, the 
importance of non-agricultural activities in rural areas has been growing, and this 
provides an alternative mechanism to the process of labour transition by means of 
rural-to-urban migration. Nevertheless, at the regional level, the number and the 
share of non-agricultural households in rural areas seem to have corresponded to the 
level of the transformation within agriculture.
The number of households engaging in non-agricultural activities in rural areas in 
Turkey has increased over the last two decades, albeit with significant variations at
24 The number of people living in slums has increased dramatically over the last 25 years, and it is 
estimated to have reached 900 million (UNPD, 2005. p. 51).
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the regional level. Their number rose from 360,000 in 1980 to approximately 1.5 
million in 2001 (SIS, 1982; SIS, 2004). Consequently, the proportion of non- 
agricultural households in rural areas -  those engaged in services and manufacturing 
activities - increased from 9.5 per cent to 28.3 per cent (see Table 2.5 below). As 
Figure 2.27 shows, the Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean regions have 
experienced the most rapid rise. For instance, in the Marmara region, the number of 
non-agricultural households increased by almost five times between 1980 and 1990. 
The Mediterranean region saw a 220 per cent increase between 1990 and 2001 (SIS, 
1982; SIS, 2004). However, other regions such as north-eastern or middle-eastern 
Anatolia did not experience to any considerable extent a transition to non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas.
Table 2-5 Share of households engaging in non-agricultural activities in rural 
Turkey by region, 1980-1991-2001
Percentages (%)
1980 1991 2001
Turkey (total) 10 14 28
1. Middle Northern 9 13 24
II. Aegean 15 12 33
III. Marmara 11 37 54
IV. Mediterranean 13 16 37
V. North Eastern 4 9 12
VI. South Eastern 7 9 17
VII. Black Sea 6 9 16
VIII. Middle East 7 8 15
IX. Middle South 8 13 22
Sources: 1980 and 2001 General Agricultural Census, Village Information (SIS, 1982; SIS, 
2004).
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Figure 2-27 Percentage of non-agricultural households in rural Turkey by 
region 1980-1991-2001
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Sources: 1980 and 2001 General Agricultural Census, Village Information (SIS, 1982; SIS, 
2004).
At the regional level, the high shares of non-agricultural households seem to
correspond to a high level of agricultural development. Those regions which had the
most rapid growth in the number and the share of non-agricultural households,
namely the Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean regions are also those which had
the highest land productivity in 2001. As shown in the first part of this chapter,
average value produced on one hectare of land was substantially higher in these
regions as compared to the country’s average (see Figure 2.12). Since the production,
expenditure and investment linkages between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sector in rural areas are strong, the growth performance of the agricultural sector
strongly affects the level and pace of the transition from agricultural to non-
agricultural activities in rural areas (Reardon, 2004, p. 5). Hence it is not surprising
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not to observe a substantial rise in the share of non-agricultural households in other 
regions where the level of agricultural development was low.
2.6 Conclusion
From an historical point of view, rural transformation has been slow in Turkey over 
the last quarter of a century.
Demographic and economic developments have been unfavourable for the process 
of transformation from agriculture. The size of the rural population has seen only a 
slight decline, while the size of the rural population of working-age has risen. The 
urban labour force has grown enormously, not only as a result of rural-to-urban 
migration, but increasingly as a result of urban population growth itself. Hence, the 
population has been growing and the work force has been growing at an even faster 
rate in both rural and urban areas, which has made the transformation more difficult. 
As for economic factors, the employment elasticity of non-agricultural growth has 
been low, leading to a substantially low level of labour participation and high 
unemployment in non-agricultural sectors. Although the services sector has absorbed 
more additional labour than the manufacturing sector, the aggregate employment 
elasticity of non-agricultural growth has been inadequate to absorb large amounts of 
surplus labour from rural areas. In addition, the low level of educational attainment 
of the rural labour force contributed to the lack of sizeable labour transition from the 
rural to urban sectors.
The transformation within agriculture has been stagnant, and low-value cropping
patterns at low productivity have continued to be prevalent. This was mainly because
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Turkey has not benefited from the Green Revolution fully, and the level of 
productivity in staple food production has remained severely dependent on ecology, 
creating substantial variations at the local level. The transition to higher value 
cropping patterns has been slow due to some structural obstacles of agricultural and 
non-agricultural origin. First, because of low yields in staple food production, high 
proportions of arable land needed to be devoted to staple foods, which has 
discouraged the transition. Second, because of low growth rates and/or skewed 
distribution of disposable income in the non-agricultural sector, the demand stimulus 
for the transition in cropping patterns has been low.
In addition, the agricultural sector has been experiencing a period of severe 
profitability crisis arising from falling prices in both domestic and world markets and 
increasing cost of production. This has also been reflected in declining investments 
going into agriculture especially by the private sector. Since low levels of investment 
diminish profitability and growth even further, the sector seems to have been 
suffering from a downward spiral of ‘low margin -  low investment -  low growth’. 
On the other hand, Turkey has not managed to utilize its full potential in export 
markets where it has the advantage of high-value vegetable and fruit production. 
Also it has not benefited from cheaper supply opportunities in other commodities, 
mainly food staples. Furthermore, its chronic macro-economic instability and 
recurrent fiscal crises brought the ‘structural adjustment’ in the 1980s and its 
‘Washington Consensus’ version in the 1990s, which resulted in a political economic 
environment which has not been conducive for transformation within agriculture.
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The stagnant process of the transformation from agriculture has led to the 
predominance of small farms in the sector. At the household level, since the chances 
of finding non-agricultural employment are low (low opportunity cost of staying in 
agriculture), small-scale agriculture has become a labour trap for some 15 million 
labourers. Since the process of the transformation within agriculture has been 
stagnant too, the opportunity cost of leaving agriculture is also low, meaning that 
small farms have continued to be tied to their land, and the process of differentiation 
through land concentration has not taken place. Some significant extent of transition 
from agricultural to non-agricultural activities in rural areas has occurred in certain 
regions of the country, providing an alternative to rural-to-urban migration; however, 
it remains directly linked to the extent of agricultural development.
This chapter has investigated the major trends in Turkish agriculture over recent 
decades. The next three chapters will go into the details and exemplify the impact of 
some of the major factors described above at the local level. Through the 
longitudinal assessment of three village cases, it will provide thematic reviews 
regarding the various aspects of rural transformation. The next chapter takes the case 
of Tuz and analyzes market trends at the commodity level and assesses the role of 
agricultural policy and politics in rural transformation at the village level.
I l l
Chapter III - The Good, Bad and Ugly: Productivity, Price and
Profitability in Tuz
A favourable agro-ecology, high-quality infrastructure, widespread use of biological, 
chemical and mechanical technology, and advanced agronomic practices represent a 
perfect combination for the process of agricultural development. These endowments 
rarely come together in developing countries, and when they do, it would be normal 
to expect that they would enable farmers to achieve high yields and high-value 
cropping patterns. However, would the consequent high-productivity be sufficient to 
sustain high levels of farm incomes and high rates of economic growth in 
agriculture?
This chapter considers the importance of market mechanisms in the process of 
transformation within agriculture. In particular, it investigates price trends as a 
crucial factor affecting the economic viability of the sector as a whole. It departs 
from the fact that the majority of agricultural commodity prices have seen a steady 
decline over the last 25 years. Taking the case of a single commodity -  cotton -  it 
examines the impact of various economic and political factors leading to the price 
fall. Apart from market mechanisms, it emphasizes the role of some extra-market 
(political) forces operating at a global level, lowering world prices artificially. It also 
investigates trends in input prices at the national level, which have been affected by 
changing domestic policies due to the ‘structural adjustment’ programmes that 
Turkey has faced. By looking at trends in productivity, prices and cost of production, 
the chapter aims at measuring the extent of, as some argue, the ‘profitability crisis’ in 
agriculture.
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The village of Tuz in western Anatolia is a substantial illustration of the impact of 
price trends in world markets on agricultural growth at the local level. It is a cotton 
producing village which is fully integrated into world markets. Over the past 25 
years, the farmers of Tuz have achieved one of the highest cotton yields in the world. 
However, what they have achieved in physical productivity has been undermined by 
market and extra-market factors operating at the international and national levels. 
Since Tuz is dominated by small farms, it also provides insightful information about 
the process of small-farm differentiation.
This chapter is divided into five sections. First, the village of Tuz will be introduced 
along with the process of its demographic and labour transition since it was first 
studied in the early 1980s. Second, the chapter will focus on the enormous success 
the farmers of Tuz have achieved in improving cotton yields. Third, it will take the 
analysis beyond the village level and investigate price trends in world cotton markets 
and assess major economic and political factors affecting prices globally and 
domestically. Fourth, the trends of output productivity and the cost of production will 
be assessed, and it will return to the village and analyze trends in profitability at the 
local level. Finally, the chapter will investigate the question of small-farm 
differentiation through land concentration over the last two decades.
3.1 Tuz, a village in agricultural transformation1
The village of Tuz is located in the Soke district of the province of Aydin in western 
Turkey. It is around 150 km south of izmir. Soke is in a delta valley fed by a river
1 This section draws partly on author’s paper published in International Journal of Agricultural 
Resources and Governance (Karapinar, 2007).
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which joins the Aegean Sea at the valley’s western edge. The village is in the south­
west of the Soke district to which it is connected by a tarmac road of about 18 km. It 
skirts a mountain range on its north side, and faces the valley along its south-east and 
south-west. The Aegean Sea is in about 2 km from the village.
In the fall of 2003,1 undertook fieldwork in Tuz for six weeks. The research design 
was based on random sampling of households, according to their location in the 
village. 130 households, covering 42 per cent of the total, were interviewed. Taking 
regard of various official lists of population, land ownership and occupation, the 
sample represented 40 to 50 per cent of all households when they were categorized 
by demographic features, farm size and occupational composition (agricultural and 
non-agricultural). In September 2004,1 revisited the village for a shorter period.
3.2 A limited labour transition
The demographic and occupational composition of the village has changed in the last 
20 years. There were 893 people living in 170 households in 1984 (Sirman, 1988, p. 
56). By 2003, the village population had grown at 1.9 per cent per year, to reach 
1275 persons residing in 306 households. While the size of population was 
increasing, the average household size declined from 5.2 in 1984 to 4.2 in 2003. The 
extent of rural-to-urban migration has not been significant, and the population has 
been growing at a natural rate. There has not been significant labour transition from 
rural to urban sectors.
There has been some labour transition, however, in terms of the occupational
composition of the labour force. In 1984, 63 per cent of households engaged in
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farming (Sirman, 1988, p. 80). In 2003, the share of farm households was slightly 
lower, at 56 per cent. Remaining households earned their livelihoods from fisheries, 
manual labour, artisanship and other service activities. As for actual numbers, around 
140 households were undertaking activities other than farming in 2003, compared to 
60 households in 1980. Increasing population along with the demographic change in 
relation to the decline in household size has brought about some labour transition to 
non-farming activities within the village.
3.3 Productivity on the rise
Tuz has experienced a full transition to high-value cropping patterns, along with 
substantial productivity improvements over the last 25 years. High-value cotton 
production constituted more than 95 per cent of field crops in 2003. In addition, land 
productivity has risen dramatically; in fact, the farmers of Tuz have achieved one of 
the highest cotton yields in the world. Yields for cotton lint increased from 750-900 
kg per hectare in 1978 to approximately 1,500 kg per hectare in 2003, more than 
doubling the world average (650 kg/ha lint) (ICAC, 2004). As for the quality of 
cotton -  measured in fibre length, fineness, strength and maturity -  the farmers 
produce (Aegean cotton) one of the world’s highest quality products (Schmitz, 1999, 
p.l). How have they made such high levels of progress in agricultural development?
First, ecological conditions are favourable in Tuz. It enjoys the availability of large
stretches of low-land in the delta valley in which it is located. It also benefits from
the right average temperatures, since in order to achieve high yields in cotton, annual
average temperatures should be around 19°C, while summer averages should be 25°
C (Tuzel and Ul, 2003, p. 83). Especially in the first few weeks of sowing,
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temperatures are important in determining the level of plant development (Ozsoy, et 
al., 2003, p. 358). Similarly, Tuz also enjoys one of the highest average lengths of 
growing period in Turkey, more than 200 days, providing high potential for 
agricultural growth.
The availability and the timing of water are also crucial in achieving such high levels 
of productivity. According to agronomic research, a precipitation rate above 389 ml 
before sowing, and below 82 ml between May and October has a positive impact on 
the yields (Ozsoy, et al., 2003, p. 361). Depending on the temperatures, precipitation 
rates, the root depth of cotton and the capacity of the soil in absorbing humidity, 4 -  
6 bursts of additional watering are required (at 15 -  20 day intervals) (Ozsoy, et al., 
2003, p. 365). In the region where Tuz is located, the average annual precipitation is 
around 600ml which fall short of fulfilling this requirement. However* the entire 
cultivable land of the village has access to water through the canal irrigation facility, 
completed by the state in the 1980s. It emanates from the river and supports the 
necessary frequency of watering all year round.2
Although almost the entire cultivable land is affected by salinity which affects yields 
badly,3 all plots in the village have drainage facilities which are designed to dispose 
of it. The farmers fill their fields with water in the off-season (winter) in order to 
create a downward pressure on the water-table towards the bottom of the soil where 
the planting takes place. Then, the extra water is automatically disposed of out of the
2 The Menderes River is regulated by reservoir gates. They are closed in the cotton growing season to 
enable high utilization o f water. The gates and flood channels are open in the winter season, which 
reduces the risk of flood.
3 It is estimated that the salt level o f 9.6 mmhos/cm decreased the yield by 10 per cent; and the level 
of 17 mmhos/cm decreased it by 50 per cent. Levels over 27 mmhos/cm made it impossible to 
cultivate cotton (Tuzel and Ul, 2003, p.84).
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canals. Hence, through the extensive irrigation and drainage infrastructure, the 
farmers of Tuz maintain high levels of productivity.
Second, they benefit from the extensive use of chemical technology, enhancing the 
productive capacity of the soil. Depending on the micro and macro elements that are 
needed for a particular soil type, the systematic application of fertilizers is necessary 
to improve the quality and quantity of cotton. The amounts are specified at about 70- 
100 kg per hectare nitrogen (N), 40-120 kg per hectare phosphor (P) and 60-300 kg 
per hectare potassium (K) (Hakarlerler and Yagmur, 2003, p. 79). In Tuz, the 
average total application was about 700 kg/ha in 2003, well above the required 
levels. However, the amount of fertiliser used by farmers was not determined by 
scientific soil analysis. Only 6 out of 72 cotton-cultivating households in the sample 
of survey declared that they had tested the composition of the soil sampled from their 
plots. Nevertheless, since fertilizers are also more effective under irrigated conditions 
(Gillham, et al., 1995, p. 72), their intensive application has improved yields 
substantially.
Third, increasing use of high quality seed varieties constituted a very important 
genetic factor enhancing productivity. In the Aegean region, research in plant 
breeding and hybridization has led to the development of higher-quality and higher- 
productivity cotton seeds. With the extensive participation of the private sector, 
several hybrid varieties have been developed over the last ten years. Almost 40 new 
seeds have been certified since 1995, and 24 of them by private companies 
(Karadayi, 2003, pp. 65-66). New varieties have enhanced yields, lint quality and 
reduced labour costs and seeding losses. They are more resistant to adverse climate
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conditions, such as strong winds, high temperatures and water limitations. They also 
enhance the quality of the lint produced after ginning.4 In Tuz, more than 90 per cent 
of cotton producers in the survey stated that they had used certified seeds in 2003.
Fourth, an increasing use of mechanical technology also contributes to improvements 
in yields. The use of tractors and other equipment (seed drills, hoes etc.) has 
expanded to even relatively small farms. In 2003, only 10 percent of the land was 
cultivated by households that did not own a tractor. There were 65 tractors in the 
sample of 130 households. Excluding those that did not farm any land, 63 out of 72 
households own at least one tractor. As the farm size increased, the proportion of 
households owning a tractor also increased. In the category of households farming 
less than 2.5 hectares, three households out of 15 owned a tractor. In the category of 
5 - 1 0  hectares, 18 households out of 20 owned one. Half of the households 
operating more than 10 hectares had more than one tractor (see Table 3.1).
Table 3-1 Number of tractors owned by category of farm in Tuz, 2003
Land o p era ted  
(ha)*
Average 
number of 
tractors per 
household
Average 
amount of land 
operated per 
tractor (ha)**
0-2.49 0.2 1.9
2.5-4.99 0.7 3.6
5-9.99 0.9 6.5
10+ 1.5 13.4
Total 0.8 6.4
*Based on households engaged in farming. 
♦♦Based on households owning tractor.
4 Better quality seeds also reduce costs, since the percentage of successful fertilizations is higher. 
They need less to be sown per hectare, which also reduces labour cost by reducing the frequency of 
hoeing after the plants’ vegetation begins. Seeds saved from waste in this way also generate value 
through seed oil production.
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However, the average amount of arable land per tractor was relatively low, at 6.4 
hectares. It was as low as 1.9 hectares per tractor in the farm-size category of less 
than 2.5 hectares, while it reached 13.4 hectares in the category above 10 hectares. 
Although a single tractor was capable of cultivating more than 50 hectares, since the 
plots were fragmented and high-productivity cotton production required precise 
timing, creating seasonal peaks for the use of a tractor, the utilization rates were low. 
Similarly, almost all farm households tend to keep a set of other mechanical 
equipment to be readily available when it is needed. Such an extensive use of 
mechanical technology contributes to increasing yields.
Fifth, the farmers’ knowledge of agronomic practices and crop management is key 
for achieving high yields in cotton. Farmers in Tuz have decades of experience in 
cotton production with right agronomic practices.5 From field preparation to harvest, 
they perform precise practices in different phases of the production process to obtain 
good quality and quantity output. For instance, the timing, frequency and the amount 
of watering is vital (Gillham, et al., 1995, p. 74), as late watering after sowing is 
estimated to result in losses of up to 22 per cent (Tuzel and Ul, 2003, p. 86). The 
amount of fertilizers the farmer applies, and the timing of fertilization are also 
critical in achieving a balanced plant development and hence high yields (Gillham, et 
al., 1995, p. 70). Farmers in Tuz perform good crop protection, through weed 
control, disease and insect protection which have had a direct positive impact on 
yields.
5Cotton production has a long history in this region, dating back to the early 19th century. According 
to Issawi (1980, p. 245), the region exported more than 70.000 bales (200 kg each) of cotton to world 
markets at the end of the century.
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Therefore, it is not coincidence that the farmers of Tuz have achieved one of the 
world’s highest yields over the last 25 years. The right combination of a favourable 
ecology, and the full application of the conventional ‘Green Revolution’ technology 
-  as a package of intensive chemical fertilizers, improved seed varieties, mechanical 
technology and extensive irrigation infrastructure -  in addition to advanced 
agronomic practices have enabled the farmers of Tuz to make such an exceptional 
progress in their agricultural transformation.
3.3.1 Cotton: still white gold?
The impact of such a substantial progress in land productivity, however, has been 
largely offset in economic terms, the underlying reasons for which go beyond the 
village. Since Tuz is fully integrated into world cotton markets, global price trends 
directly affect the village economy. Like the majority of agricultural commodity 
prices, world cotton prices have been decreasing over the last two decades, both in 
nominal and real terms. As is shown in Figure 3.1 below, the real price of cotton hit 
its lowest level for more than twenty years in 2002. It declined from US$ 2.6 per 
kilogram in 1980 to US$ 1.09 in 2002 (Baffes, 2004, p.63). This amounted to an 
annual decline of 2.1 per cent on average. Moreover, there have also been significant 
price fluctuations. For instance, the prices dropped from US$ 2.53 per kilogram in 
May 1996 to US$ 0.97 in December 1999 (Baffes, 2004, p. 5). This raises serious 
questions regarding the economic viability of cotton production, which has been a 
symbol of agricultural development in Turkey.
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Figure 3-1 World cotton prices (US$ per kilogram), 1980-2003
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3.3.2 The price trap  in cotton
Cotton prices have been affected by a combination of economic and political factors. 
The economic relationship between production and prices, which results in falling 
prices, operates in three ways: low price elasticity of demand, low income elasticity 
of demand and low price sensitivity of supply. Other supply-related factors arising 
from the substitution effect of synthetic fibre production also affect cotton prices. 
More importantly, there are major political factors operating through the trade and 
domestic support policies of major players in the market, lowering prices artificially.
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Hence, the extent of the economic losses that the farmers of Tuz have encountered is 
determined beyond the village, in the realm of global markets.
As for economic factors, the income elasticities of cotton are not high, indicating that 
the relationship between income and demand is not strong. Although it is greater for 
higher income countries (Eisa, et al., 1994, p.43), low income elasticity of cotton has 
led to a relatively slow rise in demand, averaging 1.8 per cent over the last twenty 
years (Baffes, 2004, p. 1). This is almost the same as the rate of population growth, 
implying that the impact of the demand factor in creating an upward trend in prices is 
not strong.
There are also some other major supply-related factors contributing to the decline in 
cotton prices. Although total harvested area of cotton has not increased significantly, 
increasing yields along with the substitution effect of synthetic fibre generated 
adequate output to satisfy the slow rise in demand. Increasing share of synthetic 
substances (i.e. polyester) in the fibre market has put pressure on natural fibres. The 
share of synthetic fibre increased from 22 per cent in 1960 to 57 per cent, whereas 
the share of cotton declined to 40 per cent in 2002 (Baffes, 2004, p. 1). This was 
mainly due to the decreasing production cost of synthetic fibre as a result of 
continuous technological progress in that industry. Since there is a strong 
relationship between cotton and polyester prices (Baffes and Gohou, 2005, pp. 9-12), 
price falls in polyester dragged down cotton prices over the recent decades.
There are, however, more important political factors leading to the decline in cotton 
prices. Domestic subsidy policies of major cotton-producer countries affect prices
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severely. According to the International Cotton Advisory Committee (2002), since 
1997-98 total annual direct support, provided mainly by developed countries to their 
cotton producers, ranged from US$ 3.8 billion to US$ 5.3 billion. Cotton farmers in 
the US received an average annual payment of US$ 992 million in the 1986-1993 
period, and US$ 7.045 billion worth deficiency payments (the difference between a 
target price and actual farm-gate price), in addition to US$ 889 million loan 
deficiency payments (Gillham, et al., 1995, p. 118). Then, subsidy levels further 
increased and reached their highest levels. US cotton producers received US$ 2.3 
billion in 2001-02, and US$ 3.6 billion in 2002-03 (Baffes, 2004, p. 13). Producers in 
the EU (mainly in Greece and Spain) received US$ 0.8 billion in 2001-02 (Baffes, 
2004, p. 13).6 As a result, heavy subsidies in developed countries enabled their 
farmers to increase supply and sell their cotton even below their cost of production, 
which led to the decline in world prices.
According to the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC, 2002), if all the 
direct subsidies were lifted, cotton prices would have been 17 cent/pound higher in 
the 2000-01 season, and 31 cent/pound higher in 2001-02. The ICAC also concluded 
that in the absence of subsidies provided by the US only, prices would have been 10 
per cent and 26 per cent higher, respectively.
Other studies on the impact of a possible removal of trade disturbing practices on 
world prices have produced different results. For instance, a recent study by FAO 
calculated that the price impact of the removal of subsidies would be 4.8 per cent
6 Although developing countries subsidized their farmers too, its overall impact on world prices is 
minimal. Chinese producers received US$ 1.2 billion, while, producers in Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, and 
Mexico received only US$ 150 million combined (Baffes, 2004, pp. 11-12).
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(Poonyth, et al., 2004, p. 16).7 By applying the same simulation method to ICAC 
data, the same study came up with an average world price rise of 11.4 per cent. On 
the other hand, an IMF study estimated that, if the production subsidies and market 
price support were removed, the impact would be 2.8 per cent (Tokarick, 2003, p. 
20).8 Goreux (2004, p. 16) argued that it would be around 15 per cent in 2002/03. A 
study by FABRI estimated that, in the absence of subsidies and trade barriers, prices 
would increase 15 per cent above the baseline scenario (for 2002-2011) (FABRI, 
2002, p.23).
The discrepancies between different studies seem to be due to differences in their 
modelling, assumptions and data sets, however, there is a widespread agreement 
about the adverse impact of subsidies and trade barriers on prices and supply 
patterns. It is widely accepted that in the absence of such policies, the level of 
production in subsidizing countries will decrease, as opposed to an increase in non­
subsidizing countries. If the latter has the extra capacity to expand their production, 
their share in world production and export markets will rise. Hence, there will be 
significant welfare gains mainly in non-subsidizing developing countries.
3.3.3 Cotton prices in Turkey
Turkey has a liberalized cotton market, and domestic prices (see Figure 3.2) have 
been following world trends since the late 1990s. It removed its quantitative
7 They used a data set based on the information member countries provided to the WTO regarding 
subsidy and trade barrier levels. There were five scenarios based on different price elasticities of 
demand and supply. The model assumed, among others, that there was a perfect price harmony 
between world prices and domestic prices (Poonyth, et al., 2004, p. 10). This optimistic scenario was 
based on inelastic demand, and quite elastic supply (three times the base values). That is to say, the 
scenario is based on a situation in which increasing prices would have a very limited impact on 
demand, whereas, it would have a big impact on supply, indicating that production would increase 
significantly in countries which do not support their producers).
8 Two per cent of the rise was estimated to come from removal of production subsidies, 0.8 per cent of 
it from the removal of market price support (Tokarick, 2003, p.20).
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restrictions on trade and applied no tariffs for cotton (with one digit bound rate) 
which it has also been traded without custom duty with the European Union since it 
joined the EU Customs Union in 1996 (Gazanfer, 2004, p. 12). Especially since the 
second half of the 1990s, price linkages between the domestic market and 
international markets have remained strong (see Figure 3.3), although there have 
been some occasional price differences arising from short-term supply and demand 
mismatches.9
Figure 3-2 Nominal cotton prices in Turkey (US $/Kg), 1980-2004
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Source: Author’s calculation based on cotton lint prices (SPO, 2006).*Estimate
9 The Turkish cotton market is also influenced by domestic factors such as the Agricultural Sales 
Cooperatives Unions (TARIS), ginners, mills and textile factories. In recent years, an increasing 
volume o f domestic trade has been undertaken via a spot exchange market, the Izmir Cotton Exchange 
(Gazanfer, 2004, p. 13). The trade volume in the cotton exchange increased from around 200,000 tons 
in 1992 to 260,000 in 2002 (Yemisci, 2003, p.26).
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Figure 3-3 Cotton price trends by Liverpool, US Memphis and Aegean indexes, 
2001-2003
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Source: Izmir Cotton Exchange Monthly Bulletins in (Yemisci, 2003, p. 24).
In the 1990s, the amount of cotton Turkey traded increased enormously and the 
country became a net importer of cotton. Between 1990 and 2001, the import volume 
rose 12-fold -  from 46,000 tons to around 625,000 tons -  mainly due to increasing 
demand from the domestic textile industry (see Figure 3.4). The US and the EU are 
the major source imports. As is shown in Figure 3.5, imports from the US rose from 
13,000 tons in 1993 to 327,000 tons in 2001, increasing its import share from 11 per 
cent to 52 per cent (ICAC, 2003, p. 106). Imports from Greece, which was not a 
cotton producing country before it joined the EU, increased from 40,000 tons in 1994 
to 160,000 tons in 2001, with a rising share from 17 per cent to 27 per cent. In total, 
imports from the US and the EU constituted around 80 per cent of the total imports 
by Turkey in 2001, which represents 500,000 tons (ICAC, 2003, p. 106). This was 
more than half of domestic production in that year.
Although the cost of production in the US and the EU (mainly Greece and Spain)
was more than the world prices (FAO, 2003, p. 20) - estimated to be three times the
world prices in the case of EU (Goreux, 2004, p. 5) - farmers in Turkey, including
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those in Tuz, who are more productive than their EU and US counterparts,10 have
faced thousands of tons of heavily subsidized cotton dumped on the domestic market.
Figure 3-4 Trends in cotton production, im port and export in Turkey, 1982- 
2001.
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Figure 3-5 Turkey’s cotton imports by major source, 1993-2002
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Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC, 2003, p. 106).
10 In 2003/04, cotton yields was 870 kg/ha in Greece, 820 kg/ha in the US, substantially lower than the 
yields in Turkey, 1300kg/ha (ICAC, 2004).
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3.3.4 Output productivity in cotton
Given that cotton yields have increased while prices have fallen, combining these 
two trends would be necessary to obtain an accurate picture of output value trends at 
the crop level. As is shown in Figure 3.6, land productivity improved consistently 
over the last 25 years. Average lint yields doubled from 740 kilogram per hectare in 
1980 to 1460 kilogram per hectare in 2004 (SIS, 1999; SIS, 2006c).11 This represents 
an increase from an assumed level of 100 in 1980 to 196 in 2004 (see Table 3.2).12 
However, the index for real prices followed a different trend. Starting from the base 
level of 100, after a period of gradual increase during the 1980s which followed by a 
slow declined in the early 1990s. It reached the level of 118 in 1997, and then fell 
rapidly to 59 in 2004. Therefore, between 1980 and 2004, prices fell by more than 40 
per cent in real terms.
11 1 kg cotton lint is produced out of about 2.6 kg cotton raw on average.
12 Cotton yields in Tuz have followed almost the same trend as those at country level.
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Table 3-2 Price, yields and total output value in cotton production in Turkey, 
1980-2003
Year Real Price o f cotton* Yield o f cotton* Value Productivity* 
1980=100 1980=100 1980=100
1980 100 100 100
1981 89 100 90
1982 84 110 93
1983 112 116 130
1984 112 103 115
1985 95 105 100
1986 86 119 103
1987 136 123 168
1988 113 118 133
1989 120 114 137
1990 105 137 144
1991 103 126 130
1992 100 121 120
1993 96 143 136
1994 92 145 134
1995 111 151 167
1996 105 142 148
1997 118 155 183
1998 87 157 137
1999 78 148 115
2000 83 181 151
2001 85 180 152
2002 69 184 127
2003 77 194 149
2004 59 196 116
Source: Author’s calculation based on (SPO,2006); for yields, (SIS, 1999; SIS,2006c).
* Nominal prices have been deflated by the GNP deflator (1987=100) based on (SPO, 2006). 
Yield increases have been adjusted to the base yield of 1980 (1980= 100);
Value productivity (yield*prices) has been adjusted to base productivity of 1980 
(1980=100).
The index combining prices and yields provides the index for value productivity. 
Starting from the assumed level of 100 in 1980, it increased throughout the 1980s, 
remained somewhat stable in the early 1990s (despite price fluctuations). Then began 
to rise and peaked at the level of 183 in 1997. Then it fell rapidly to 116 in 2004 (see 
Figure 3.7), meaning that cotton producers were able to generate almost 60 per cent 
more value on 1 hectare of land in 1997 than they did in 2004. As such, over the 
course of the last 25 years, the impact of enormous growth in cotton yields has been 
largely offset by declining prices, resulting in substantial losses in real output value.
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Figure 3-6 Trends in cotton (lint) yields in Turkey, 1980-2004
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Figure 3-7 Trends in value productivity (real) in cotton production in Turkey, 
1980-2004 (1980=100)
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3.3.5 Rising costs
In addition to declining prices, farmers have also been pressured by increasing cost 
of production over the last 15 years. As Figure 3.8 illustrates, the price of fuel, 
fertilizer and pesticide often increased at rates above inflation. The level of increase 
in diesel prices has been about 10 per cent above inflation rate since 1990. Fertilizer 
prices fluctuated wildly ranging from -22 per cent below and 283 per cent above 
inflation rate, while staying 18 per cent above on average for the period between 
1991 and 2001 (MARA, 2004). Hence, the margins of cotton producers have been 
squeezed between falling prices and increasing costs.
Figure 3-8 Price trends in cotton inputs relative to inflation in Turkey, 1990- 
2003.
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Source: Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs (MARA, 2004).
* Based on average annual increase in seven types of chemical fertilizer.
** Based on a pesticide used in cotton production, DELTAMETRIN (Decis2,5EC).
The level of increase in the cost of production has been exacerbated by political 
factors at the domestic level. The ‘structural adjustment’ programmes that the
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country has periodically faced imposed policies cutting input subsidies. As is 
analyzed in Chapter II, major input subsidies have been cut or lifted altogether in 
recent years. For instance, the share of total support in the form of fertilizer, pesticide 
and seed subsidies fell from one per cent of GDP in 1999 to almost nil in 2004 
(OECD, 2006a). More importantly, falling subsides have affected agricultural 
credits. Real interest rates in agricultural credits provided by the state’s agricultural 
bank had been favourable to producers until the late 1990s. It fluctuated wildly in 
mid-1990s due to fluctuations in inflation, yet stayed favourable. However, with the 
introduction of the IMF-led standby programme, the credit subsidies were lifted in 
1999. For the first time, the real interest rates were above zero, averaging around 20 
per cent between 1999 and 2003 (MARA, 2004). Hence, over the recent period, 
farmers have faced declining government support for major inputs, increasing their 
cost of production. This affected cotton producers particularly more adversely, since 
they used these inputs intensively in order to maintain their high levels of 
productivity.
3.3.6 Cost of production at the local level
At the local level in Tuz, the proportion of the different components of the cost has 
changed along with a general increase in the real cost of production over the last 25 
years. The share of major inputs - fuel, seed and fertilizers combined - increased 
from 10.4 per cent of the total cost in 1978 to 22 per cent in 2003 (see Table 3.3 
below).13 More significantly, the cost of agricultural credits has risen substantially. It 
was not even taken into account in 1978 (since the real interest rates were negative),
13 The cost calculation for 1978 is based on a farmer cultivating 50 hectares; for 2003, it is based on a 
farmer cultivating 20 hectares. These figures were also checked against other farms in the village.
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whereas, it constituted more than 16 per cent of the total cost in 2003. Hence, the 
impact of the ‘Washington Consensus’ cutting input subsidies was visible in Tuz.
Table 3-3 Production cost of cotton per hectare in Tuz, 1978 vs. 2003*
1978
US$ %
2003
us$ %
Fuel 112 5.8 327 12.5
Seed 22 1.2 100 3.8
Pesticide 74 3.8 100 3.8
Fertilizer 65 3.4 150 5.7
Driver, Guard, Cook 74 3.8 53 2.0
Land improvements 31 1.6 33 1.3
Depreciation of implements 93 4.8 67 2.6
Maintenance of equipment - - 67 2.6
Land tax and protection 23 1.2 7 0.3
Irrigation 74 3.8 33 1.3
Hoeing (labour) 248 12.8 107 4.1
Harvest (labour) 620 32.0 469 17.9
Rent 496 25.7 670 25.6
Cost of credits (real) - - 437 16.7
T otal 1932 100.0 2620 100.0
Source: (Sirman, 1988, p. 375) and author’s field research in 2003.
* 1978 cost figures have been adjusted to 2003 prices by the GDP deflator based on (SPO, 
2006) and converted to US$ (US$ 1= 1.493 YTL).
The relative weight of labour costs, on the other hand, fell from 44.8 per cent in 1978 
(harvest and hoeing together) to 22 per cent in 2003, mainly due to increasing 
seasonal labour flow from south-eastern Anatolia. Land rents increased in real terms, 
although not in proportional terms. Adjusting the total costs in 1978 with GNP 
deflator indicates that real costs in 2003 were 36 per cent higher than those in 1978. 
Hence, along with changes in its composition - increasing share of inputs such fuel, 
fertilizers and seeds - the cost of production in Tuz has increased considerably over 
the course of the last 25 years.
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3.3.7 The profitability crisis
Combining the cost of production and the price of cotton, the profitability of cotton 
production can be assessed at the local level in Tuz. Adjusting the cost figures 
collected in 1978 by the GDP deflator and converting them into 2003 US$ prices 
indicates that total variable costs increased by 7 per cent in real terms. Despite rising 
fuel, fertiliser and pesticide costs, total variable cost saw only a slight increase due to 
falling labour costs. As a result, gross margins increased by 50 per cent from around 
US$ 790 per ha in 1978 to US$ 1210 per ha in 2003 (see Table 3.4 below).
However, land and credit related fixed cost increased substantially in the same 
period. Land rents rose from US$ 500 to US$ 670, while cost of credit increased 
from nil (since the real interest rates were negative) in 1978 to US$ 440 per ha in 
2003. A combination of a growing need for cash flow in an economy of increasingly 
commodified and intense production cycle, and the government’s unfavourable 
credit policies is accounted for the rising weight of cost of credit. As a result, total 
fixed costs doubled between 1978 and 2003, putting immense pressure on net 
margins. The yield of 2.5 t/ha, left a net margin of US$ 240 in real terms in 1978, 
representing a profitability rate of 11 per cent.14 In 2003, the yield of 4.0 t/ha 
bringing a total output of US$ 2680 left a net margin of US$ 60, representing a 
profitability of only 2.2 per cent (see table 3.5 below).15 Therefore, the case of Tuz is 
facing a severe profitability crisis in cotton production.
14 The price of cotton was between 13.25 TL to 14 TL per kilogram in 1978 (Sirman, 1988, p. 375). 
The official price was 14 TL/kg.
15 The local price of cotton raw was approximately 1 YTL/kg (US$ 0.67/kg) in 2003.
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Table 3-4 Comparison of gross and net margins (US$/ha)* in cotton production 
in Tuz, 1978 vs. 2003
u s$
1978 2003
OUTPUT
Marketable yield (t/ha) 2.5 4.0
Price per tonne (US$) 868 670
Total output (US$/ha) 2169 2679
VARIABLE COSTS (US$/ha)
Fuel 112 327
Seed 22 100
Pesticide 74 100
Fertilizer 65 150
Driver, Guard, Cook 74 53
Depreciation of implements 93 67
Maintenance of equipment - 67
Irrigation 74 33
Hoeing (labour) 248 107
Harvest (labour) 620 469
Total variable costs ($/ha) 1382 1473
GROSS MARGIN ($/ha) 787 1206
ALLOCATABLE FIXED
COSTS ($/ha)
Land improvements 31 33
Land tax and protection 23 7
Land Rent 496 670
Cost of credits (real interest.) - 437
Total fixed costs($/ha) 550 1147
NET MARGIN ($/ha) 237 59
Source: (Sirman, 1988, p. 375) and author’s field research in 2003.
* 1978 cost figures have been adjusted to 2003 prices by the GDP deflator based on (SPO, 
2006) and converted to US$ (US$ 1= 1.493 YTL).
Table 3-5 Profitability of cotton production in Tuz, 1978 vs. 2003
19 7 8 * 2 0 0 3
Total O utput (U S$) 2169 2679
Total c o s t  (variab le  + fixed ) 1932 2620
N et su r p lu s  (U S$) 237 59
Profitability 10.9% 2.2 %
Source: (Sirman, 1988, p. 375) and author’s field research in 2003.
* 1978 figures have been adjusted to 2003 prices by the GDP deflator based on (SPO, 2006) 
and converted to US$ ( US$ 1= 1.493 YTL).
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The farmers of Tuz are specialized in cotton production, having achieved one of the 
word’s highest productivity levels over the last 25 years. Yet their incomes have 
been undermined by continuous price falls on the one hand, and increasing cost of 
production on the other. Their margins are squeezed so severely that they continue to 
produce cotton only by ignoring some essential cost components, such as the 
opportunity cost of land and labour. Since Turkey liberalized its cotton markets, they 
face the impact of market forces operating at the global level. However, the way 
cotton markets work has been far from fair to developing country producers. Due to 
trade distorting subsidies of developed countries, world cotton prices are set unfairly, 
failing to reward developing country producers who have comparative advantages.
In 2003, around 170 farm households in Tuz produced approximately 1,950 tons of 
cotton lint on about 1,300 hectares. Based on the margin above, their total 
operational profit was around US$ 72,000.16 By looking at the results of the models 
assessing the impact of a possible removal of trade disturbing practices on world 
prices (see section 3.3.2 above), if one can moderately assume that cotton prices 
would have been 10 per cent higher, the total profit generated in Tuz would have 
increased by US$ 330,000. Such a high level of welfare loss for a single village 
clearly illustrates the extent of the damaging impact of trade distorting policies on 
developing countries.
16 Based on the price of 2.5 YTL/kg (US$ 1.67 per kg) for cotton lint.
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3.4 Asymmetrical differentiation
Due to the distribution of state-owned land and relatively low labour/land ratio in the 
1960s, land distribution had been relatively equal until the late 1970s. However, the 
level of inequality seems to have increased over the last 20-25 years. There was a 
rise in the number of households that do not have access to land. As is shown in 
Table 3.6 below, 25 per cent of households did not cultivate any land in 1978 
(Sirman, 1988, p. 241). By 2003, the number rose to 43 per cent. The percentage of 
households cultivating 3 to 9 hectares of land fell from 31 to 22 per cent. More 
significantly, the area cultivated by this category declined from 44 to 27 per cent (see 
Table 3.6).
Table 3-6 Land distribution in Tuz, 1978 vs. 2003
Land operated in 1978 Land operated in 2003
Area % Households % Area Area (hectare) % Households % Area
(hectare) cultivated cultivated
0 25 0 0 43 0
1-3 35 18 1-3 19 8
3.1-9 31 44 3.1-9 22 27
9.1-15 6 20 9.1-15 6 17
15+ 3 18 15+ 8 47
Source: (Sirman, 1988) and author’s field research in 2003
On the other hand, there was a significant rise in the number of households and their
operational size in the highest category. Only three per cent of the households
cultivated more than 15 hectares in 1978 and their total operation size constituted 18
per cent of the total. In 2003, more than 8 per cent of the households were in that
category and their operation size reached up to 47 per cent of the total. Therefore, as
the number of households which did not farm any land increased, the operational size
of the highest category expanded, the patterns of land distribution have become more
unequal (see the Lorenz curve, Figure 3.9).
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Expansion in the operation size of the highest category and subsequent decline in the 
middle, however, does not necessarily imply a process of small-farm differentiation: 
First, the change in land distribution (through sale, rental and sharecropping markets) 
did not necessarily take place exclusively among the villagers. Big landowners seem 
to have expanded their operations towards neighbouring villages. Officially, the total 
cultivable land of the village is about 600 hectares, but the villagers’ plots spread 
over other villages in the vicinity. In 2003, the farmers of Tuz cultivated around 
1,300 hectares of land.
Figure 3-9 Lorenz curve: land operated in Tuz, 2003.
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Source: Author’s field research in 2003
Second, the process of land accumulation has been taking place mainly through the
operation of a rental and sharecropping market, constituting around 40 per cent of the
total land in 2003. However, the market was used mainly by relatively large farms
(see Table 3.7). In the category of 0 to 2.49 hectare, only eight per cent of the total
land was under cultivation through rental or sharecropping arrangements. It was 23
per cent in the category of 2.5-4.99 hectare, 39 per cent in the category of 5-9.99
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hectare. The proportion of rented and sharecropped land further increased to 44 per 
cent in the category of operation above 20 hectares. This clearly illustrates that rental 
and sharecropping markets are being widely used by large farms as a way of 
expanding their operational size.
Table 3-7 Land Rental and Sharecropping in Tuz, 2003
Land operated (ha) Proportion of owned land
(%)
Proportion of rented & 
sharecropped land (%)
0.1 -  2.49 92.5 7.5
2.5 -  4.99 76.7 23.3
5.0 -  9.99 60.9 39.1
1 0 -1 9 .9 9 62.4 37.6
20+ 56.4 43.6
Total Average 62.5 37.5
Source: Author’s field research in 2003.
Third, although there has been a significant run of operational land accumulation by 
large farms, it has not led to the disappearance of small farms. In fact, the number of 
small farms operating below 3 hectares increased from 55 in 1978 (Sirman, 1988, p. 
241) to an estimated 60 in 2003 (based on the sample). The total area they operated 
also increased from 106 hectares in 1978 (Sirman, 1988, p. 241) to around 110 
hectares in 2004. Similarly, the number of farms in the category of less than six 
hectares increased from 94 to around 100. Their operational size in total slightly 
increased too, from 290 ha (Sirman, 1988, p. 241) to an estimated 310 ha. Therefore, 
Tuz has been experiencing a process of land accumulation without small farm 
disappearance.
The fact that the extent of change in ownership patterns has been slower than the 
patterns of land access through the rental and sharecropping market can be partly 
explained by the fact that the real land prices have increased enormously over the 
past two decades. It was reported to be 1,500,000 -  2,000,000 TL per hectare in 1985
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(Sirman, 1988, p.266). Based on the price of cotton at that time, 242 TL/kg, this was 
equivalent to the price of 6,250 to 8,250 kg cotton, the harvest of around 6 - 8  
hectares of land. In 2003, land prices were between 2,500 and 3,000 YTL which was 
equivalent to the price of 25,000 to 30,000 kg cotton, the harvest of 14 to 17 hectares 
of land. It is clear that land prices have been getting substantially higher, making 
land purchases relatively more difficult. In addition, falling profitability has made it 
even more difficult for any farmer to accumulate land.
The enormous increase in land prices and the persistence of small farms seem to be a 
linked phenomenon. The price of cotton in general and the profitability of production 
in particular is a major factor affecting land prices. Prices and the profitability were 
high until the late 1990s, when land prices went up, making it relatively more 
difficult for large producers to accumulate land. At the same time, since farm- 
incomes were also higher, the opportunity cost of leaving agriculture for small farms 
got higher too, which in turn reduced the propensity of small farms to sell their land. 
Hence, when the sector achieved high output growth and profitability, the counter 
productive factors of increasing land prices and low land supply by small farms 
begin to operate, making the differentiation process through land concentration more 
difficult to take place.
Since the sector has been performing poorly since the end of the 1990s, there seems 
to be different factors inhibiting the process of differentiation. On the demand side, 
due to the profitability crisis, the accumulation capacity of large farms has weakened, 
so has their demand for land. On the supply side, the opportunity cost of leaving 
agriculture for small farms declined too. However, for many of them, it was still
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higher than the opportunity cost of staying in agriculture. For a household owning 
two hectares and having a workforce of two labour equivalent, renting out the land 
and working in the harvest season would provide a total income of around US$ 
2400,17 close to the minimum wage rate in urban areas. As long as their chances of 
finding non-agricultural employment are low, farming continued to be the last resort 
of income activity.
TARIS, one of the biggest farmer associations in the country, also plays a major role 
in preventing small farms from disappearance. It has 5087 members in the district, 
and 88 members in the village. It provides inputs, credits and acts as a major 
purchaser of cotton in the market. It supplied a total of around US$ 0.8 million 
agricultural credits to its members in Tuz in 2003.18 The existence of such a big 
credit provider prevents the operation of credit-bondages created by private money 
lenders charging high interest rates in return for collaterals in the form of land.19 
TARIS is also the biggest purchaser of cotton in the province with a market share of 
53 per cent in 2003, which is large enough to set local prices.20 This prevents private 
buyers from speculating on prices which are more likely to harm small farms since 
they often have to sell their product immediately after the harvest. Thus, the 
existence of an effective farmer’s association performing essential functions protect 
small farmers from the potential impact of ‘extra-market’ forces in the form of credit 
bondages and price speculations.
17 Rent of land was approximately 1,000 YTL/ha (US$ 670) in 2003 and an adult cotton picker could 
make up to US$ 550 in season (based on lOOkg/day, 45 days/season and US$ 12/day)
18 Based on official information collected from TARIS in Soke. The credits are provided in the form 
of fertilizer, pesticide, seed, and also for the purposes of field preparation, fuel purchase, sowing, 
hoeing and watering.
19 Villagers state that a private money lender may charge a yearly interest rate of up to 150 per cent 
(eight per cent monthly) while the market rate was around 40 per cent in October 2003.
20 It purchased about 66 million kg cotton from the Soke district in the 2002/2003 season (based on 
the official information collected from TARIS in Soke).
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3.4.1 Small-Farm Efficiency?
The level of land productivity and the real cost of production do not seem to be
significantly affected by farm size in Tuz. Sirman also reported that the scale of
operation did not affect yields in the 1980s (Sirman, 1988, p. 357). As is analysed
above, cotton yields are determined by various ecological, technological,
infrastructural, agronomic factors and the scale does not seem to have a major 
0 1impact. As for the cost of production, small family farms are argued to have labour 
related cost advantages as they do not rely on external labour. However, Tuz shows 
that even small farms have to use external labour in certain seasons. It also illustrates 
that given the abundance of labour demand in the harvest season, the operational cost 
of family labour is equal to the wage rate. Hence, from a productivity and cost 
perspective, small farms are not more efficient than large farms.
According to Sirman, small producers did not include labour cost in their cost 
accounts in 1978, as they do not make direct payments for such costs (Sirman, 1988, 
p. 375). Likewise in 2003, small-scale family farms tended to ignore labour costs. 
However, the opportunity cost of labour cannot be ignored in a case where there is an 
abundant demand for labour. In the research sample of 130 households, the size of 
the labour force was 412.5 (adult labour equivalent22). The total cotton needed to be
21 However, it might be the case that the range of farm size in Tuz is below a certain level which 
would constitute a threshold beyond which scale has an impact on yields. Nevertheless, in a private 
interview, the owner of one of the largest farms in the region, operating on 250 hectares, stated that 
the average yield in his fields was 3,900kg/ha (cotton raw), which was very close to the average in 
Tuz.
22 Based on the count of every individual (without terminal illness) between the ages 16 to 60, plus 
counting persons between the ages 10 to 15 as 0.5.
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harvested in the sample was approximately 2,300,000 kg.23 Given that an average 
adult can harvest 100 kg cotton per day, in a harvest season of 45 days, the size of 
labour force required for the task would be at least 510 adults. Therefore, even the 
most extreme case of the participation of the entire labour force would not be 
adequate to finish the harvest. Therefore, the opportunity cost of family labour (in 
harvest) was equivalent to the labour wage. In the harvest season, workers are paid 
based on the amount of cotton they pick, 0.175 YTL/Kg in 2003. The daily wage rate 
would be around 17.5 YTL (US$ 12) (based on 100 kg harvest).
At the household level, the average size of labour force increased as the farm size 
increased. The number of labour equivalents for households in the 0.1-2.49 hectares 
category was 2.1. It was 2.7 for households in the category of 5 - 9.99 hectares. It 
further increased to 3.2 and 4.1 in the categories of 10 - 19.99 and 20+, respectively. 
Therefore, there was a linear relationship between farm size and the size of the 
labour force at household level.
Based on the peak period for labour demand (i.e. harvest season), and average labour 
productivity during the harvest, the amount of land a family farm could harvest 
without relying on external labour can be calculated. In the harvest season of 45 
days, an average adult labourer can harvest 4,500 kg cotton. Given that the average 
yields are 3750 kg/ha (cotton raw), only households in the category of 0-2.49 could 
do the harvest without the need of outside labour. For an average-size household in 
the 2.5-9.99 hectares category, up to 3.1 hectares could potentially be harvested by 
family labour. For an average-size household in the 10-19.9 hectares category, up to
23 Based on the total area of 610 hectares and the average yields of 3750 kg/ha (cotton raw).
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3.8 hectares could be harvested by exclusively relying on family labour. Therefore, 
apart from the smallest farms, relying on external labour in the harvest season is 
unavoidable (see Table 3.8, column 5).
Table 3-8 Relationship between size of farm and quantity of labour in Tuz, 2003
Land
operated
(ha)
Household
size
Adult
equivalent*
Labour
equivalent**
Maximum amount of 
land cultivable by 
exclusively relying 
on family labour***
0 3.02 2.6 1.9 -
0.1-2.49 3.33 3.0 2.1 2.5
2.5-4.99 3.67 3.3 2.6 3.1
5.0-9.9 4.25 3.8 2.7 3.2
10-19.9 5.00 4.4 3.2 3.8
20+ 6.25 5.4 4.1 4.9
Averages 4.25 3.7 2.8 3.5
* Based on counting every individual over the age of 15, plus counting those less than 15 
years of age as half.
** Based on the count of every individual (without terminal illness) between the age 15 to 
60, plus counting individuals between 10 and 15 as 0.5.
*** Based on the formula:
Labour Equivalent* Unit-Labour Harvest Capacity (4500kg/season)/ Cotton Yield 
(3750kg/ha).
However, organizing and managing labour was easier for small-scale producers as 
compared to large-scale farmers. Since the demand for labour peaks in the harvest 
season, arranging the necessary amount of labour to undertake the harvest on time is 
more difficult for large-scale producers. Small farms organize labour groups in the 
village to pick the harvest of each participating household. Large farms have to 
organize labour from outside the village. They tend to arrange it in winter to be ready 
for early September. They often organize labour from other parts of the country, 
mainly from the interior of the Aegean region and south-eastern Anatolia. They make 
advance payments to some middle-men, who organize the workers and manage their
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relations with the farmer during the harvest. In September 2004, there were around 
850 migrant labourers harvesting cotton in Tuz.24
Middle and large farms face certain risks in relation to labour. First, the labour they 
organize from other parts of the country may never show up in the harvest season. As 
their arrangements are based on tacit agreements and an informal deposit paid by the 
farmer, there is no guarantee that the agreed number of workers will turn up . 
Second, there is also no guarantee that the workers would finish the harvest. 
Dissatisfied with the price (they may get a better price from another farmer or in 
another region) or with the yields (higher yields increase their picking performance, 
so they prefer fields with high yields) they may leave the field in the middle of the 
harvest. Third, the wages may go up during the harvest season. If yields are better 
than average or weather is not favourable because of rain, the demand for labour 
peaks and the cost of labour increases.26 Fourth, the quality of a labourer’s work may 
turn out to be poor. Since the wage rate is based on the amount of cotton picked, 
workers may leave some residue of unpicked cotton behind as they hurry to harvest 
the dense parts of the plant, which may result in significant losses. Nevertheless, 
these risks do not apply to all farmers, since some of them work with the same group 
of labourers with whom they have established good relationships.
24 However, in that particular year, the number of migrant workers was said to be lower than in 
previous years.
51 was told that some farmers pay up to US $3000 in advance in order to arrange 15 to 20 workers in 
the winter season. A couple of farmers stated that they have lost significant sums of money as the 
workers they had agreed did not turn up in the harvest season.
26 Rain affects the quality of cotton badly. It also makes it difficult for workers to work effectively on 
the fields. Therefore, in rainy harvest seasons, all farmers want to finish their harvesting as quickly as 
possible, soaring the demand for labour,
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Almost all farmers in the research sample stated that organizing labour is a major 
problem and thus cotton combine harvesters, which have become available in recent 
years, should be used widely. Large-scale producers consider buying a harvester for 
their own use, while small-scale producers think that harvesters would reduce the 
demand for labour which would then reduce their labour cost. The price of a 
harvester ranges between US$ 60,000 (for mechanical ones of Uzbekistan origin) 
and US$ 250,000 (for computerized ones of usually US origin), which are not 
affordable by small and medium size farms. Although there was no field in the 
village harvested by a harvester at the time of the survey, the number of mechanical 
harvesters imported from Uzbekistan was increasing in the region.27
A sudden increase in the numbers of these harvesters might lead to some significant 
change in the labour dimension of cotton production both at the household and 
regional levels. Based on the information given by the regional distributor of 
mechanical harvesters, an advanced harvester could harvest up to 10 hectares per 
day, displacing about 400 workers. A mechanical harvester on the other hand could 
harvest 4 hectares, replacing the need for 160 labourers.28 Hence, the introduction of 
a large number of harvesters may lead to a change in the production function of 
cotton from being labour intensive to technology intensive.
In sum, the process of differentiation has been asymmetrical in Tuz. There has been 
some significant land accumulation (mainly through rental and sharecropping
27 Based on the information given by the regional distributor of mechanical harvesters, four harvesters 
were imported in 2002, while the number rose to 35 in 2003.
28 Yet there are certain constraints in relation to the use of harvesters, since they require specific 
plantation practices. Only certain cotton varieties are convenient for mechanical picking, they also 
require a certain type of transport, storing and ginning facilities.
147
markets) while small farms have continued to predominate in numbers. However, 
this should not suggest that small farms are more competitive or more efficient than 
large farms. As was also shown in the previous study in Tuz, there seems to be no 
strong relationship between farm size and land productivity. The labour related 
advantages of small farms did not give significant cost advantages to family farms 
either, since the opportunity cost of family labour was equal to the wage rate. The 
asymmetry was mainly due to the two counterbalancing factors hindering the 
differentiation process in the periods of both high and low agricultural growth. When 
agricultural growth was high enough to create big surpluses, the demand for land 
increases which rises land prices. This in turn makes it increasingly more difficult for 
large farms to accumulate land. On the supply side, high agricultural growth and 
relatively high farm incomes increase the opportunity cost of leaving agriculture for 
small farms. This in turn discourages them to sell their land, constraining the 
differentiation process from the supply side. On the other hand, in the periods of 
slow agricultural growth, the accumulating potential of large farms weakens. 
Therefore, since there has not been any substantial labour transition driven by 
demand from the non-agricultural sector, the land accumulation at the operational 
level has taken place without the disappearance of small farms.
3.5 Conclusion
The farmers of Tuz, who specialized in cotton production, have achieved one of the
world’s highest yields over the last 25 years. The example illustrates that achieving
such levels of land productivity requires a combination of favourable ecology
(convenient average temperatures, precipitation rates and humidity), irrigation
facilities to overcome water deficiencies, intensive use of chemical fertilizers to
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overcome nutritional deficiencies in the soil, improved seed varieties (biotechnology) 
developed specifically for the local environment, mechanical technology, and 
farmers knowledgeable about precise agronomic practices and crop management. 
However, it has also been shown that even achieving such high levels of productivity 
may not be sufficient to realize high levels of income. Their enormous progress has 
been largely offset in economic terms by sharp falls in prices and increasing cost of 
production.
As with the majority of agricultural commodities, world cotton prices have been 
falling steadily over the last two decades both in nominal and real terms. There are 
both market and extra-market (political) factors that are responsible for the 
downturn. The negative impact of economic factors such as low price and low 
income elasticity of demand, the low price sensitivity of supply combine with 
increasing market share of synthetic fibre have been putting pressure on prices. 
More importantly, political factors, arising from trade and domestic policies of 
developed countries, have been suppressing prices artificially. Heavy subsidies in 
developed countries enable their farmers to sell cotton below their cost of production. 
The dumping of these products into world markets further leads to a decline in 
prices, leading to substantial welfare losses in developing countries.
Tuz has also shown that, like many other producers in developing countries that 
have experienced ‘structural adjustment’ policies, the cost of production has 
increased substantially. Government support in inputs, such as agricultural credits, 
fertilizers and seeds have been removed as a result of ‘structural adjustment’ 
programmes aiming at cutting government spending. Increasing cost of production
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further squeezed the margins of farmers. At the local level in Tuz, profitability has 
fallen to as little as one digit marginal levels. Driven by declining prices and 
increasing cost of production, the situation at Tuz has illustrated a case of serious 
‘profitability crisis’ in agriculture.
The Tuz history has also shown that without substantial demand for labour transition 
arising from the non-agricultural sector, the process of small-farm differentiation is 
slow or stagnant. It has illustrated that the predominance of small farms is not 
necessarily a function of their superior efficiency, since there seems to be no 
significant relationship between farm size and land productivity in this case. The 
number of small farms continues to predominate merely because the demand for 
labour from the non-agricultural sector is not big enough to encourage them to leave 
agriculture. On the other hand, the process of land accumulation is counterbalanced 
by increasing land prices and decreasing land supply of small farms in periods of 
high economic growth, and by decreasing accumulation potential of large farms in 
periods of low growth and recession. Hence, without the non-agricultural sector 
stimulating the process of transformation from agriculture, the small-farm 
differentiation cannot be driven by the transformation within agriculture alone.
The next chapter turns to another longitudinal case study which exemplifies a totally 
different ecological, social and economical setting as compared to that of Tuz. The 
village of Sakai in Central Anatolia illustrates a transformation process in a severely 
unfavourable ecology, combined with a lack of technological progress and 
infrastructural development. Unlike the case of Tuz, low productivity and low-value 
agricultural activities dominates its agricultural economy, illustrating a low degree of
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transformation within agriculture. However, the case provides a good ground to 
analyse the various aspects of labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas.
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Chapter IV - Non-agricultural Economy in Non-favourable
Ecology: Sakai
Ecological factors play a significant role in the process of rural transformation. More 
than 50 per cent of cultivable land in Turkey is in arid and semi-arid agro-ecological 
zones, where there is low potential for agricultural development. In central Anatolia 
(the regions of middle-south, middle-north, middle-east and north-east), low 
precipitation (275 to 375 ml/year), especially during the growing period, is a major 
constraint (TSMS, 2004). Similarly, in high altitude farming areas of eastern 
Anatolia, low temperatures and high prevalence of cold stress are major obstacles for 
agricultural development. The average growing period can be as short as 60 days a 
year, which is only suitable for low-yield cereal production. In these regions, 
overcoming ecological constraints and achieving high yields and high-value cropping 
patterns is extremely difficult.
Agricultural activities alone fall short in generating adequate income for millions of 
rural households in these regions, especially in areas where unfavourable ecologies 
combine with high population density. However, millions of rural households are 
still engaged in agricultural activities in such areas. The level of their labour 
productivity is low, mainly as a result of constraints in land productivity, and their 
contribution to the national gross value-added is almost insignificant. In such areas, 
non-agricultural activities are often seen as crucial for alleviating poverty and 
un/underemployment. They are also considered to be an alternative to rural-to-urban
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migration. However, is the transition to non-agricultural activities a remedy for or a 
symptom of lack of agricultural development?
The emergence and the growth of non-agricultural activities in rural economies is a 
complex phenomenon. On the rural side, the transition is strongly linked to the state 
of the agricultural economy, whereas on the urban side, it depends on the 
favourability of the macro-economic environment in manufacturing and services 
sector. Where the transition to non-agricultural activities is underway, they may face 
serious problems in relation to productivity, under-employment and inequality. 
Hence, this chapter attempts to shed light on the multidimensional process of the 
transition from agricultural to non-agricultural activities in rural areas.
The case history of Sakai in central Anatolia, which will be put forward in this 
chapter, is the account of a village where non-agricultural activities emerged almost 
half a century ago. The long history of these activities, engaged in by men and 
women, provides a good opportunity to analyse various transitions these activities 
have undergone. It illustrates the huge socio-economic dynamism they can create 
within rural economies. The case history also demonstrates the mixture of linkages 
between and within agricultural and non-agricultural activities.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces Sakai. It provides a 
short history of the process of transition to non-agricultural activities in the village. 
Then, in the light of recent fieldwork, it analyses the current phase of these activities. 
Second, the chapter investigates major factors, of rural and urban origin, that affect 
the process of the transition to non-agricultural activities in rural areas. Third, it
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highlights various economic and social roles that these activities play, from urban 
and rural perspectives. Fourth, it analyses the process of small farm differentiation in 
Sakai’s context.
4.1 Green revolution missing 1
Sakai is located in the province of Kayseri. It lies on a plateau skirting the volcanic 
mountain Erciyes with an altitude of 12,860 feet (3,917 metres). It has a dry agro­
ecology and climate showing steppe characteristics with average temperatures of 
21°C in summer and -1°C in winter (TSMS, 2000, p 113). Cold stress is a major 
constraint too; the number of frosty days is as high as 120 days a year (TSMS, 1996, 
p.46). There is no irrigation facility in the village, and production is fully dependent 
on rainfall which is one of the lowest in Turkey (390 ml per year). The growing 
period is around 100 days. The quality of its soil is poor, made up of volcanic 
residues.
In the summer of 2003, I undertook a population survey with the existing 137 
households in Sakai. For each household, a schedule including demographic features, 
asset ownership and income activities was canvassed. The research has illustrated the 
general trends that the village has undergone since it was first studied by Stirling at 
the beginning of the 1950s (Stirling, 1965).
In the 1950s, the economy of the village was isolated from national markets, and the 
peasants were undertaking agricultural production mainly for subsistence (Stirling,
1 This section draws partly on author’s paper published in International Journal of Agricultural 
Resources and Governance (Karapinar, 2007).
155
1965, p. 46). The variety of the cropping pattern was limited to wheat, barley and 
millet. Production was still undertaken with ancient methods which generated very 
poor yields. A light wooden plough attached to a pair of oxen could only produce 
one metric ton of cereals per hectare every other year (due to a two-year fallow 
system) (Stirling, 1965, p. 44). Low value production for subsistence at low 
productivity characterized the primitive stage of agricultural economy in Sakai.
It appears that the process of agricultural transformation has been stagnant over the 
last half century. In 2003, around half of the total cultivable land was left fallow and 
uncultivated. The majority of the cultivated area was still under wheat and barley 
along with some potato production. Yields were still extremely low. Although 
tractors were introduced in the late 1970s, the village has been untouched by the 
Green Revolution through the intensive the use of chemical fertilizers, high quality 
seeds and irrigation. Hence, wheat yields increased only marginally to 1400 kg per 
hectare, equal to the yields in the Fertile Crescent 10,000 years ago. Considering that 
the land is cultivated only every other year, annual average production on one 
hectare of land was 700 kg/ha. Therefore, since the village has not benefited from 
modem chemical and biological technology and infrastructural development, its 
agricultural economy has remained dependent on ecological circumstances which 
were not favourable for the transformation within agriculture.
4.2 Transition to non-agricultural activities
The process of labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural activities began
as early as the 1950s, and followed two different paths. First, the population of the
village has been falling due to permanent rural-to-urban migration. Secondly, there
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has been a process of transition to non-agricultural activities which followed two 
major channels: the first one was through the temporary migration of men seeking 
employment in the urban construction sector; the second was through the 
development of carpet weaving by women in the village. By 2003, it appears that the 
labour transition to non-agricultural activities has continued over the last half 
century. However, there have been significant changes in the nature and type of these 
activities.
4.2.1 Rural to urban migration
In the 1950s, Stirling reports that permanent migration to towns was rare, since 
temporary migration was more acceptable to households in terms of the cost and risk 
assessment. The cost of keeping a family in the village was relatively low and having 
some land -  however unproductive -  was vital for food security given volatile job 
markets in the towns. However, permanent migration to towns began to accelerate in 
the 1960s. About 65 adult men had migrated between 1950 and 1970 (Stirling, 1974, 
p. 211). Most of them started as temporary migrants. When they learned how to 
survive in towns and had established business networks to secure relatively regular 
work, they took their families and moved from the village permanently. As the 
incidence of permanent migration increased, it became easier for those staying 
behind in the village to follow the previous examples (Stirling, 1974, p. 213).
Nevertheless, the size of the village population continued to increase until the 1980s 
when it began to decline. Between 1950 and 1970, it increased from 633 to 852 
(Stirling, 1974, p. 201) and stayed somewhat stable until the 1980s. In 1986, Stirling 
reported that 840 people resided in 143 households. There were also 650 people (165
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households) originally from Sakai living outside the village, mainly in big cities, 
such as Mersin and Antalya (Stirling, 1993, p.6). In 2003, the population of the 
village appeared to have been decreasing. At the time of my survey, 664 people lived 
in 137 households. Average household size decreased from 5.8 persons in 1986 to
4.8 in 2003; it is shown in Figure 4.1 that the village population has declined to its 
level in 1950.
Figure 4-1 Population of Sakai, 1950-2003
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Source: Stirling (1974, 1993) and author’s field research in 2003.
4.2.2 Labour move-out
At the beginning of the 1950s, there were a few households engaging in non-farm 
activities in the village. For men, the most common alternatives were masonry, 
carpentry and blacksmithing (Stirling, 1965, p.60). Young men learned traditional 
skills through apprenticeship from older experts in the village. Weaving was the craft 
exclusive to women; the output was such as rugs, saddlebags and grainsacks for 
domestic consumption, (Stirling, 1965, p.59). The skill had been transferred from 
one generation to another through mothers and daughters. There were also some 
short-lived shops. In 1950, about 15 per cent of households relied mainly on income 
from non-agricultural activities, whereas 22 per cent drew both on agricultural and
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non-agricultural income. About 47 per cent still depended on agriculture for their 
livelihoods (Stirling, 1965, p.69).
The pace of labour transition rapidly increased after 1950. Increasing labour demand 
from the construction sector in urban areas led many building craftsmen and 
unskilled labourers in the village to seek temporary employment in nearby towns. 
There were 39 semi-skilled men working in the construction sector, most of them 
plasterers, a relatively easy skill to pick up (Stirling, 1965, p.65).2 For households 
which were in the position of surplus labour relative to their farm size, seeking jobs 
in the construction sector was an easy way of finding non-agricultural employment. 
Between 1950 and 1970, the population of Sakai increased from 633 to 852, a 35 per 
cent rise. However, the number of semi-skilled labourers working in the construction 
sector rose more rapidly, from 40 to around 150, growing by more than 375 per cent 
(Stirling, 1974, p. 201).
In 2003, there were 129 labourers working in the construction sector out of a total 
labour force of 346 (including men and women between the age of 15 and 60). 
Accordingly, in more than 70 per cent of households, there was at least one 
construction labourer. It must be noted that the remaining households which did not 
have any construction labourer were not necessarily farmers. More than 60 per cent 
of them were elderly couples, widows or government officials. More than 80 per cent 
of the other households participated in the construction sector in 2003, confirmation 
that the proportion of non-agricultural households continued to grow since the 1980s.
2 The first plasterer, who learned the skill in the 1940s, taught it to his friends and relatives. Then, the 
skill widened within the village (Stirling, 1965, p.65).
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4.2.3 Women’s role shifting
Carpet weaving which had always been a traditional craft in Sakai which was 
commercialized during the 1960s. By 1970, it flourished in a way in which, for the 
first time, women began to be involved in direct income-generating activities. In that 
respect, they started to utilise their labour in an effective way through long working 
hours in tough working conditions. The activity developed like a putting-out industry 
(Stirling, 1974, p. 206). Entrepreneurs, usually from the town of Kayseri, provided 
materials necessary for production, while the women provided the labour. Although 
at the end of the production chain, the women, in their workshops at home, were 
linked to the larger urban manufacturing sector. They worked in a physically isolated 
way in the sense that they never got into contact with the other parts of the chain, 
apart from their employer, who provided them with the inputs and paid their wages. 
However they were economically linked to urban chains such as manufacturers, 
producers of looms and yams, wholesalers, retailers and middlemen, who were 
competing to meet increasing demand for hand-made carpets. By 1977, carpet 
weaving had already become a widespread non-agricultural activity. Around half the 
total of 120 households was engaging in commercial carpet weaving, albeit in 
various degrees; 35 households had looms in their own houses while 13 households 
were sending one or two female members to the houses of other loom holders 
(Ayata, 1982, p. 117).
However, over the last two decades, women’s involvement in carpet weaving seems 
to have almost disappeared. Around 60 households were weaving carpets at the end 
of the 1970s. In 2003, there were only 11. Since the decline was quite recent, many
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women who knew how to weave carpets were unwilling to engage in the activity. I 
shall discuss the main causes of the decline in the next section.
Women seemed to have turned to dairy production instead. Many households had 
begun to earn income by selling dairy products, mainly milk, to the nearest city 
market in Kayseri 32 km away. Four middle-men from the village collected the milk, 
then took it everyday to the town.4 Depending on the season, each middle-man 
distributed up to 150 litres of milk per day. At the time of my survey, 74 households 
were selling milk on a regular basis,5 with an average of 12 litres per day. As milk 
production became commercialized, it took over the position of carpet weaving as 
preferred non-faming activity.
In sum, the development of non-farm activities is not a new phenomenon in Sakai, 
going back to the early 1950s. Since their first emergence, they have become the 
dominant form of income activity in the village. In 1950, half the households relied 
entirely on agriculture, only 10 per cent in 2003. In 1950, around 15 per cent of 
households depended entirely on non-agricultural activities; in 2003, more than half 
the households derived the bulk of their income from non-agricultural activities. In 
addition to this trend, there has been some rural-to-urban migration which has led to 
some decline in the absolute size of the labour force in the village. Hence, over the 
last half century, Sakai has experienced a process of transformation from agriculture 
through the emergence of non-agricultural activities and rural-to-urban migration.
3 However, as the years pass by, the skill may face extinction altogether, as mothers are no longer 
teaching the skill to their daughters.
4 They were buying the milk at 0.3 YTL (US$ 0.2) per litre, and selling it for 0.4 YTL (US$ 0.26), 
with a 33 percent margin.
5 Apart from around four months of the year during which cows could not be milked.
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4.3 Determinants of non-agricultural activities
Various factors have affected the process of transition from agricultural to non- 
agricultural activities in Sakai. First, the low income potential of the agricultural 
sector was a major influence. Second, labour demand from the non-agricultural 
sector affected the pace and the extent of the process. Third, improvements in the 
transportation and communication infrastructure brought new opportunities and 
stimulated the transition. On the other hand, non-agricultural activities that the 
villagers in Sakai engaged in have encountered challenges from urban sectors too. 
Low level of educational attainment amongst labourers seems to be the biggest 
obstacle that prevents a transition to high-productivity non-agricultural activities.
4.3.1 Agro-ecological push
The level of agricultural incomes has been consistently low relative to non-
agricultural incomes, which pushed the vast majority of households away from
agriculture, partially or fully. In 1950, Stirling reported that a single semi-skilled
labourer could earn twice as much as the value of grain produced in 4 hectares (4
tons), which was the average cultivated area per household at the time (8 hectares in
total, leaving half fallow). In 2003, the bulk of cultivated land was still under
cereals, mainly wheat. 1 hectare of land produced around 1400 kg wheat, which
generated 400 YTL (US$ 280) at 2003 prices. The net income generated from wheat,
deducting the cost of production, if it is taken very optimistically as 50 per cent, was
around US$ 140. Given that the plots were cultivated every other year, average
annual net income that one hectare produced was US$ 70. On the other hand, the
common wage rate in the building sector was US$ 13 per day. Hence, slightly more
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than five days of work of a single unskilled labourer in the construction sector was 
providing a yearly income of a 1 hectare of land in Sakai.
In 2003, the average number of days each household had labourers working in the 
building sector (at one year before the survey) was 135 days, which can be taken as 
the opportunity cost of staying in agriculture for an average household. It was equal 
to the net income equivalent of having 26 hectares of land. Looking at the land 
distribution pattern in the village, only two households owned more than 26 hectares 
in 2003. Among households who engaged in agriculture (excluding landless 
households), around 20 per cent owned between 10 to 20 hectares, 17 per cent owned 
between 5 to 10 hectares. More than 50 per cent owned less than five hectares, 
generating a net income of less than US$ 350 a year, smaller than the monthly 
income of a labourer working in the construction sector. Such low levels of income 
in agriculture mean that the opportunity cost of leaving agriculture, partially or fully, 
even for those households having relatively large farms (above 20 hectares) is lower 
than the opportunity cost of relying fully on agriculture, given the wage rates and the 
average number of days labourers from Sakai could find employment in the 
construction sector.
Consistent with the opportunity cost calculation above, there is an inverse 
relationship between farm size and participation in non-farm activities in the 
construction sector. Non-agricultural activities are taken more frequently by 
households which had little or no land. On average, every 1 person in 4.4, belonging
163
to a landless household worked in the construction sector in 2003.6 Every 1 person in 
5.9, belonging to a household owning 10 to 20 hectares, and 1 person in 14.9 from 
households owning more than 20 hectares, also worked in the sector. Therefore, a 
member of a landless household was around three-times more likely to work in the 
construction sector than a member of a household owning more than 20 hectares. 
Since those households having little or no land had a lower opportunity cost of 
leaving agriculture relative to those who had larger farms. As farm size decreases the 
incidence of participation in the construction sector increases in Sakai.
A similar relationship existed in respect of carpet weaving too. The average farm size 
of households engaging in carpet weaving was 0.8 hectares (Ayata, 1982, p. 121). 
Such a small piece of land produced around one ton of cereal every other year, which 
would hardly save a household from starvation (Ayata, 1982, p. 122). Hence, 
relatively low-income households were more frequently engaged in carpet weaving 
(Ayata, 1982, p. 112). Since the level of wages was below that of unskilled worker in 
the building sector7 and the working conditions were difficult,8 it was not a 
widespread activity amongst relatively wealthier households. In 2003, there were 
only 11 households remaining in the activity, and the majority were the poorest in the 
village. Amongst them, 8 out of 11 were landless households, indicating that carpet 
weaving continued to be a coping strategy for relatively poor households rather than 
a strategy to accumulate wealth.
6 There were 59 households, around 40 per cent in total, having no land in 2003.
7 It was reported that even unskilled workers in the construction sector could earn twice as much as a 
weaver (a skilled worker could earn three times more) (Ayata, 1982, p. 152).
8 Carpet weaving was considered to be very hard work as it required keen attention to detail and long 
working hours. It also required sacrificing other duties, such as looking after children and the elderly, 
and working on the farm.
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4.3.2 Urban pull
The macroeconomic situation in urban areas, particularly in the construction sector, 
has always determined the direction of labour migration and the stability of non-farm 
incomes in Sakai. As early as the 1950s, Stirling reported that because of the slow­
down in the sector and the general shortage of jobs in towns due to the 1950 
elections, migrants returned to the village without having been able to work much 
(Stirling, 1965, p.68). However, in the 1960s and 1970s, national growth along with 
rapid urbanization generated a boom in the construction sector, which gave rise to 
demand for labour. As a result, real wages in the sector rose sharply, which impacted 
on the village economy. (Stirling, 1974, p. 206).
Similarly in 2003, the provision of full employment was poor due to weak demand 
from the sector. The average time a household had a member working on 
construction was 4.5 months (within twelve months before the survey).9 This directly 
impinged on the macro-economic environment in the urban sector. The building 
sector has been severely affected by financial crises over the recent years. It saw a 
decline of 13 per cent and 6 per cent in 1999 and 2001 respectively (SPO, 2006). The 
total number of labourers working in the sector at national level declined from 1.4 
million in 1988 to less than 1 million in 2002 (SIS, 2006a). Since then it has 
recovered slowly, approaching to a level slightly above 1 million in 2004 (SIS, 
2006a). Since the employment elasticity of the building sector is high, any significant 
change in its growth has a direct impact on labour participation in the sector. Like in
9 For households having more than one member working in the construction sector, the aggregate 
number of months was taken here.
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the 1960s and 1970s, the extent of the transition to non-agricultural activities in the 
village is dependent on the strength of urban demand for labour.
4.3.3 Diminishing boundaries
The physical boundaries of non-farm activities have gone beyond the village and 
local labour markets towards national and even international labour markets. At the 
time of the survey in 2003, there were 58 male labourers from 52 household working 
outside the village. In the twelve months before the survey, 85 households had at 
least one member who worked more than one month outside the village. Amongst 
them, 24 households had at least one labourer working in the nearest province, 
Kayseri, while 34 households had members working outside the province in other 
parts of Turkey. Moreover, 26 households had at least one member who had worked 
in a foreign country, 16 in Russian Federation, 4 in Cyprus, 3 in Libya, 2 in Dubai 
and 1 in Kazakhstan. A total of 67 households had at least one member who had 
work-experience in at least one foreign country in their lifetime.
Improvements in transportation and telecommunication infrastructure have played a 
significant role in the widening scope of off-farm activities. In 1950, the some 30 km 
distance from the village to Kayseri took 6 hours and there was no regular transport 
means (Stirling, 1965, p. 16); in 2003, the journey took half an hour on minibuses 
passing through the village every half an hour. This has increased labour mobility. 
Similarly, mobile phones are being used extensively to keep work-networks 
functioning effectively. Labourers no longer have to be physically present in urban 
areas to gain information about job availability. Around 80 per cent of households 
participating in the construction sector had at least one member with a mobile phone
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in 2003. Without leaving the village, labourers could search for employment all over 
the country. Similarly, when an employer had vacancies, getting in touch with 
labourers in the village, or working in other parts of the country, was instantaneous. 
Therefore, the isolation of the village, and thereby the labourers, in physical and 
communication terms, has been diminishing with improvements in transportation and 
communication infrastructure
However, the poor level of educational attainment of the labour force has continued 
to be a major obstacle preventing the transition to higher productivity non- 
agricultural activities and entrepreneurship. More than 94 per cent of the population 
in working-age had no more than primary school education (see Figure 4.2). This 
includes illiterates constituting 10 percent of the total. Only five per cent of the total, 
mainly among those below 25 years of age, had high school education, and only two 
men had university education in the village. As for the distribution based on gender, 
all illiterates were women and there was no woman having high school or university 
education. Similar to the averages in rural Turkey in general (see Figure 2.8), the 
level of educational attainment is poor in Sakai which seems to prevent labourers to 
move to more lucrative non-farm activities in both urban and rural areas.
Figure 4-2 Distribution of Sakai’s population of working-age by education, 2003
-100 1----------------------------------------------------------
1
Illiterate Primary High University 
School School
Source: Author’s field research in 2003.
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4.3.4 Urban competition
Non-agricultural activities have also faced challenges from urban sectors over the 
last couple of decades. The main reason for the near extinction of carpet weaving 
was the fact that the sector began to face severe competition from urban industry. 
Industrial carpet production gained momentum in the 1970s and directly affected the 
hand-made weaving sector (Ayata, 1982, p. 189,191). Poor quality hand-made 
carpets have now gone out of the market, given factory production with cost 
advantages and higher quality. This in turn pushed hand-made carpets into high- 
income domestic and export markets where there is lower demand. Ayata reported a 
shift in demand from conventional woollen carpets, ‘Manchester’ type, that weavers 
in Sakai were producing to small silk carpets in 1977 (Ayata, 1982, pp. 151-180). 
Given that silk carpets were on average five-times more expensive than the woollen 
ones, home weaving became a niche market with limited demand.
At the end of the 1970s, a carpet weaver was reported to earn half of an unskilled 
worker in the construction sector (Ayata, 1982, p. 152). In 2003, a household with 
two female members working on a carpet could earn around 140 YTL (US$ 93) for 
at least three months of hard work. This was equivalent of seven days work of an 
unskilled construction labourer. Thus, it was not surprising to find an almost terminal 
decline of the weaving activity in Sakai.
Similarly, improvements in the transportation infrastructure and the consequent ease
of travel, have affected another type of non-farm activity. Small shops which had
emerged in the past have gone out of business due to the regional spread of mobile
retailers. Goods of all kind have begun to come to the doorstep of the villagers
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almost on a daily basis. Their prices reasonably match the prices in nearby Kayseri. 
Some of them also provide their customers with small accounts of credit to be paid 
back later. Faced with this competition, local shops, which were generating 
alternative incomes for a few households (up to five) have disappeared. Hence, 
improving infrastructure has eradicated the natural protection of local non- 
agricultural enterprises by enabling competitive producers from outside to enter the 
rural market (Reardon, 2004, p. 17).
In sum, various challenges have been affecting the process of labour transition from 
agricultural to non-agricultural activities in Sakai over the past half century. The lack 
of agricultural transformation (poor yields and low value cropping patterns) mainly 
due to unfavourable agro-ecology has ‘pushed’ households to develop non- 
agricultural activities as a form of survival strategy. The process has been mainly 
driven by households’ ex-ante risk management in the face of certain risks of income 
inadequacy (Barrett, et al., 2001, p. 322). The Sakai experience has shown that, as 
Reardon argued, in areas where agro-ecology was unfavourable, there was a high 
incidence of temporary migration. The attraction of non-agricultural income earned 
outside poor agro-ecological zones (in this case through construction work) was 
higher than the income earned through local non-agricultural activities (in this case 
through carpet weaving and milk production) (Reardon, 2004, p. 12). Sakai has also 
illustrated that, similar to Islam’s observation of villages in Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, Thailand and Sri Lanka, there was an inverse relationship between farm 
sizes and the proportion of non-agricultural income in households’ total income 
(Islam, 1986, p. 159). As farm size decreased, the participation rates in non- 
agricultural activities increased.
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4.4 The role of non-agricultural activities
In Sakai labour transition to non-agricultural activities has played major economic 
and social roles. First and foremost, the non-agricultural sector has absorbed some 
extra labour from the unproductive agricultural sector. However, the level of 
productivity in the non-agricultural sector itself was a matter of concern, as it 
determined the extent of its overall impact on the rural economy. The employment 
generation and labour absorption functions of non-agricultural sectors have been 
very important in the context of unfavourable agro-ecology where Sakai is located. 
Emergence of non-agricultural activities has also affected rural-to-urban migration 
patterns. Moreover, the impact of non-agricultural activities on rural income 
distribution has been significant. As for social relations within the village, the role of 
women both in the village and within the household has changed.
In 2003, the construction sector employed 129 labourers which constituted 40 per 
cent of the total labour force. Activities adopted by the women, i.e. carpet weaving 
and milk production, provided non-agricultural employment to another 25 percent of 
the total labour force. Hence, both men’s and women’s non-agricultural activities 
have generated employment for a labour force which would have been severely 
un/underemployed in the agricultural sector. They have absorbed substantial amount 
of surplus labour out of the agricultural sector.
Nevertheless, the level of productivity in these activities needs to be considered in
weighing their ‘real’ significance and potential. The distinction that needs to be made
here is between the activities of high productivity and that of ‘residual’ character, i.e.
those developed by the poor as a last resort (Islam, 1986, p. 153). In Sakai, similar to
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Islam’s investigations in other developing countries, low productivity wage 
employment constituted the greater proportion of non-agricultural employment 
(Islam, 1986, p. 159).10 Similarly, Harriss’s distinction between ‘involutionary’ non- 
agricultural activities, and ‘positive diversification’ is relevant too. In the former, 
increasingly impoverished households diversifies their incomes towards broader 
range of low-productivity activities. Whereas in the latter, households participated in 
high productivity activities with higher levels of consumption (Harriss, 1991, p. 432). 
In Sakai, the fact that average total time that a household had a member working in 
the construction sector 135 days meant that there was a serious underemployment 
problem in the construction sector. Therefore, although, they have increased labour 
productivity from the agricultural baseline, productivity levels in non-agricultural 
activities were relatively low.
Similarly, women’s non-farming activities were also of low productivity. Carpet 
weaving households produced 1 - 3  carpets a year, contributing US$ 93 to US$ 280 
to the village economy. On the other hand, milk production was not exceptionally 
profitable, nor was it undertaken in a productive way. The average amount of milk 
that a household produced for the urban market was relatively low, 12 litres per day. 
This generated an output value of US$ 3.6 per day, and less than US$ 1,000 per year 
on average.11 On the other hand, the cost of production was high, given that the
10 Agricultural wages usually determine the base rate, below which could be regarded as ‘residual’ 
( ‘or of very low productivity’) in rural areas. In Islam’s study, wage rates in non-farm activities, like 
carpet weaving, pottery, oil extracting in Pakistan was lower than those of in agriculture. However, 
wages in non-rural activities requiring skill and training were generally higher (Islam, 1986, p. 163). 
In Sakai, wages in carpet weaving was lower than agricultural wages, but wages in the construction 
sector were higher.
11 The average yearly output is less than US$ 1000, since the cows cannot be milked throughout the 
year.
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village had small amount of poor grazing land for cows.12 Especially those 
households lacking adequate lands to cultivate fodder crops, had to purchase their 
animal food exclusively from the market, reducing their profitability. According to 
my estimates, average cost of a litre of milk was between 60 to 70 per cent of the 
price the villagers sold it for. The average daily margin of milk production for an 
average household was between 1.08 YTL (US$ 0.7) to 1.44 YTL (US$ l) .13 Hence, 
like men’s off-farm activities, the level of both productivity and margins was 
relatively low in women’s alternative income activities too.
Non-farm activities have played a role, to some extent, to prevent excessive rural-to- 
urban migration. Although both men and women labourers worked in direct linkage 
with the urban sector, they have continued to live in the village. This was partly 
because non-agricultural income and farming supplemented each other in a risk 
eliminating way, especially in the early stages of non-farm activities (Stirling, 1965, 
p.69). In seasons of bad harvests more men sought outside employment, while in 
seasons of recession in the construction sector, migrant labour returned to the village 
and carried on farming in the traditional way. This provided households with some 
flexibility and a certain level of income and food security (Stirling, 1965, p.69). The 
cost of keeping their families in the village was relatively low too. Accommodation, 
food and heating were cheaper in the village than in towns. This prevented the 
migration of even those households who rely exclusively on non-agricultural 
activities since they did not have any land to cultivate. In addition, as the physical 
and communicational disadvantages of rural life lessened, engaging in non-
12 The total size o f grazing land was 150 hectares.
13 Based on the milk price of 0.3 YTL (US$ 0.2) per litre.
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agricultural activities (both in rural and urban areas) without migrating has become a 
feasible alternative.
The transition to non-farm activities has also had some significant effect on income 
distribution in Sakai. Without non-farm activities, it would have been no more than 
agricultural income which is directly associated with land distribution. Hence, as 
Saith (1991, p. 470) argued elsewhere, the inverse relationship between farm size and 
participation in non-agricultural activities has decreased the level of inequality. In 
that respect, non-farm activities developed by men had an equalizing effect, as it has 
been undertaken more frequently by households whose access to land was relatively 
small. Since non-agricultural activities in the construction sector did not require any 
capital investment, there were no entry barriers to prevent the poor from 
participating. Necessary skills were relatively easy to pick-up, and required no 
formal training. Therefore, they have reduced the level of inequalities arising from 
unequal land distribution.14
The impact of women’s non-farm activities on equality has changed from being 
positive to negative as the dominant type of non-farm activity changed from carpet 
weaving to milk production. Since there were no entry barriers in carpet weaving, 
even the poorest of the poor had the opportunity to engage in it. Given that relatively 
poorer households participated in the activity more extensively, it had a positive
14 Earning regular income in the construction sector was not always accessible to all participants. 
Labourers’ ability to build effective social networks was the key for success in the sector. As the 
construction work was based on contracting and subcontracting, establishing and maintaining contacts 
within the sector was vital for getting regular jobs. Yet, there was no guarantee of finding continuous 
work. Being a friend or relative to a contractor or subcontractor was an advantage (Stirling, 1965, 
p.65). There was some reciprocity and favouring among workers in the village. However, the vast 
majority of labourers state that rather than a network of strong relations, a wider network of loose 
relationships is much more effective for finding regular work.
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effect on relative inequality in the village. However, dairy production seems to have 
worked in the opposite direction. Since it required certain amount of start-up and 
running capital, it was undertaken more by households having better access to land. 
Those households selling up to 10 litres of milk per day, had access to 3.8 hectares of 
land on average, whereas, for those selling between 11 and 20 litres, the average size 
of holdings was 5.9 hectares. The households selling more than 20 litres owned 7.8 
hectares on average. Moreover, there was also a significant difference between the 
productivity of the cows in different category of land ownership. The difference 
seems to be due to the fact that relatively better-off households have higher quality 
breeds than poor households; and they also tended to be able to feed their animals 
better from home-grown feeder crop.15 Hence, this fairly linear relationship between 
milk production/productivity and farm size appears to have been widening, or at least 
reflecting, the existing inequalities based on land distribution.
On the other hand, non-farm activities have had a direct effect on the economic 
division of labour in the village and within households. The commercialization of 
carpet weaving has transformed the economic and social role of women. For the first 
time in the 1960s, women had become income earners for their households. This also 
enabled them to gain more influence over male household-heads as much as they 
became a cash asset (Stirling, 1974, p. 207). Men’s increasing participation in the 
construction sector in urban areas has changed the role of women within the 
household too. At the time of the survey in 2003, there were 24 female-headed 
households, as male heads were away from the village. This constituted twenty per
,5For households producing more than 20 litres (at the same time they owned more land), average 
productivity was 8,41itre/day/cow, almost double that o f those producing up to 10 litres (owning small 
land), 4.6 litre/day/cow.
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cent of total households, excluding those which had no male labourer (less than 60 
years of age). It was more common for households having labourers working abroad. 
Half of the households in that category were female-headed. As such, non-farm 
activities have radically changed the role of women, increasing their responsibility in 
running household duties and managing its economy.
4.5 Small-farm differentiation with land fragmentation
Sakai is about two hundred years old (Stirling, 1965, p.23). As an outcome of typical 
Ottoman land system based on the predominance of independent peasantry, land 
distribution had been relatively equal. In 1950, only five per cent of households had 
no access to land, while half of the total owned less than 6 hectares. No household 
owned more than 50 hectares to bring it into the category of large holding. However, 
the patterns of land distribution have changed over the last couple of decades. By 
2003, there were 59 households, about 40 per cent, having no access to land through 
ownership. While 34 per cent owned between 0.1 to 6 hectares, 9 per cent owned 
between 6 to 10 hectares. On the relatively high-scale category, six per cent (eight 
households) owned between 16 to 30 hectares. There was no household owning more 
than 30 hectares.16
16 For the accuracy of the time-scale comparison, the categories used here are based on Stirling’s.
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Table 4-1 Land distribution in Sakai, 1950 vs. 2003
Land distribution in Sakai
Households (%)
Land ownership 
(ha)
1950 2003
0 5 40
1-6 49 34
6.1-10 30 9
10.1-16 10 9
16+ 5 6
Source: Stirling (1965) and author’s field research.
As is clear from Table 4.1, more significant changes took place in the lower 
categories of land ownership. Households having no land increased from 5 - 4 0  per 
cent. This was a result of the decline in the middle and lower middle categories 
combined. The percentage of households owning 1 to 10 hectares dropped from 79 in 
1950 to 43 in 2003. However, this has not been accompanied by § parallel increase in 
the percentages of higher categories. Both in 1950 and 2003, 15 per cent of 
households owned more than 10 hectares. Hence, the proportion of farms in the 
middle ownership categories has declined, along with an increase in the number of 
small holdings. However, there has not been an increase in the proportion of higher 
ownership categories. This clearly indicates a significant extent of land 
fragmentation in Sakai.17
These results suggest that there is a relationship between land fragmentation and the 
transition to non-agricultural activities, which seems to be two directional. On the 
one hand, land fragmentation has pushed households to engage in non-agricultural
17 There has been a relatively small rise in the total size of large farms, suggesting some land 
concentration, however, at the same time, the total area farmed seems to have fallen too. Given the 
substantial growth in the share of small farms, the pace of fragmentation seems to have been faster 
than that of concentration.
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activities. Among 59 landless households, 52 had at least one male member 
participating in non-agricultural activities. At the same time, land fragmentation 
might have taken place as a result of the labour transition to non-agricultural 
activities. The average family size of a landless household was 30 per cent smaller 
than an average household owning more than 10 hectares.18 Similarly, the average 
age of household-heads in landless families participating in non-agricultural 
activities was 15 years younger than in households owning more than 10 hectares 
(the ages of 40 and 55, respectively). This may suggest that the labour transition to 
non-agricultural activities might have pushed/enabled younger generations out of 
extended families, which in turn increased the incidence of land fragmentation 
through inheritance practices.
There was almost no market for land in either 1950 or 2003. Since yields and output 
values was too small to generate attractive incomes relative to non-agricultural 
incomes, the demand for land was almost non-existent. Furthermore, land holdings 
were fragmented, which would have complicated any attempt at land consolidation. 
Both in 1950 and 2003, the exact ownership of a particular plot was obscure, since 
villagers did not follow complex bureaucratic procedures to alter ownership deeds, as 
their lands changed hands through inheritance (Stirling, 1965, p.51). In 2003, only 
200 hectares of land were registered for direct subsidy under the scheme introduced 
through a World Bank Project, which constituted less than 40 per cent of the total 
land (based on my survey). Since the process of making land applicable for the 
subsidy requires laborious procedures of updating deeds, the bulk of the land was not 
registered although the subsidies would have provided income. Therefore, as the land
18 For landless households household size was 4.7; for households owning more than 10 hectares, it 
was 6.
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did not constitute a pivotal role in the livelihoods of the majority of households, and 
holdings were fragmented and their ownership was obscure, a land market was not 
functioning.
It is, therefore, not surprising that there has not been any significant trend towards 
increasing land concentration. Since the transformation within agriculture has been 
stagnant, the demand for land was minimal. Instead, Sakai has been experiencing a 
trend of land fragmentation and declining average farm size (as a result of an 
increase in the number of households). While the transformation from agriculture 
was taking place, land ownership has lost its economic significance, especially in the 
lower segments of ownership categories. Households with low opportunity cost of 
leaving agriculture left it without this leading to land concentration. Therefore, in the 
absence of agricultural transformation, small farm differentiation has occurred 
without land concentration. The role of land relations in the process of rural 
transformation has not been decisive in Sakai.
4.6 Conclusion
Over the last half century, cereal yields in Sakai have increased from an extremely
low baseline (1 ton per hectare) to a level which is still lower than yields in the
Fertile Crescent 10,000 years ago (1.5 ton per hectare). The case has illustrated the
importance of ecological factors in the process of rural transformation. High
altitudes, a steppe climate, unfavourable temperatures, cold stress, poor soil quality
and a short period of growing represent an unfavourable ecology which is not
conducive for achieving high yields and high-value cropping patterns. More than half
of Turkey’s cultivable land is in areas where some or all of the agro-ecological
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constraints affecting Sakai are in operation, creating ecological dependencies which 
hinder the process of transformation within agriculture.
Sakai has also shown that a stagnant transformation within agriculture pushes the 
process of labour transition to non-agricultural activities. Since agricultural incomes 
(the opportunity cost of leaving agriculture) was low relatively to non-agricultural 
incomes (the opportunity cost of staying agriculture), the vast majority of households 
in Sakai have turned, partially or fully, to non-agricultural activities. Since the 1950s 
when non-agricultural activities first emerged in the form of temporary work in the 
building sector, they have become the dominant form of income activity. There is an 
inverse relationship between farm size and participation in non-farm activities which 
are taken more frequently by households who had no or relatively small amount of 
land.
The process of labour transition has also been strongly affected by the overall state of 
the macroeconomic situation in urban areas. The labour demand from the urban 
construction sector, consumption demand for carpet and dairy products determined 
the pace and the extent of the labour transition. On the other hand, improving 
transportation and communication infrastructure has reduced the physical and social 
isolation of the rural space, and thus contributed to the process. However, as the near 
extinction of carpet weaving has illustrated, increasing linkages between rural and 
urban areas has also reduced the natural protection over rural non-agricultural 
activities making them vulnerable to urban competition.
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The case of Sakai has therefore illustrated that the categorization of non-agricultural 
activities based on ‘location’ and ‘linkages’ (Saith, 1991, p. 663-4) needs to be more 
dynamic. Non-agricultural activities in the construction sector have established a 
labour linkage between the rural and urban spaces. The activity was urban located, 
and it was linked back to the rural space through the backward linkages of wages, 
which has been intensified by improving communication and transportation 
infrastructure. Similarly, the development of milk production for urban markets as an 
alternative income activity would not have been possible without the improvements 
in transport facilities. On the other hand, local retail shops have gone out business as 
a result of increasing penetration of more flexible and cost effective mobile retailers. 
Hence, improving transportation and communication infrastructure diminishes the 
boundaries of location while intensifying the linkages between rural and urban 
economies. It reduces the transaction costs arising from the physical isolation of the 
rural areas while increasing the level of urban competition that rural non-farm 
activities faces.
Sakai has also illustrated that the labour transition from agricultural to non- 
agricultural (and non-farming) activities plays major roles in rural economies. First, 
non-agricultural activities absorb a substantial amount of surplus labour from the 
agricultural sector. Second, given that living expenditures are lower in rural areas as 
compared to urban areas the transition to non-agricultural activities has an effect of 
reducing excessive rural-to-urban migration. Third, when non-farm activities were 
adopted more extensively by lower-income households, they reduce the level of 
inequalities in rural areas. Fourth, they affect the division of labour within 
households and may empower the role of women within rural societies.
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As for small-farm differentiation, Sakai has shown that if the process of 
transformation within agriculture is stagnant, the demand for land is low and thus 
there is no significant trend towards increasing land concentration. Instead, as Sakai 
has illustrated, a trend of land fragmentation and declining average farm size is a 
more likely outcome. Through the labour transition from agricultural to non- 
agricultural activities, land ownership has lost its economic significance, especially 
in the lower segments of ownership categories. Therefore, in the absence of 
agricultural transformation, small-farm differentiation has taken place in the form of 
increasing number of rural households de-linked from agriculture without this 
leading to land concentration.
The next chapter focuses on another case, Sinan, located in further east from Central 
Anatolia. It has a more favourable agro-ecology and better infrastructural 
development allowing it to achieve higher levels of agricultural development as 
compared to Sakai, but lower relative to Tuz illustrated in the previous chapter. It has 
also experienced a somewhat moderate pace of labour transition to non-farm 
activities. However, the main distinctive characteristic of Sinan relative to the other 
two cases is its different social and political structure at the local level leading to a 
skewed land distribution pattern. It exemplifies a transformation process whereby 
high level of inequality in income generating assets (mainly land and water) is the 
most limiting factor. The next chapter assesses the social and political dimensions of 
the process rural transformation.
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Chapter V - A Captive Village in Transformation: Sinan1
A village in the province of Diyarbakir in South-eastern Turkey has recently 
appeared in many national newspapers and on TV with headlines such as ‘Peasants 
united against the landlord’, ‘Villagers are marching against landlordism’, ’Rebellion 
against the landlord continues’.2 For many, this was rather amusing news -  
reminding them of a popular comedy film based on a fictional representation of 
peasants rebelling against their landlord in the 1970s. In reality, however, the 
actions were a serious appeal by peasants voicing their plight about extreme 
inequality in rural south-eastern Anatolia.
This region of Anatolia is an extreme case of rural inequality, which has historically 
evolved through state politics. The seeds of current inequalities in land distribution 
were sown in Ottoman times. From the 16th century onwards, in return for their 
alliance, the central authority offered the Kurdish tribal chiefs the control of large 
stretches of land.4 State politics continued to legitimize or otherwise reinforce this 
structure after the establishment of the Republic. Despite attempts at land reform in 
the first half of the 20th century, for the most part the structure of land distribution
1 This chapter draws heavily on author’s paper on Sinan published in New Perspectives on Turkey 
(Karapinar, 2005).
2 Headlines in Cumhuriyet (02.10.2004), Kdylu (September-October 2004), and Radikal (17.09.2004), 
respectively.
3 A popular national newspaper, Sabah (24.08.2004), used the headline, ‘Kibar Feyzo Gets Real in 
Bismil ( ‘Kibar Feyzo Filmi Bismil’de Ger?ek Oldu’. In the Atif Yimaz’s 1978 movie, Kibar Feyzo, a 
young peasant is influenced by leftist urban slogans of the time in Istanbul, and initiates a struggle 
against the landlord in his village in south-eastern Anatolia.
4 For the discussion of the history of the region’s land ownership patterns, among others, see Barkan, 
(1980), Jwaideh (1960, 1999), Aydin (1986), McDowall (2000), Barkey and Fuller (1998).
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remained nearly intact throughout the early modem history of Turkey.5 By 1980, 
agricultural production relations had undergone a series of transitions, however, 
because of landlords undertaking land enclosures and expansions, inequality in land 
distribution intensified on an unprecedented scale.
This chapter explores the political economy of rural inequality from an historical and 
social point of view by investigating trends in the distribution of agricultural 
resources -  mainly land and water. The process of urbanization (transformation from 
agriculture), the extent of transformation within agriculture resulting from a huge 
infrastructural project -  the GAP (South-east Anatolia Project), and peasant struggle 
for land constitute the issues with which the chapter highlights the impact of 
inequality.
The village of Sinan, analyzed in this chapter, exemplifies the impact of severe 
inequality in the distribution of land and water resources on the process of rural 
transformation. The case history illustrates an example of extreme inequality that has 
been ascribed through state politics. The main argument proposed in this chapter is 
that ‘ascribed’ inequality in resource distribution is a push factor for rural-to-urban 
migration while also constituting a major obstacle to the transformation within 
agriculture.6 Other factors, such as enjoying relatively favourable ecology and having 
integrated into domestic and international markets, have affected the village through
5 For the discussion of the political economic developments in rural south-eastern Anatolia after the 
establishment of the Republic, see, Avcioglu (1969), Tezel (1982); for various perspectives in relation 
to the land reform attempts, see Tokin (1990), Tarakli (1976), Keyder and Pamuk (1984-1985), 
Karaomerlioglu (2000).
6 I use the distinction that Eastwood and Lipton (2000) made between ‘ascribed’ inequality and 
‘achieved’ inequality. The former is based on inheritance, status and ethnic discrimination, etc.; the 
latter is based on merit, competitiveness and market performance, etc. (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000, 
p.46). This chapter focuses on the impact of ‘ascribed’ inequality on rural transformation.
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the filter of this politically embedded inequality. Likewise, the GAP has benefited 
the village through the same filter. Therefore, Sinan provides a substantial case to 
weigh the impact of rural inequality on the process of rural transformation at the 
local level.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first investigates regional trends in 
inequality in landownership over the last half century. Here, it also explores the 
effects of inequality on urbanization and on economic development from the GAP 
since 1980. In the second part, it presents a longitudinal village study exemplifying 
an extreme case of ‘ascribed’ inequality in land distribution. This section discusses 
the political and economic transitions that the village of Sinan has been through. It 
also explores a recent grassroots movement that has been initiated by the peasants. 
Third, in the light of my fieldwork and the recent empirical evidence, the chapter 
assesses the validity of some arguments that have been put forward in the past about 
the process of scale differentiation, before it finally concludes.
5.1 Persistent inequality
After the end of World War II, with the help of the Marshall Plan, Turkish 
agriculture has experienced massive progress which reflected in the region too. The 
number of tractors quadrupled in 12 years, from about 9,900 in 1950 to 43,700 in 
1962.7 This led to the opening up of virgin land and, at the same time, the 
displacement of redundant agricultural labour. The total area devoted to agriculture 
increased from 14.5 million hectares in 1950 to 23 million hectares in 1962 (SIS,
7 For the data concerning 1950 see (SIS, 1956), for 1962 see (SIS, 1963).
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1963).8 In south-eastern Anatolia, too, the number of tractors increased remarkably, 
from 318 in 1950 to 1038 in 1962.9 However, it was the large landowners who 
purchased tractors first. They began to expand their control over land through 
bringing new land under cultivation as well as enclosing some land that had been 
previously cultivated by peasants under traditional sharecropping arrangements.
Between 1950 and 1980, the total amount of arable land in south-eastern Anatolia 
increased from 1.6 million hectares to 3.5 million hectares, an expansion of more 
than 1.8 million hectares (see Table 5.1). However, most of this extra land was 
brought under cultivation by large landowners. Almost 40 per cent of the total 
expansion (1.8 million hectares) occurred in the category of households owning more 
than 50 hectares. On the other hand, only seven per cent of it occurred in the small 
holders category (i.e. household owning less than five hectares). During the same 
period, the number of households living in rural areas increased by more than 
210,000. As is shown in Table 5.1 below, the bulk (63 per cent) of this growth 
occurred in the small holders category. Therefore, by 1980, large landowners had 
expanded their control over land, while small holders, despite their growing 
numbers, were squeezed into small portions of the region’s arable land. This in turn 
exacerbated the level of rural inequality in the period.10
8The total cereals production doubled in the period, from 7.7 million metric tons to 14.6 million metric 
tons (SIS, 1963).
9 For the data concerning 1950 see (SIS, 1956, pp. 2-3), for 1962 see (SIS, 1963, p. 16).
10 Keyder and Pamuk (1983-1984, p. 61) argued that the opening o f new land had an equalizing effect 
on land distribution in Turkey. Although this argument accounts for the introduction of tractors, it 
does not take into account the issue of their unequal distribution. It was mainly the large landowners 
who were able to purchase tractors, and they were the ones who expanded their control over land, 
thereby exacerbating inequality in land distribution.
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Table 5-1 Land holdings in south-eastern Anatolia,* 1950-1980
A: Households B: Land
Ownership Net increase (1950-1980)
Categories 1950 1980 (% )***
(Hectare) ** A B A B A B A B
0-4.9 69 600 177 420 201 900 301 347 132 300 123 927 63 7
5-9.9 42 600 333 480 63 650 408 519 21 050 75 039 10 4
10-19.9 27 000 377 220 53 405 676 778 26 405 299 558 12 16
20-49.9 6 600 208 140 28 880 810 977 22 280 602 837 11 33
50+ 3 600 535 320 12 855 1 260 604 9 255 725 284 4 40
Total 149 400 1 631 580 360 690 3 458 225 211 290 1 826 645 100 100
Sources: State Institute of Statistics, General Agricultural Censuses 1950 (SIS, 1956), 1980 
(SIS, 1984b).
* Land census data presented here is based on the region (region VI) including the provinces 
of Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Van 
** The ownership categories used in the 1950 census were slightly different: 0-5, 5.1-10, 
10.1-20, 20.1-50 hectare.
*** Distribution of the net increase between the categories of ownership.
B etw een 1980 and 1991, the extent o f  inequality in land distribution continued to get 
worse. A s is shown in Table 5.2 and 5.3, households ow ning more than 50 hectares 
increased the size o f  the total area that they controlled from 1.3 m illion hectares in 
1980 to an historic high o f  2.4 m illion in 1991. Their share in the region’s total area 
increased from 36 per cent to 49 per cent. On the other hand, the share o f  households 
ow ning less than five hectares further decreased from nine per cent to six per cent. 
B y 1991, approximately 70 per cent o f  the total arable land rested with the wealthiest 
15 per cent o f  the rural population, w hile alm ost half o f  the population owned six per 
cent o f  the la n d .11
11 For a thorough analysis o f land distribution patterns in all regions between 1950 and 1991, see 
(Koymen and Ozturkcan, 1999).
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Table 5-2 Land holdings in south-eastern Anatolia,* 1950-2001 (percentages)
A: Percentage o f Total Households B: Percentage o f Total Land
Ownership 1950 1970 1980 1991 2001
categories** A B A B A B A B A B
(Hectare)
0-4.9 47 11 60 10 56 9 49 6 58 11
5-9.9 29 20 16 12 18 12 19 9 18 13
10-19.9 18 23 14 20 15 20 16 15 13 19
20-49.9 4 13 8 24 8 23 10 21 9 28
50+ 2 33 2 34 4 36 5 49 2 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 5-3 Land holdings in south-eastern Anatolia*, 1980-2001
A: Households B: Land
Ownership
Categories 1980 1991 2001
(Hectare) A B A B A B
0-4.9 201 900 301 347 179 265 299 044 177 666 289 892
5-9.9 63 650 408 519 67 506 439 517 53 820 360 567
10-19.9 53 405 676 778 59 585 744 034 39 964 517513
20-49.9 28 880 810 977 37 907 1 011 946 27 723 767 950
50+ 12 855 1 260 604 18 395 2 404 339 7 256 804 892
Total 360 690 3 458 225 362 658 4 898 881 306 429 2 740 814
Sources: State Institute o f Statistics, General Agricultural Censuses 1950 (SIS, 1956), 1970 
(SIS, 1979), 1980 (SIS, 1984b), 1991 (SIS, 1994), and 2001 (SIS, 2003b).
* Land census data presented here is based on the region (region VI) including the provinces 
o f Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Van, Batman, and 
Simak (Batman and Simak were not administrative provinces before 1990)
** The ownership categories used in the 1950 census were slightly different: 0-5, 5.1-10, 
10.1-20, 20.1-50 hectare.
According to the results of the most recent (2001) agricultural census, this trend of
land concentration appears to have changed. The total area cultivated by households
owning more than 50 hectares dropped from 2.4 million in 1991 to 0.8 million
hectares. The proportion of land controlled by this category also declined from 49 to
29 per cent (see Table 5.3). At first glance, this might occur like the sign of a trend in
the direction of a more equal land distribution, but it was not. The main reason for
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the seemingly decreasing size of land owned by large landowners was the 
‘evaporation’ of large amounts of land in the data collection. When the results of the 
2001 census are checked against the previous agricultural census of 1991, it is 
immediately apparent that more than 2 million hectares have disappeared. Precisely 
44 per cent of the land counted in the census of 1991 does not appear in the 2001 
census data. Unsurprisingly, 67 per cent of the missing data were in the categories of
19large landownership (i.e. over 50 hectares).
The decrease in the total size of land in the highest category would have been a sign 
of the dissolution of large ownership if there had been corresponding expansions in 
the ownership categories immediately below. However, as is shown in Figure 5.1 
below, the size of the middle category -  households owning 20 to 50 hectares -  did 
not expand. In fact, the total area in the middle category also shrank from around 1 
million to 0.75 million hectares. Moreover, even if one takes the 2001 census at face 
value, the level of inequality would not have been much different from that in 1970 
(see Table 5.2).
12 The main reason for such a mismatch in the data is the method used in agricultural censuses in 
Turkey, which are based on the declaration of landowners. As such, they have always tended to 
underestimate the actual level o f inequality in land ownership. As Boratav (1999, p. 86) illustrated in 
the case of the 1970 agricultural census, the significant extent of ‘missing land’ was because of the 
fact that land reform debates were on the public agenda, which made landowners hesitant to declare 
the actual size of their holdings. In 2001, however, rather than land reform speculations -  which have 
disappeared since 1980 -  a possible expectation of taxation in the course of a major economic crisis 
might have been a factor.
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Figure 5-1 Total area operated by households in selected categories of land 
ownership, 1950-2001
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Sources: State Institute of Statistics, General Agricultural Censuses 1950, 1970, 1980, 1991 
and 2001 (SIS, 1956; SIS, 1979; SIS, 1984b; SIS, 1994; SIS, 2003b).
5.1.1 Pushing migration
There has been rapid urbanization along with population growth in the region since 
1980. It escalated in the 1990s, during which time the number of people living in 
urban areas came to surpass the number in rural areas. The percentage of people 
living in rural areas decreased from more than 60 per cent in 1980 to 44 per cent in 
2000. As is shown in Figure 5.2, in the mid-1990s, the share of urban population 
surpassed 50 per cent for the first time. The total number of people living in urban 
areas increased from approximately 1.5 million in 1980 to about 3.8 million in 2000, 
which represents an annual growth of 4.9 per cent. The number of people living in 
rural areas grew at a slower pace, 1.2 per cent annually (SIS, 1984a; SIS, 2003c). 
This indicates one of the highest regional out-migration rates from rural to urban 
areas in Turkey.
Area operated by 
households owning 
more than 50ha
Area operated by 
households owning 
between 20 to 50ha
Area operated by 
households owning less 
than 5 ha
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Figure 5-2 Rural and urban population of south-eastern Anatolia, 1950-2000
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Sources: State institute of Statistics, Censuses of Population (SIS, 1961a; 1960; 1977; 1984a; 
1991; 2003c).
* Including the provinces of Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, 
Sanliurfa, Batman, Simak (Batman and Simak were not administrative provinces before 
i990).
Extreme inequality and consequent poverty in rural areas has had a significant 
impact on urbanization. If the population figures above are taken into consideration 
along with the data provided by agricultural censuses illustrated in Table 5.2 and 5.3 
above, the relationship between rural inequality and urbanization becomes clear. The 
number of households in the ownership category of less than five hectares decreased 
by 12 per cent between 1980 and 2001. Similarly, the level of landlessness also 
declined from around 30 per cent in the 1970s to six per cent in 2001 (Koymen and 
Ozturkcan, 1999; SIS, 2003b). This was not because landless peasants became 
landowners, but because they left the rural space, indicating that rural inequality has 
been pushing land-poor peasants into urban areas, constituting one of the main 
causes of the region’s rapid urbanization.
Rural Population 
Urban Population
191
5.1.2 Bridging the GAP
The Southeast Anatolia Project, the GAP, is a vast regional development project 
aimed at resolving the region’s socio-economic ‘backwardness’ by means of 
agricultural development. It entails creating an extensive irrigation scheme -  with 22 
dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants -  constructed on the Tigris and the 
Euphrates. The main objective of the project is integrating the region into the 
national economy by means of advancing its agricultural economy. This was to be 
achieved through irrigated farming, improving land and water resources 
management, changing the cropping pattern towards more value-added products and 
the development of modem farming practices (Kudat and Bayram, 2000, p. 255). 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the objective of bridging the economic 
disparity between the region and the rest of the country has failed so far. Moreover, 
the way the project has been implemented appears to have created significant 
inequalities at the regional, provincial and household levels.
The project covered nine provinces and around 75,000 square kilometres, 10 per cent 
of the country. It was initiated at the end of the 1970s, revised at the end of the 
1980s, and is still in the implementation phase in 2005. The estimated total cost of 
the project is US $ 32 billion, including the hydroelectric power plants and the 
irrigation scheme (GAP, 2005).13 The total cost of agricultural investment is planned 
to be around US$ 10 billion (GAP, 2005). It is based on the irrigation of 1.7 million 
hectares of land, more than half of the region’s total cultivable area. Since the 
beginning of the project, the cumulative investment made for agricultural
13 According to the GAP Master Plan, three scenarios were envisaged setting different targets for the 
year 2005 (Mutlu, 1996, pp.70-71).
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development had reached US$ 1.6 billion by 2001. A total area of 215,000 hectares, 
13 per cent of that proposed, has been irrigated (GAP, 2005).
The impact of the GAP on agricultural development can be assessed systematically 
by analysing growth in the gross agricultural output value (GAOV) produced in the 
region between 1991 and 2001. Approximately 11.5 per cent of the agricultural value 
produced in Turkey was produced in the GAP region in 2001 (see Table 5.4). This 
represents a slight increase from its level of 9.4 per cent in 1991.14 In absolute terms, 
however, the gross agricultural output value produced in the GAP did not increase 
during the period. It was US $ 1.9 billion in both 1991 and 2001 at current prices. At 
first glance, it seems that the GAP failed to achieve any agricultural growth between 
1991 and 2001.
However, the GAP’s performance cannot be interpreted without taking into account 
general trends in Turkish agriculture over the same period. The gross agricultural 
output value produced in Turkey fell by almost 20 per cent, from around US $ 20 
billion in 1991 to US $ 16 billion in 2001 (see Table 5.4). Therefore, although land 
output productivity decreased in Turkey, it remained stable in the region. As a result, 
the region’s land output productivity has exceeded Turkey’s average in the period. 
Therefore, it seems that the GAP has slowed down the countrywide trend of the 
sectoral shrinking in the region.
14 There was a more visible increase in the share the GAP in field crops, from 11.2 per cent in 1991 to 
16.2 per cent in 2001 (see Table 5.4).
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Table 5-4 Gross agricultural output value (GAOV) in the GAP region and
Turkey, 1991 vs. 2001
1991 2001
GAOV Turkey GAP Share of Turkey GAP Share o f
(US $) * GAP GAP
(%) (%)
Field crops 10,005,588,930 1,124,731,585 11.2 7,280,294,275 1,197,438,167 16.4
Vegetables 4,877,883,377 287,288,512 5.9 4,373,316,487 376,932,935 8.6
Fruits 5,196,694,366 479,979,616 9.2 4,714,950,395 313,263,773 6.6
Total 20,080,166,673 1,892,000,192 9.4 16,368,561,156 1,887,634,876 11.5
Source: Author’s calculation based on (SIS, 1995) and (SIS, 2003a).
* At current prices based on monthly average exchange rate of TL against US$. Exchange 
rates as follows: for 1991, US $ 1 = 4,169.9 TL; for 2001, US $ 1 = 1,222, 921 TL (SPO, 
2003, pp. 78-79).
At the regional level there are huge disparities between provinces in terms of their 
trends in gross agricultural output value. Five out of eight provinces experienced 
negative growth in their gross value between 1991 and 2001. Especially three of 
them, Adiyaman, Siirt and Batman, saw declines of more than 30 per cent, well 
above Turkey’s average. Only $imak and $anliurfa achieved significantly high 
growth rates, at 42 and 52 per cent, respectively.15 This was mainly due the fact that 
the bulk of the completed part of the agricultural project was located in a single 
province. More than half of the completed irrigation (115,000 hectares of the 
215,000) is in the Harran plain within the province of $anliurfa (GAP, 2005). 
Therefore, as is shown in Figure 5.3, negative growth rates in five provinces, and 
high positive growth rates in the aforementioned two, illustrate a trend towards intra- 
regional polarization in terms of agricultural development.16
15 However, $imak’s share in regions aggregate output value was relatively small (2.1 per cent in 
199land 3 per cent in 2001). Its per capita output was the lowest in the region in both 1991 and 2001.
16 As a result, the share of provinces in the region’s total output changed significantly as is shown in 
Table 5.5. Over the period, the shares o f five out o f eight provinces declined.
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Figure 5-3 Growth in agricultural output value* in GAP provinces, 1991-2001
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Table 5-5 Gross agricultural output value* (GAOV), the GAP provinces, 1991- 
2001
Provinces 1991 2001 Growth in
Share of Share of GAOV
Value (US$)* provinces Value (US$)* provinces 1991-2001in GAP % in GAP % (%)
Adiyaman 239,469,285 12.7 143,970,190 7.6 -39.9
Diyarbakir 459,953,236 24.3 402,471,743 21.3 -12.5
Gaziantep** 339,981,054 18.0 307,912,354 16.3 -9.4
Mardin 217,818,387 11.5 237,850,660 12.6 9.2
Siirt 58,122,714 3.1 39,858,629 2.1 -31.4
Sanliurfa 404,319,340 21.4 614,898,969 32.6 52.1
Batman 132,916,532 7.0 84,567,855 4.5 -36.4
Simak 39,419,643 2.1 56,104,475 3.0 42.3
GAP (total) 1,892,000,192 100.0 1,887,634,876 100.0 -0.2
Turkey 20,080,166,673 16,368,561,156 -18.5
Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS, 1995) and (SIS, 2003a).
* At current prices based on monthly average exchange rate of TL against US$. Exchange 
rates as follows: for 1991, US$ 1 = 4,169.9 TL; for 2001, US $ 1 = 1,222, 921 TL (PMSPO, 
2003, p. 78-79).
** The province of Kilis has recently been established through the division of Gaziantep. For 
accuracy of the comparison, the value produced in Kilis in 2001 was added to the value for 
Gaziantep.
Therefore, looking at the provincial level, it is no wonder, that the success story
being highlighted by successive governments is that in the Harran Plain of Sanliurfa.
The annual gross agricultural product produced in the province is 50 per cent larger
than the amount in 1991 (see Table 5.5). However, when we investigate the land
distribution patterns in the province, the beneficiaries of the irrigation become
apparent. The province of §anliurfa has one of the most unequal land ownership
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patterns not only in the entire GAP region, but in the whole of Turkey. Households 
owning less than five hectares constitute 25 per cent of the total, and they control less 
than 4 per cent of the province’s total cultivable land. In contrast, the top six per cent 
of the holdings owned 43 per cent of the total land in 2001 (SIS, 2003b). Obviously, 
it is the large landowners who are the major beneficiaries of the GAP’s irrigation, 
while the small farmers are only benefiting according to their access to land.17 As a 
result, in the province where the project has been implemented, it has been 
exacerbating the existing inequalities at the village and household levels.
There are four main conclusions that should be drawn from the findings presented 
above. First, the GAP has not achieved its objective of bridging the economic gap 
between the region and the rest of the country. This is mainly because only a fraction 
(13 per cent) of its agricultural component has been completed. As a result, looking 
at the agricultural sector, the existing disparities seem to be widening for at least half 
of the provinces in the region. Second, the bulk of the completed part is located in 
one province, namely §anhurfa, where it has achieved substantial progress in 
agricultural growth. Third, it has exacerbated, however, existing inequalities within 
this province. Since there is major inequality in the distribution of land in that area, 
the completed part of the project has benefited the large landowners more than it has 
benefited poor peasant households. Fourth, the combination of the previous two 
outcomes has led to a trend of polarization between the provinces in terms of their 
agricultural growth. In sum, the overall impact of the GAP seems to have been far 
more limited than was expected and is often portrayed. Moreover, if the project does 
not address the issue of inequality (in terms of both the allocation of its investments
17 Kudat and Bayram (2000, p. 256) also mentioned the problem of increasing inequality in Sanliurfa 
because o f the unequal distribution of the benefits of the irrigation projects.
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at the regional level and inequalities in land distribution at the province level), it is 
very likely that it will lead to more severe socio-economic problems than it has so far 
alleviated.
5.2 Sinan, a captive village in transition
Moving from the regional level of analysis to the case of Sinan offers us an 
opportunity to analyse the impact of inequality on rural transformation at the village 
and household levels. Sinan is a village in Diyarbakir, one of the biggest provinces in 
the GAP region.18 The village has a considerable amount of cultivable land, around
3,000 hectares. 19 However, no single peasant household has ownership rights; the 
entire land of the village is owned by a single family living in Istanbul. As such, 
Sinan does not necessarily represent the land ownership patterns of the whole 
southeastern Anatolia or the GAP region. Nevertheless, it illustrates some major 
historical trends that the region has experienced. More importantly, as an extreme 
case, it exemplifies the extent of the impact of inequality on the process of 
transformation from and within agriculture. It also shows that severe inequality is a 
potential source of political discontent amongst peasants.
In the summer of 2003,1 carried out a field research in Sinan. During the two months 
of fieldwork, I carried out a population census and household surveys with the 
existing 146 households at the time. The surveys were essentially quantitative, 
investigating production relations and demographic and income related
18 It is in the district o f Bismil located on the main road between Diyarbakir and the province of 
Batman. It is located further in the east of the district, approximately 15 km to Batman.
19 According to the local land registry documents, there is also small amount o f state-owned land, 90 
hectares.
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characteristics of households. I also collected some official information about state- 
owned land, agricultural subsidies and cropping patterns at the district level from the 
local administration (Bismil Kaymakamligi). In the summer of 2004, I revisited the 
village for a shorter period to investigate the recent political developments taking 
place in the village.
Sinan has a history of about 300 years, and the current inhabitants are Kurdish 
peasants (Akcay, 1985, p. 124). The historical roots of current land relations in the 
village go back to the end of the 19th century. They began to take shape with the 
arrival of a rich family from a neighbouring province, Mu§. The family, called Sinan, 
arrived with a large herd of animals indicating a strong economic power at that time. 
The head of the family, who was said to be an educated man, consolidated his 
political and economic authority over the peasants in the early 1900s. He acquired 
the control of large amounts of land and became a landlord.
There is no official registry record as to how exactly the family secured the control of 
the entire land, however, it is clear that the family managed to acquire a substantial 
amount of land from the state. Akcay (1985, p. 126) argued that along with the land 
that had been provided by the state, the family might have purchased some land from 
the former Christian inhabitants living in the village vicinity. There is some recent 
evidence suggesting that the family began to obtain the titles of some state-owned 
land at the end of the 1950s.20 A document from the land registry archives in Ankara
20 Apart from this document, there is no clear evidence about the land transactions before 1980. 
According to Akcay (1985, p. 123), the landlord was leasing 500 hectares o f state-owned land by 
paying nominal rates in 1980. Since the amount of state-owned land decreased to 90 hectares in 2003, 
the family appears to have obtained the ownership rights of a considerable amount of land from the 
state since 1980.
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indicates that an official land commission visited Sinan in 1957.21 These were land 
registry commissions set up to distribute state-owned land to landless or land-poor 
peasantry. However, in this case, it appears that they transferred large amounts of 
land from the state to the family. 22 Such land transaction would not have been 
possible without the family’s political influence at the local level.23
From the 1920s onwards, a semi-feudal type of relationship between the landlord 
family and the peasants was established. Peasant households cultivated the land 
under a sharecropping arrangement, through which the landlord acquired 1/8 or 1/10 
of the product in kind in return for providing the land (and possibly draft animals) 
(Akcay, 1985, p. 128). Since the level of technology in agriculture was very 
primitive, manpower was the limiting factor of production. Thus, the welfare of the 
landlord was bounded by his ability to expand sharecropping to the broadest peasant- 
base available.24 The landlord allowed each household to cultivate 5-6 hectares, 
which was the amount a single household could cultivate with the technology at 
hand, i.e. a pair of oxen.
5.2.1 First phase
The landlord began to invest in technology after 1950, which led to a transition in 
land relations. He bought his first tractor in 1955 through cheap credits available 
under the Marshall Plan, and he bought two more tractors between 1955 and 1965 
(Akcay, 1985, p. 146). However, the economic logic of expanding sharecropping
21 This document has recently been gathered by some villagers in Sinan.
22 For similar stories of land commissions granting large stretches o f land to certain ‘powerful’ 
families in Diyarbakir in the 1960s, see (Yalman, 1977, p. 211).
23 Keyder (1983, p. 43) and Yalman (1977, pp. 212-3) mentioned the role of the landlords’ political 
influence on land transactions in those years.
24 The population of the village was 449 in 1935 (SIS, 1937, p. 19).
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was no longer plausible for the landlord. Every additional tractor made him less 
dependent upon the peasants and created more incentives for enclosing the land for 
his own use. For the peasants, on the other hand, it meant being driven from the land 
that they had cultivated for decades through sharecropping (Akcay, 1985, p.130).25 
Land came to replace manpower as the limiting factor, resulting in land relations in 
the village facing a radical transition.
The peasants encountered a dual pressure to their livelihoods. The landlord’s 
enclosures severely reduced the availability of land, both for cultivation and grazing 
for their animals. By 1981, approximately 20 per cent of households had no access to 
land (Akcay, 1985, p. 176).27 The land available to those households continuing to 
engage in sharecropping had decreased to between 2 and 15 hectares, with an 
average of 4.5 hectares (Akcay, 1985, p. 136). At the same time, however, they faced 
increasing population pressure on land left over from the enclosure process. The size 
of the village population rose from 834 in 1955 to 1,480 in 1985 (SIS, 1961b, p. 168; 
SIS, 1988, p.6).28 Similar to overall trends in the region, this meant that the 
livelihoods of the peasants were squeezed by increasing population pressure on 
decreasing amount of land resources.
25 Some peasants resisted the enclosure process because they had traditional rights to inherit the land 
that they sharecropped (Akcay, 1985, p. 174). However, the landlord employed reward-punishment 
tactics: he exercised coercive methods, like beating, firing and bulldozing houses, indeed even killing 
(Akcay, 1985, pp. 133-4), and he also (re)allocated the land outside his own operation to buy loyalty 
from within the village (Akcay, 1985, p. 133). As such, he managed to shift the traditional economic 
balance o f feudalism to a politically risky, but economically more rewarding equilibrium.
26 Yalman (1977, pp. 198-9) observed similar structural changes in the landlord-peasant relationship 
in Diyarbakir as a result o f the introduction of tractors in the 1950s and 1960s. She mentioned the 
introduction o f the tractors as ‘disastrous’ from the point of view of the peasants.
27 It is based on Akcay’s sample (1985, p. 176).
28 This figures includes the population o f two hamlets administratively linked to Sinan.
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By 1980, the landlord had turned into a capitalist farmer -  having 13 tractors, 2 
trucks, 2 harvesters, 6 water pumps, and undertaking wheat cultivation on 1,500 
hectares of land (Akcay, 1985, pp. 123-76).29 However, he continued to engage in 
traditional sharecropping relations with relatively ‘trouble-free’ families.30 He 
sharecropped-out around 800 hectares to the peasants, and left some land fallow 
(Akcay, 1985, p. 176). Parallel to what happened in the region during the same 
period, the level of economic inequality intensified, since the combination of the 
availability of labour replacing technology and the political power allowed the 
landlord to expand his control over land at the expense of the peasants.
5.2.2 Second phase
When I visited the village in the summer of 2003, I discovered that Sinan was in a 
significantly different socio-economic and political phase than it had been in the 
early 1980s. A considerable degree of out-migration to urban areas has occurred. The 
impact of the GAP appears to have made a huge impact on the village economy, in 
general, and on social relations between the landlord and the peasants, in particular. 
In addition, there were some important political developments indicating upfront 
popular discontent about the level of inequality.
At the time of my survey in 2003, there were 1,138 people living in 146 households. 
Considering the fact that there were around 105 households and 1000 people living 
in the village in 1981 (Akcay, 1985, p. 121), it was clear that there had been a net
29 The term ‘capitalist’ implies here that the landlord had begun to utilize technological capital to 
produce exclusively for national markets, which greatly increased his potential for capital 
accumulation.
30 If the landlord had full political power to enclose the entire land for his own use, he could have 
become a fully-fledged capitalist undertaking large-scale, technologically intensive farming.
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out-migration from the village to urban areas. If the village population had grown at 
a natural rate, it would have reached roughly 1,800 in 2003.31 This meant that similar 
to the regional demographic trends, there has been a significant amount of out­
migration from Sinan to urban areas since 1980.
As a result of increasing state investment in the irrigation infrastructure through the 
GAP, the size of irrigated land expanded from around 200 hectares in 1981 to almost 
700 hectares in 2003.32 This has brought about a big increase in gross agricultural 
output value produced in the village. Almost all of the additional irrigated land was 
devoted to high-value cotton production. At 2003 prices, the gross value produced in 
the additional irrigated land (500 hectares) was around US$ 1,225,000.33 Without the 
irrigation, this area would have been devoted to low-value cereal production. The 
gross value output produced on it would have been around US$ 175,000, almost 
seven-times smaller.34 This clearly illustrates the huge potential investing in 
irrigation has for generating accelerated growth in output value production through 
yield improvements and transition to higher value crops.
The extensive growth in output value has transformed the production relations 
between the landlord and the peasant. As the area of irrigated land increased, the son 
of the landlord, who took over control from his father, gradually lowered the size of
31 Natural growth rate is taken as three per cent, which was the average annual growth rate between
1980 and 2000 in south-eastern Anatolia (SIS, 1984a; SIS, 2003c).
32 For the 1981 data, see Akcay (1985, p. 123).
33 Cotton yields were around 3,500kg/hectare, and market price for cotton was US$ 0.71/kg (1
YTL/kg).
34 For simplicity, wheat was taken as a proxy for cereals. Wheat yields were around 2,500 kg/hectare, 
and market price for wheat was US$ 0.25 /kg (0.36 YTL/kg).
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his own cultivation, and began to rent-out irrigated land to the peasants.35 By so 
doing, he seems to have rationalized/optimized his economic relationship with the 
peasants. He secured a substantial amount of income without engaging in production, 
while peasants began to have access to irrigated land.
The main reason why the landlord has minimized his own cultivation is 
economically rational. In areas where the GAP increased the area of irrigated land, it 
enabled the production of higher-value cash crops, such as cotton. Since such crops 
mostly require labour-intensive production, small-scale family organization is cost 
effective. This is because production and management costs are high for large-scale 
farms undertaking labour-intensive production. The relevant technology to replace 
labour is either not available or too expensive to justify the opportunity costs.36 
Simultaneously, the (opportunity) cost of labour for peasant households is very low, 
given the levels of un/underemployment and other social factors preventing women 
from working. Therefore, the landlord was in a position to make risk-free higher 
profits by renting the irrigated land to peasants than engaging in direct cultivation.
The landlord introduced a fixed-rent system. Households which were willing to rent 
land had to pay a certain amount of cash to his designated representatives before the 
beginning of the production season. Since the rent was fixed, and paid in advance, 
there was no distribution of the risk of production between the landlord and the
35 At the time of the survey in 2003, the previous landlord was not alive, and the landlord family was 
no longer living in the village.
36 For instance, cotton harvesters have become available only in the 1990s in Turkey. In 2002-2003, 
its price ranged around US$ 60,000-250,000, depending on its technological advancement. Unless 
these prices come down considerably, the opportunity cost o f harvester technology does not seem to 
justify the investment.
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peasant. All risks associated with fluctuating yields and/or prices were assumed by 
the peasant.
At the time of my survey in 2003, one third of the households rented irrigated land 
from the landlord.37 The size of their operation varied between 1 and 70 hectares, 
with the average of 6.7 hectares.38 The total amount of irrigated land rented by 
peasant households was 420 hectares. In the season of 2002-2003, the rent of one 
hectare of irrigated land was around US$ 450 (650 YTL). Therefore, the total amount 
of rent that the landlord collected from the peasants amounted to approximately US$
190,000 in that season.
The rental market allowed peasants to integrate into the national and international 
cotton markets. Since cotton production on irrigated land enabled them to generate 
up to ten-times higher value per hectare as compared to dry-land cereal production, 
having access to irrigated-land through the rental market has provided them with the 
opportunity to engage in better income generating activities. Because labour- 
intensive production allowed them to utilize their own family labour, which had been 
mostly idle before they began cotton cultivation.39 Some households have even 
managed to purchase tractors in the last 20 years. There were 28 tractors owned by 
peasant households in 2003, although no single household, apart from the landlord 
and headman, had a tractor in 1980.
37 Some households continued to engage in sharecropping on dry land. The size of their dry plots 
ranged from 0.5 to 90 hectares. However, one-third of households still had no access to land at all, 
either through sharecropping or through land rental.
38 These figures are based on the household survey. In addition, according to the landlord’s 
representative, 120 hectares o f the remaining irrigated land was rented-out to someone from outside 
the village.
39 ‘Idle’ in relation to income generating activities. Both men and women engaged in limited income 
generating activity before the cotton production.
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The village had comparative advantages in labour-intensive cotton production since 
the cost o f  labour was relatively low. As compared to the case studied in Chapter III, 
Tuz in Western Anatolia, the cost o f  labour was alm ost 50 per cent lower. Similarly, 
land rents were 35 per cent lower in Sinan (see Table 5.6, below ). H owever, since the 
villagers did not own any land, and not registered as farmers, they did not have any 
collateral to secure official credits. M ost o f  them relied on either their savings from 
the previous season and paid cash for their inputs, or m oney they borrowed from  
their relatives. Som e villagers also took loans from cotton traders in Batman to be 
paid after the harvest. Therefore, it is difficult to asses the weight o f  (opportunity) 
credit costs in this case. N evertheless, relatively low  cost o f  labour allow ed those 
villagers w ho rented from the landlord to accumulate som e wealth to buy tractors.40
Table 5-6 Production cost of cotton per hectare in Sinan vs. Tuz, 2003
Sinan Tuz
US$ % us$ %
Fuel 268 19.4 327 12.5
Seed 87 6.3 100 3.8
Pesticide 94 6.8 100 3.8
Fertilizer 141 10.2 150 5.7
Driver, Guard, Cook - - 53 2.0
Land improvements - - 33 1.3
Depreciation of implements 27 1.9 67 2.6
Maintenance of equipment 27 1.9 67 2.6
Land tax and protection - - 7 0.3
Irrigation 33 2.4 33 1.3
Hoeing (labour) 87 6.3 107 4.1
Harvest (labour) 181 13.1 469 17.9
Rent 435 31.6 670 25.6
Cost of real interest rates - - 437 16.7
T otal 1380 100.0 2620 100.0
Source: Author’s field research in 2003.
40 The surplus, they generated was around US$ 600 per hectare (based on the yields o f 3000 kg/ha and 
the cotton price o f  US$ 0.67/kg in 2003).
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Some households, which had no access to land of any kind, became agricultural 
workers. They began to work for cotton-producer households during the hoeing and 
cotton-picking seasons, about two months altogether.41 Therefore, increasing 
irrigation created a land-rental market that optimized the production of labour- 
intensive crops generating higher value per hectare. This in turn had a welfare effect 
through increasing the utilization of peasant labour in the village (Sadoulet, et al., 
2001, p. 196).
However, the rental market was biased because it was built on politically imposed 
land relations within the village. First, the previous distribution of dry land had a 
strong effect on which peasant households would have access to the new rental 
market. For those who had no access to dry land for sharecropping -  because of 
lacking past political affinity with the landlord -  the rental market was still mostly 
closed. The landlord’s monopoly power over land was the second obvious reason 
why the rental market was biased. The peasants had no power to negotiate over the 
terms of rental or the level of rents. They had to accept whatever the landlord wished 
to impose. He exploited this power not only to maximize his economic interest but 
also to sustain his political leverage over the peasants. He prevented some 
households from renting land while favouring others with better rental terms and 
better quality land. Therefore, the rental market in Sinan was based upon a politically 
biased economic rationale. It was not open to all peasants, and hence, it was 
hindering competition and efficiency.
41 In 2003, the wage for an adult worker was around US$ 6 per day.
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The landlord’s monopoly over land has also determined the way national and 
international agricultural policies affected the village. For instance, a new subsidy 
project introduced by the World Bank has radically changed the nature of 
agricultural subsidies by decoupling them from output.42 It granted farmers an annual 
payment in compensation for the removal of price and input-based subsidies. An 
amount of approximately US$ 110 per hectare was granted to all farmers, with a 
maximum of 50 hectares allowed per farmer.43 The objective was to make small- 
scale producers benefit more from direct subsidies relative to big landlords who had 
been enjoying large indirect subsidies (World Bank, 2001, p. 66).
However, at the village level in Sinan, such compensation has not had the intended 
outcome. I discovered that the landlord was getting direct subsidies for 2,523 
hectares of land, 50 times larger than the limit.44 According to the peasants, he had 
found a way of circumventing the 50 hectares cap by abusing another rule of the 
project, which subsidized the actual person cultivating the land irrespective of who 
was the owner. The peasants claimed that the landlord had arranged some 50 false 
rental contracts (each for less than 50 hectares) under his relative’s names and those 
of some villagers, and made the whole land eligible for the direct subsidy.45 
Apparently, he also collected direct fuel subsidies, which were meant to be
42 After the introduction of an IMF stand-by programme in 1999, this project was initiated under the 
name of Agricultural Reform Implementation Project, ARIP (World Bank, 2001).
43 The upper limit was originally 20 hectares in 2001 (World Bank, 2001, p. 11).
44 This information was gathered from the local administration of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs. It is based on the total direct subsidy approved for Sinan in 2003. The official 
information is about the total area (2,523 hectares) subsidized. The suggestion that the whole subsidy 
was actually received by the landlord is based on my survey in the village.
45 The villagers claimed that they had to sign the contracts because the landlord would have punished 
them by not allowing them to continue to sharecrop or rent his land. However, all complained because 
they had the right to receive the subsidies, not the absentee landlord.
207
subsidizing tractor owners.46 Although the peasant households who were actually 
cultivating the land were the legal recipients of these subsidies, no household in my 
survey stated that they had received direct subsidies from the state.
Therefore, it appears that the new subsidy project turned out to be a very effective 
way of pouring hundred thousands of dollars to the landlord family, rather than 
improving the livelihoods of poor peasants. Based on the rate of US$ 110 per 
hectare, the landlord seems to have received approximately US$ 280,000 as direct 
subsidy for 2,523 hectares of land. In addition, he collected about US$ 70,000 as fuel 
subsidy at 2003 prices.47 Therefore, the World Bank-initiated subsidy project 
provided the absentee landlord with a total of US$ 350,000, while the actual 
cultivators faced a significant burden of decreasing input and output subsidies.
In the form of direct subsidies and rent (in cash), the landlord extracted around 
US$ 540,000 out of the village to Istanbul -  where he was living -  which had severe 
consequences for the village economy.48 First, since the amount of capital in 
circulation was limited, the potential for the development of non-farm activity was 
very low. Apart from two small retail shops and a coffeehouse, there was almost no 
commercial activity corresponding to the agricultural economy. Since peasants show 
high propensity to spend their income on locally produced agricultural and non- 
agricultural goods (Reardon, 2004, p. 5), the siphoning off of large amounts of 
financial capital by the landlord out of the village inhibits the development of
46 The limit o f 50 hectares applied for direct fuel subsidies too.
47 The total amount of direct fuel subsidy was based on the same amount o f land, US$ 28 per hectare 
(39 YTL/Ha) at 2003 prices.
48 The figure is the sum of the direct subsidies (US$ 280,000), fuel subsidies (US$ 70,000), and the 
rent he collected from the peasants on 420 hectares (around US$ 190,000 based on rent US$ 
450/hectare). This figure excludes his income (in kind) from sharecropping.
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consumption linkages. Second, these transfers drained the local capital that could be 
spent on agricultural investments. The landlord himself ceased investing in 
agriculture in the 1980s.49 His agricultural machine park has become idle. He left 
over 1,000 hectares of land uncultivated for consecutive years in 2002 and 2003.50 
The peasants, on the other hand, had more incentives to invest in technology, yet 
their means were very limited.51 As Patnaik (2003, p. 40) argued, those 
monopolizing land lacked the incentive to invest and those renting in land lacked the 
means to invest.
The results of my research in 2003, along with previous research by Akcay and his 
colleagues, show that the landlord-peasant relationship in Sinan has experienced two 
phases of a dynamic transition since 1950. In the first phase, state-led investment in 
technology infrastructure through the introduction of tractors was a key factor which 
enormously accelerated the process of transformation within agriculture through 
integration into the national markets. However, it was not the peasants but the 
landlord who purchased tractors, and benefited from the market integration. The 
peasants faced the bitter consequences of this transition either being driven from the 
land on which they had traditional rights to sharecrop, or being squeezed into 
increasingly smaller amounts of land, despite their increasing numbers. This in turn 
further intensified the level of inequality (both asset and income) in the village.
49 He engaged in business activities in the urban sector in the western parts of the country. He is also 
said to have some trade business in East European countries.
50 Based on information gathered from the landlord’s agent.
51 The tractors that some households managed to purchase are usually aged, inadequately equipped 
and low quality.
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In the second phase, which began after 1980, the production relations between the 
landlord and the peasants experienced transition from a phase in which the landlord 
undertook direct cultivation through mechanized cereal production, into a phase in 
which the landlord rented the land to the peasants, who paid in cash.52 This transition 
took place mainly because of the increase in the size of irrigation infrastructure built 
by the state through the GAP, which brought about a partial transition from low- 
value cereal production to high-value cash crops, mainly cotton. This in turn 
necessitated a change in the production organization from being technology-intensive 
to labour-intensive. The existence of a readily available labour force, which was 
willing to work at relatively low costs, optimized the transition. As a result, the 
landlord turned into an absentee who extracted huge amounts of financial resources 
out of the village while assuming no financial risk of production. This has not only 
drained the capital for agricultural investments, but also reduced the potential 
development of non-agricultural activities within the village.
As for small farm efficiency, the case shows that such levels of ‘ascribed’ inequality 
constitutes a big obstacle to agricultural growth (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000, p. 50), 
by harming the operation of potentially more efficient and competitive small farms. 
In this case, small-scale farming has proved to be cost effective in labour-intensive 
crops. On irrigated land, cotton producing small farms generated higher net value per 
hectare than the landlord’s own technology-driven operation on dry land. The large 
stretches of cultivable land that the landlord left uncultivated would have also 
generated economic value if it was under small-scale farming. It would also have 
enhanced the livelihoods of the poor through providing them with a certain level of
52 Using Kay’s (1974, p. 70) terminology, a transition from Gutsherrschaft into Grundherrschaft.
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food security, and through guaranteeing social security in different stages of their 
household cycle (de Janvry, et al., 2001a, pp. 5-6). Hence, high levels of inequality 
reduced the full utilization of abundant labour and land resources in Sinan, leading to 
economic inefficiency and rural poverty.
5.2.3 Peasants united vs. the landlord
The political relationship between the landlord and the peasants, which had been 
sustaining the economic dominance of the landlord, changed dramatically in 2004. 
The peasants initiated a grassroots movement against the landlord family, and 
claimed the ownership rights of the village land. This started when ambiguity 
amongst the peasants about who actually owned the land began to disappear in the 
spring of 2004. Until that time, there had been a perception that the state was the 
actual owner of the majority of the land in the village. Many peasants thought that 
the landlord had been renting the land from the state for certain periods of time by 
paying marginal rates, and subletting it to them at higher rates. The arrival of an 
official letter from the district administration (Kaymakamhk) to the village headman 
changed this perception.53 The letter announced that the state-owned land was to be 
rented to peasants in the district, which encouraged some peasants to consider renting 
land from the state. When they approached the administration to make an inquiry 
about it, however, they discovered that the actual amount of state-owned land was 
only around 90 hectares, drastically smaller than 1,000 to 3,000 hectares they had
53 In fact, this letter was not something sent to the village o f Sinan specifically. Apparently, it was sent 
to all villages in Bismil, where the state owned some land. The letter was posted to the village’s 
headman to be announced publicly. Some villagers suspected that there were letters o f similar content 
that had been sent to the village; however, former headmen o f Sinan had never made them public 
if/when such letters arrived.
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had in mind.54 Then they took further steps to find out when this land was actually 
titled under the landlord’s family. After searching in the local administration land 
registry and in registry archives in Ankara, they discovered that state-owned land in 
the village had been gradually titled under the landlord’s family since the 1950s.55 
There was still a small area of land in the legal process of being titled by the family. 
This created great anxiety among the peasants, especially among the younger 
generation.
Some peasants, then, decided to take common action against the landlord family in 
order to regain the possession of the land on which they had been working. They 
claimed that they should have been the legal recipients of the ownership of the state- 
owned land, because the common practice of the state was to transfer the ownership 
rights of its land to the farmers who had cultivated it for a certain length of time. 
They visited the head of the local administration and asked for a new cadastre 
survey. Unsatisfied by the negative response, they decided to initiate a protest march 
against the landlord family in the village in August of 2004. They invited local 
newspapers and TV broadcasters. They prepared banners, slogans and a black 
emblem to be placed in the gates of the landlord’s currently unoccupied house, as a 
symbol of their opposition to the family. They received considerable media coverage,
54 There were huge speculations about the size of the state-owned land among peasants both in 1981, 
and in 2003. Akcay (1985, p. 122) notes figures provided by peasants up to 1,000 hectares in 1981. I 
was given figures in the range of 1,000 to 3,000 hectares in 2003. Obviously, no one in the village had 
searched for reliable information through official channels, or those who had, did not manage to 
achieve reliable information.
55 A document they gathered from the land registry archives showed that an official land commission 
visited the village in 1956. It declared that some plots, which were titled with Ottoman deeds, had no 
known inheritors in the village. The peasants claimed that the inheritors of those plots were actually 
living in the village at that time. In fact, currently there are peasants arguing that they were the 
inheritors of those plots that are mentioned in the document. They claimed that the then landlord 
bribed the commission to produce the document which then allowed him to get the titles o f the plots 
declared by the commission unoccupied. The author holds a copy of the 1956 document.
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both in national newspapers and on TV.56 A couple of weeks later, they organized 
another protest rally, this time in the district of Bismil, which was attended by almost 
everyone in the village, apart from the very young and old.57 That event was more 
successful in receiving media coverage at the national level.58 As a result, trying to 
raise government and public awareness about the plight of peasants became a 
fundamental element of the movement.
The tension between the peasants and the landlord family rose after the peasants 
organized another protest march in the province of Diyarbakir in November 2004. 
Meanwhile, they took legal action against the landlord for illegally receiving the 
direct subsidies that the peasants had the right to claim. In return, the landlord, with 
the objective of punishing the peasants, attempted to cultivate the entire land of the 
village, preventing peasants from sharecropping and/or renting. He employed tractor 
drivers from a nearby hamlet, which was known to be loyal to the landlord family. 
However, the peasants resisted this attempt by occupying the land.59 The local 
military intervened, some villagers and a couple of soldiers were injured during a 
minor fight, and around 140 protestors were taken in for questioning by the 
military.60 Some of the leaders of the movement stayed in custody for four months.61 
Meanwhile, the head of the district administration intervened to allow the landlord to
56 A national newspaper, Sabah (24. 08. 2004), reported the protest with the headline ‘Kibar Feyzo 
Gets Real in Bismil’.
57 Only three households stayed out of the movement, since they had very close relations with the 
landlord family.
58 Cumhuriyet (17.09.2004) The peasant’s rebellion against the landlord does not end’; Radikal 
(17.09.2004) ‘Rebellion against the landlord continues’; Milliyet (17.09.2004) ‘Tractor chain against 
the landlord’, and Aydinlik (19.09.2004) ‘The villagers of Sinan o f Bismil are determined to get rid of 
landlordism’.
59 Aydinlik (12.12.2004). ‘The peasant resisted, the landlord’s men run away’,
60 Cumhuriyet (09.12.2004) ‘Rebellious peasants were taken into custody’.
61 Cumhuriyet (01.03.2005) ‘Rebellious peasants were before the judge’. As of June 2005, the trial o f  
more than hundred villagers who took part in the incident still continues.
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cultivate some dry land. The irrigated land has not been cultivated, and the landlord 
refused to rent it out to the peasants. As a result, all peasant households have lost 
their access to land altogether, and apart from some small amount of dry land, 
agricultural production came to a halt. In March of 2005, the peasants travelled more 
than 1,000 km, and organized protest marches in Ankara.
There are a couple of dynamic factors to explain why this overt oppositional 
movement has emerged recently. First, the social ties between the landlord and the 
peasants are not based on tribal/kinship linkages. As such, the family lacked the 
‘social legitimacy’ for its dominance over the peasants.62 Sentiments of injustice 
amongst the peasants about the level of inequality are deeply rooted. Even in the 
1980s, there were expectations of land reform (Akcay, 1985, p. 174). Second, the 
physical absence of the landlord from the village has weakened his political leverage 
over the peasants. Apart from his control over the rental market through his agents, 
he had no pretence of participating in the village’s daily political life. The third 
factor was about the political environment at the regional level, which has become 
relatively more tolerant to civil political action after the armed conflict decelerated in 
the late 1990s. The flourishing of private media enabled the peasants to voice their 
protests more effectively. Organizing public rallies and broadcasting them through 
the private media would not have been possible during the years of the conflict in the 
1980s and 1990s.
62 This is one of the main reasons why it is less likely to expect collective action in villages where 
inequality is further strengthened by tribal norms and practices.
63 However, according to the peasants, the headman of the village has always been selected by the 
landlord.
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The peasants’ collective action is not motivated by ethnic identity along the lines of 
regional politics. Even at the height of the armed conflict, there was no peasant 
participation from the village.64 As such, the regional conflict does not seem to have 
had direct impact on the emergence of the movement. Furthermore, the peasants 
have never attempted to challenge the state. Instead, they have actively sought to 
gain the support of state authorities both at the local and national levels. They 
initiated a mass petition appealing to the President, the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. In their protest marches, they carried 
Turkish flags and posters of Atattirk. They have deliberately sought to avoid being 
seen as affiliated to any political Kurdish group. As such, this movement does not 
seem to set an example of a ‘post-modem’ anti-state struggle emphasizing 
regionalism, ethnicity and cultural identity. Rather, it is a movement for economic 
rights, with peasants clearly positioning themselves against the landlord in the 
village, and ‘feudalism’ in the region.65 The peasants of Sinan are calling for land 
reform.66
5.3 Lost in transition?
The fate of the region’s land distribution pattern has always attracted academic 
debate, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s. Some scholars believed that the
64 There might have been many reasons for this, but there were some obvious ‘logistical’ factors such 
as Sinan being a lowland village located on the main road connecting the province o f Diyarbakir to 
Batman, and having a military station within its territory.
65 They perceive the existence of landlords as ‘feudalism’, and they see this as unacceptable at the 
outset of the 21st century in a country which is applying to join the European Union.
66 There have been examples of similar grassroots movements in other developing countries. For 
instance, the Brazilian landless movement, the MST (Movement of Rural Landless Workers), is one 
the most successful grassroots movements in Latin America (Wolford, 2003, p.500). The peasant 
organization negotiates with the state and landowners for land reform settlements. In this way, the 
MST has achieved settlement negotiations enabling 250,000 landless families to receive over 6 
million hectares o f land since its establishment in the mid-1980s (For updated figures, see the 
movement’s website at www.mstbrazil.org).
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landlordism in the region would dissolve in the last couple of decades. For instance, 
approaching the issue from a theoretical perspective, Keyder argued that the region’s 
bi-polar landownership structure was not permanent but a transitional one (Keyder, 
1983, 47). Having been inspired by the late 19th century theorist Chayanov, who 
approached small-scale family production with a rather romantic idealization, 
Keyder argued that large estates, including the one in Sinan, were doomed to 
disintegrate into small-scale family farms (Keyder, 1983, pp. 46-48). As such, the 
Keyder’s approach was an attempt to stretch a narrow economic/romantic theory for 
a case that was inherently shaped by political factors. He paid no serious attention 
to political factors denying peasants having access to land. He turned a blind eye to 
inherent asymmetries of power within the rural structure (i.e. between the peasants 
and landlords). His approach was also criticized because of its overemphasis on 
inter-village inequality while categorically neglecting intra-village inequality (Aksit, 
1993, p. 200).
After a decade of profound climate change in the Turkish political economy (and in 
academia), Keyder brought a new dimension to his analysis. He claimed that regional 
development through the GAP had failed because the state had not intervened 
(through a land reform) to promote labour-intensive small-scale agriculture (Keyder, 
1993, p. 106). As such, he was introducing the missing link of politics to small-farm 
orthodoxy by acknowledging that pure economics was inadequate to capture trends 
in agricultural transformation. Ironically this time, in analysing the region’s lack of 
economic development, he almost exclusively relied on state politics as a key 
explanatory factor, assigning no significant role to economics. He paid full attention
67 Even the economic grounds of the argument were problematic in their own account. For an 
extensive criticism of Chayanovian populism, see Patnaik (1979).
216
to the role of the state, and almost none to his earlier convictions envisaging that 
small-scale family farms would eventually replace large-scale land ownerships.
There were other scholars -  approaching the issue from empirical grounds -  who 
reached similar conclusions implying the dissolution of large-scale ownership. For 
instance, Aksit and Akcay (1997) based their argument on the evidence they 
collected through a socio-economic survey. Using the results of a sample of 180 
villages located in four provinces in the region, they argued that large land holdings 
had been in transition, in which the number of landlords and the size of their estates 
had been in decline (Aksit and Akcay, 1997, p. 527). Moreover, they claimed that 
many large holdings had been undergoing fragmentation as a result of natural factors, 
such as inheritance and direct sale, which should be considered as an ‘informal 
process of land reform’ (Aksit and Akcay, 1997, p. 535).
The scientific validity of this argument, however, begs for special attention. First of 
all, the sampling of the research was not sufficiently representative to allow general
/ * o
assertions about the region to be made. Second, measuring the magnitude and the 
pace of change in land ownership patterns would not be possible without making 
measurements at two different points in time. As such, the argument about a ‘trend’ 
of the dissolution of landlordism had no reference point to be based upon. Third, the 
survey took village as the unit of analysis, and typified it according to the 
predominance of ’landlordism’ or large, medium and small farms.69 Thus, the
68 The research was undertaken in four districts, and the villages were selected disproportionately 
between them. Approximately 65 % o f villages in their sample was in §anliurfa, 16 % in Gaziantep , 
12 % in Diyarbak'ir, 8 % in Adiyaman (Aksit and Akcay, 1997, p. 526).
69 Aksit and Ak§ay introduced a household survey in the later parts of their article. However, it was 
on its own, not supplementing the actual argument based on the village survey.
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7Hargument was not based on an analysis of intra-village household differentiation. 
As a result, the empirical evidence leading to arguments about the dissolution of 
landlordism was not rigorous.
On the other hand, there were other scholars who have long been arguing that 
historical inequalities in land distribution were persistent, so constituted a major 
obstacle to economic development (Cinar and Silier, 1979, p. 25). Given the regional 
land censuses data provided in this chapter, the suggestion that there has been a 
disintegration of large landholdings in the region over the last two decades has no 
empirical base. In fact, the level of inequality in terms of income generating assets 
(land and water combined) seems to have increased, not decreased. Those scholars 
argued -  explicitly or implicitly -  for the dissolution of large landholding, 
underestimated, if not misunderstood, the strength of the political and socio­
economic establishment sustaining rural inequality.
During the last two decades, land relations have changed, which has altered the ways 
through which peasants have access to land. But this, by itself, has not weakened the 
position of the landlords. As in the case of Sinan, many of them enhanced their 
incomes as the region benefited from increased investment in irrigation through the 
GAP. It was/is rather naive to expect a loosening of the landlordism -  whose political 
establishment is so deeply rooted -  without observing any political transition which 
would lead in that direction. Neither Chayanovian neo-populist romanticism, nor
70 Ironically, Aksit (1993, p. 200) himself was critical about the attempts (for instance by Keyder 
(1984)) at analysing agricultural transformation at the village level without considering intra-village 
differentiation.
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arguments that are based on inaccurate empirical evidence are sufficient to declare 
the region’s landlordism dead.
5.4 Conclusion
Since 1980, rural inequality has had a significant impact on the process of rural 
transformation in south-eastern Anatolia. First, it has affected the transformation 
from agriculture by leading to a massive rural-to-urban migration. The region had 
one of the highest urbanization rates in the country. Second, inequality has also 
determined the impact of the GAP on the region’s transformation within agriculture. 
As the analysis of the empirical data on agricultural output value has illustrated, it 
seems that the GAP has exacerbated disparities at all levels of analysis, from the 
household to the region. Especially in provinces where the agricultural components 
of the project were completed, large landowners have been the major beneficiaries. 
The bulk of the peasants have benefited from the project only in proportion to their 
limited access to land and water.
However, this does not invalidate the fact that such a large-scale investment in rural 
infrastructure was necessary. The GAP has proved that investing in irrigation could 
generate high levels of progress in the transformation within agriculture by 
facilitating a transition from low value to high value crops, and increasing yields. 
Therefore, given that a fraction of the project has been completed, the GAP still has 
huge potential for agricultural growth. However, the entire agricultural component of 
the project needs to be reviewed so as to address inequalities in resource distribution.
The village of Sinan sets an example of the persistence of ‘ascribed’ inequality,
which hinders economic development in rural areas. It was ‘ascribed’, because the
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initial appropriation of the entire village land by a single family was a political 
undertaking. The case shows that ‘ascribed’ inequality can persist, albeit in different 
forms in different political economic circumstances. The periods of mechanization in 
agriculture, integrating into high-value commodity markets, national and 
international policy initiatives (the GAP, direct subsidy project, etc.) intensified the 
level of inequality. It also illustrates that neither sharecropping nor rental markets 
promoted competition and efficiency since they were fundamentally biased. In 
addition, the transfer of large financial resources from the village by the landlord 
drained the capital for investment initiatives as well as reducing the potential 
development of non-agricultural activities. Therefore, the process of transformation 
both from and within agriculture in Sinan remained captive to entrenched inequality. 
The case also illustrates that it provides a fertile ground for political conflict -  as the 
peasants have recently initiated a grassroots movement against the landlord.
Finally, the issue of rural inequality is also vital in relation to understanding the 
underlying causes of conflict at the regional level too. Given that the major uprisings 
that occurred in the region in the last century were rural-based, there is a legitimate 
case for arguing that structural inequalities in distribution and control of resources 
(chiefly land and water) have played a significant role in perpetuating conflict. In the 
last conflict, the PKK recruited a majority of its militants from the masses of landless 
and poor peasants.71 As such, inequality in the distribution of rural resources was one 
of the factors contributing to the widening of the conflict. Therefore, promoting 
equality in rural areas would also contribute to the post-conflict reconciliation of the 
region.
71 In an interview with White (2000, p. 155) in 1992, the leader of the PKK claimed that the ‘social 
base’ of the movement is landless and poor peasants.
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Chapter VI - New Opportunities in the Age of Globalization: A 
Realistic Policy Approach and the New Social Democracy
This thesis has investigated the economic dimension of rural transformation as an 
historical process which is completed when societies have achieved a ‘modem’ stage 
of development in which the vast majority of their labour force engages in high- 
productivity manufacturing and service activities while a small minority undertakes 
high-productivity and high-value agricultural activities. The approach that has been 
developed here has analysed this process from two dimensions: transformation from  
agriculture and transformation within agriculture. It has suggested that if these two 
processes -  a decline in the actual size of rural labour force (transformation from  
agriculture) and a rapid increase in land productivity {transformation within 
agriculture) -  overlap, the rural transformation can be considered as a process 
moving towards ‘completion’. Since there has not been any case of a ‘completed’ 
transformation over the last quarter of a century, the thesis has taken on the questions 
of why it has been so, and how such a process of successful ‘completion’ may take 
place in today’s developing countries in the era of globalization.
The thesis has focused on three main themes. First, departing from observations on 
worldwide trends in the process of transition of labour from agriculture, it has put 
forward hypotheses based on demographic, economic and human capital-related 
(mainly education) factors to explain why it has been slow. Second, the thesis has 
investigated the process of the transformation within agriculture; its hypotheses 
accounting for its stagnation were based on ecological, technological, market-related,
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distributional and political factors. Third, it has looked at the process of small-farm 
differentiation and put forward hypotheses explaining the predominance of small 
farms and the absence of scale differentiation in agriculture. Therefore, through three 
interrelated themes, the thesis has investigated why the process of rural 
transformation has been stagnant in the vast majority of developing countries over 
the last quarter of a century.
The hypotheses have been tested in the case of Turkey. As a middle income 
developing country having one-third of its labour force working in the agricultural 
sector, it has provided a good ground to test hypotheses in relation to the three major 
themes and related research questions. The case has highlighted a common dilemma 
in a situation where the role of agriculture in economic development is diminishing 
without this leading to movement of labour out of agriculture. Since both the transfer 
of labour from the agricultural sector has been slow and the sector itself has been 
suffering from low productivity, the country’s four million small farms have become 
a labour trap for millions of rural labourers facing poverty.
Then the thesis has taken the analysis into the micro-level through three longitudinal 
case studies which have provided a thematic review substantiating the analysis at the 
macro-level. The village of Tuz in western Anatolian shows the impact of a 
combination of global price trends and the policy framework at the national level on 
rural transformation. At the commodity level of cotton, it has illustrated an example 
of profitability crisis in agriculture in Turkey. Taking the case of Sakai in Chapter 
IV, the thesis has shown the impact of unfavourable ecology on the transformation 
process. It has illustrated the relationship between unfavourable agro-ecology and
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circular and permanent migration from rural to urban areas, and the importance of 
the transfer of labour to non-agricultural activities within rural areas. Next in chapter 
V, the case of Sinan has been taken to analyse the impact of an historical legacy of 
inequality on the rural transformation. It has illustrated how such inequality had an 
accelerating effect on rural-to-urban migration while hindering agriculture from 
achieving its full growth potential. Therefore, in each micro-level case study, the 
thesis has underlined certain major themes to deepen the analysis developed at the 
macro-level.
This final chapter builds on the case studies and defines the boundaries of the agro­
realist approach proposed in this thesis. First of all, it reprises each of the three 
themes by grounding them in a macro-level analysis at the country level and micro­
level case studies at the village level. It summarizes the major findings of the 
research, and their relevance to the central thesis question. Then, the second part 
opens out into a discussion of recent debates on the role of agriculture in economic 
development, and clarifies the position of this thesis. Finally, the chapter concludes 
by reflecting on some new opportunities for making progress in the rural 
transformation. In particular, it reflects on the recent calls for different policy 
frameworks - such as new social democracy - providing an alternative to the 
‘Washington Consensus.’ In so doing, it aims at contributing to the development of 
an operational framework through which the completion of the rural transformation 
can be envisaged in developing countries in the age of globalization.
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6.1 Transformation from agriculture: slow
Analysing trends in the urban and rural labour force in Turkey has shown that 
although the services and manufacturing sectors have grown considerably, there has 
not been substantial transfer of labour from the agricultural to non-agricultural 
sectors over the last 25 years. The contribution of the services and manufacturing 
sector to the country’s GDP tripled between 1980 and 2004, however the size of rural 
population of working-age (15-59) continued to rise. Both demographic and 
economic factors have been unfavourable for the transition.
Rapid urbanization mainly driven by urban population growth rather than by rural-to- 
urban migration has resulted in a rapid increase in the size of the urban labour force. 
In addition, fertility and mortality decline have expanded the size of population in 
working age in both urban and rural areas. Hence, the labour supply has increased 
substantially. On the demand side, however, the level of non-agricultural growth and 
its labour absorption capacity have not been adequate to match the growth in the 
labour supply. This has created huge unemployment and low labour participation in 
urban areas which has limited the non-agricultural demand for rural labour force. 
Therefore, Turkey has shown that there has been a big mismatch between population 
growth and the labour absorption capacity of non-agricultural growth. Hence the pull 
factor -  urban demand for rural labour -  has been weakening, if not disappearing, 
which has hindered the labour transition from the agriculture to non-agricultural 
sectors.
Although, the level of non-agricultural growth has been inadequate to absorb large
amounts of surplus labour from the agricultural sector, the service sector has been the
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main driver of the labour transition in both urban and rural areas. This is mainly due 
to the fact that the employment elasticity of the services sector has been substantially 
higher than that of the manufacturing. Every additional contribution of the services 
sector to the country’s GDP has created twice as many jobs as compared to the 
contribution of the manufacturing. In rural areas, on the other hand, the share of the 
rural labour force engaging in services increased from around 20 per cent in 1988 to 
25 per cent in 2004, while the share of manufacturing activities has not seen 
significant growth, staying around less than 10 per cent (SIS, 2006a). Therefore, 
growth in the services sector, with its higher employment elasticity, plays a bigger 
role in the transformation from agriculture.
The case of Turkey has also shown that the rural labour force’s low level of 
educational attainment is a major factor discouraging the labour transition further. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the urban market for low-skilled labour has already 
been saturated by the urban labour force itself. As such, the absorption capacity of 
non-agricultural growth for low-skilled rural labour is smaller than its capacity for 
relatively higher-skilled urban labour. Therefore, having a low level of education is a 
major factor reducing the chances of rural labourers to find employment in the non- 
agricultural sectors. Moreover, the modernization of the urban non-agricultural sector 
further de-links them from non-agricultural growth.
The spatial dimension of the labour transition in historical sense -  rural to urban 
migration -  no longer appears to be an indispensable aspect of the transformation 
process. While the speed of rural-to-urban migration has slowed down, a slow but 
significant extent of labour transition from agricultural to non-agricultural activities
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within rural areas has taken place in Turkey over the recent decades. The net 
migration decreased from an annual level of 1 million people in the early 1980s to
300,000 by the early 1990s, whereas the share of households engaging in non- 
agricultural activities in rural areas has increased from 10 per cent to 30 per cent 
(SIS, 1982; SIS, 2004). Therefore, the process of labour transition non-agricultural 
activities within the rural space seems to be offering an alternative to the spatial 
transformation through rural-to-urban migration.
In sum, Turkey’s experience over the recent decades has illustrated that, unlike any 
other previously ‘completed’ transformations, the growth in the urban manufacturing 
and services sectors no longer provides a significant stimulus for the labour transition 
at the macro level. However, there has been some limited extent of labour transition 
within rural areas, indicating that the labour transition may take place without rural- 
to-urban migration. On the other hand, unlike the previous cases, the services sector 
-  rather than the manufacturing -  with its higher labour absorption capacity, seems to 
be the driver of the transition of labour out of agriculture. Hence, Turkey, in common 
with the vast majority of developing countries, has been experiencing an era of 
economic modernization (growing share of the non-agricultural sectors in total 
output) without experiencing a substantial transformation through the shift of labour 
out of agriculture.
6.2 Transformation within agriculture: stagnant
The case of Turkey has shown that the agricultural sector has been stagnant and there
have been very little improvements in yields and transition to higher value cropping
patterns over the last 25 years. The bulk of the country’s cultivable land has been
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devoted to low value staple food production with historically low yields. The 
cropping pattern has not seen a significant change and the process of transition to 
higher value industrial crops, fruits and vegetables has been stagnant. In output value 
terms, the growth performance of the sector has been poor, with an average growth 
rate of around one per cent per year since 1980. Hence, Turkey has illustrated a case 
whereby the slow process of transformation from agriculture has been accompanied 
by a slow process of transformation within agriculture.
The thesis has analysed five major obstacles that have affected the transformation 
within agriculture.
It has first investigated the ecological dependency that Turkey has not managed to 
overcome through technological progress over the recent decades. The difficulties in 
the structure of terrain (high altitudes and high slopes), unfavourable temperatures 
(cold stress), relatively low levels of precipitation and the low average length of 
growing period have continued to determine cropping patterns and yields over large 
parts of the country’s arable land. Since Turkey has been slow in adopting and 
implementing all the components of the Green Revolution, it has not been able to 
reduce the impact of these serious ecological constraints. Although the mechanical 
dimension of agricultural technology has been continuously improved, biological, 
chemical and infrastructural dimensions have not seen significant progress. As a 
result, the growth performance of Turkish agriculture has remained heavily 
dependent on ecological constraints with regional variations (Akder, et al., 2000).
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The village of Sakai that was studied in Chapter IV illustrates the impact of 
unfavourable agro-ecology on the transformation process at the local level. Suffering 
from the general ecological characteristics of the region of central Anatolia -  such as 
high altitude, cold stress, low precipitation and short growing period -  low value 
staple food production at extremely low yields has continued to dominate the 
cropping pattern. Since the village is almost untouched by the Green Revolution, and 
the intensive use of chemical fertilizers, high quality seeds and irrigation, cereal 
yields have seen no substantial improvements for almost half century, and stayed at 
historically low levels. Sakai has shown that a combination of unfavourable ecology 
and the lack of technological progress is the fundamental factor hindering the 
transformation within agriculture.
Turkey has demonstrated the impact of the classical market obstacle arising from the 
low income elasticity of demand for staple food products. Expectedly, the demand 
for staple foods has grown only marginally, well below the rate of the country’s 
overall economic growth. Furthermore, the relatively skewed distribution of the 
country’s disposable income has created an asymmetrical demand structure which is 
not conducive for the transition in cropping pattern. It has led to a shallow but broad 
demand-base for low value staple foods, while there is a deep but narrow one for 
commodities of high income elasticity. Therefore, a combination of almost flat 
demand for staple foods, skewed income distribution and weak demand for higher 
income-elasticity commodities have created a big obstacle for the transition to higher 
value cropping patterns.
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Turkish agriculture has also been badly affected by a downward spiral of declining 
commodity prices, profitability, investment and low growth. Global prices have been 
going down over the last three decades, and the terms of trade have been 
unfavourable for agricultural commodities. At the national level, prices for the 
majority of commodities have fallen rapidly since the second half of the 1990s. On 
the other hand, the cost of major inputs has increased, leading to a decline in the 
profitability in the sector as a whole. The level of investments especially, from the 
private sector, has also been deteriorating. Falling commodity prices have reduced 
the output value generated in the sector, while also discouraging investment and 
growth.
The village of Tuz in western Anatolia exemplifies the impact of price trends on 
agriculture at the village level. Although it enjoys a perfect combination of 
favourable ecology, full adoption of all the components of the Green Revolution, and 
advanced agronomic practices, its economy suffered from the declining world prices 
and increasing cost of production, pushing producers into a profitability crisis. 
Although farmers in Tuz have managed to achieve one of the world’s highest yields 
in cotton, they have not been able to reap the benefits of their exceptional 
achievement due to falling margins. The case has also shown the direct impact that 
trade distorting domestic subsidies, export support and protection policies of major 
developed countries have had, suppressing world prices artificially.
With the help of the third village study, Sinan in south-eastern Anatolia, Chapter V 
has shown the impact of historical inequality in land relations on the transformation 
within agriculture. Sinan is located in the region which illustrates an exceptionally
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high land inequality originating from centuries of political patronage between the 
central state and peripheral elite. The case has illustrated that since such inequality is 
based on political factors rather than merit, operational efficiency and market 
performance, it encourages rent-seeking and hinders the efficient allocation and 
utilization of natural and human resources. Therefore, it constitutes a big obstacle for 
the transformation within agriculture.
Turkey also exemplifies the impact of ‘structural adjustment’ programmes in the 
1980s and their ‘Washington Consensus’ version in the 1990s. Both the first example 
of ‘structural adjustment’ in 1980 and the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the late 1990s 
came as a result of two major crises in which the country’s economy came close to 
collapse. The severity of the crises pushed the government into a position whereby it 
was dependent on the external support of the IMF and the World Bank. The bail-out 
programmes, by design, had a narrow and exclusive focus on achieving fiscal 
stability, even at the expense of the agricultural sector. The conditions attached to the 
programmes substantially reduced the role of the government in providing services 
and support which were essential for the sector. However, in periods of relative 
macro-economic stability, the government’s agricultural policies were tied to 
electorate politics aiming at populist returns rather than facilitating agricultural 
growth through investing in infrastructure, research and development and other 
productivity enhancing services.
Turkey’s slow progress in its agricultural transformation is directly linked to its low 
level of integration into world cereal, fruit and vegetable markets. Its trade policy is 
highly defensive, aiming at protecting a large number of small farms undertaking
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low-productivity cereal production which the country has comparative disadvantage. 
Such a high level of protectionism penalizes consumers, mainly the poorest segments 
of the society, who have to pay higher prices for basic foodstuff than they would 
have paid under a less restrictive trade policy. On the other hand, Turkey is not able 
to capitalize its full potential in (high-value) fruit and vegetable export markets 
where it has a comparative advantage. This in turn slows down the transition from 
low to high-value cropping patterns. Moreover, the country has not been able to 
attract significant amount of foreign direct investment going into the sector. 
Although there has been a substantial change in food chains through the increasing 
diffusion of supermarkets, this has not yet resulted in a significant extent of contract 
farming. Hence, the vast majority of small farms in Turkey, neither taking part in 
global trade nor benefiting from foreign direct investment, have been left out of the 
process of economic globalization.
6.3 Small farm (in)differentiation
The thesis has also analysed the factors determining the predominance of small farms 
and the process of scale differentiation in agriculture. The approach developed here 
argued that the dominance of small farms is a phenomenon arising from lack of rural 
transformation. Since the marginal demand for unskilled rural labour has been low 
and getting lower, the opportunity cost of staying in agriculture has been falling at 
the household level, which has discouraged small farmers from leaving agriculture. 
On the other hand, the predominance of low-value and low productivity activities 
within the agricultural sector has restrained accumulation. Therefore, scale 
differentiation has not taken place in any significant extent and small-scale farms
have continued to dominate the agricultural sector.
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At the village level, in Tuz, which has experienced high levels of agricultural growth 
through increasing productivity, small farms have continued to predominate in 
numbers, although there has been some significant land accumulation (mainly 
through rental and sharecropping markets). That is to say, land accumulation at the 
operational level has taken place without the differentiation (disappearance) of small 
farms. The persistence of small farms was not due to their superior efficiency, since 
there was no correlation between farm size and land productivity. It was mainly due 
to two counterbalancing factors hindering the differentiation process in the periods of 
both high and low agricultural growth. In the absence of the labour transition, in 
periods of high agricultural growth, higher land prices and increasing opportunity 
cost of leaving agriculture (for small farms); in periods of stagnation, the weakening 
accumulation potential of large farms and continuous status of agriculture as the last 
resort income activity (for small farms) has hindered the process of scale 
differentiation. Therefore, the case has illustrated that labour transition away from 
agriculture is an essential part of the process of scale differentiation.
On the other hand, the case of Sakai shows a different process of scale 
differentiation. In this case, the transformation from agriculture has been taken place. 
However, the transformation within agriculture has been stagnant and farming has 
lost its significance as an income activity for the vast majority of households. As the 
households move to non-farming activities, the number of farms in the middle land- 
ownership categories has decreased, along with an increase in the number of 
smallholdings and landless households, indicating a significant extent of land 
fragmentation. However, since yields and agricultural value productivity were so
small, the demand for land was almost insignificant. Hence, there has not been an 
increase in the proportion of higher ownership categories. Although many 
households left agriculture, this has not led to a significant extent of land 
concentration. Therefore, in the absence of transformation within agriculture, small 
farm differentiation (disappearance of small farms) has taken place without land 
concentration.
A totally different process has been in place in Sinan. It represents a case of 
politically enforced land concentration, which does not have any similarity to the two 
opposite trends above. A high level of initial land concentration was not based on the 
process of differentiation but based on political land grab. Over the last decades, land 
relations have changed, which has altered the ways through which small farms 
operated. For instance, they faced the risk of extinction before the 1980s due to the 
landlord’s enclosures. However, in the 1990s, the introduction of labotir-intensive 
cotton production has revitalized them at the operational level through the rental 
market. Yet, this has not weakened the dominance of the landlord, or affected the 
level of inequality in ownership. Hence, in Sinan, the history of land concentration 
has pushed the process of differentiation to a political realm.
6.4 Neo-populism vs. agro-pessimism
The approach developed in this thesis positions itself in recent debates on the role of
agriculture in economic development. It argues for a framework which syntheses the
processes of labour transition, agricultural transformation and small-farm
differentiation. It reflects on Lewis’s (1954) ‘disguised’ unemployment in the
agricultural sector while questioning whether the ‘conventional wisdom’ on the role
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of agriculture in overall economic development is still relevant in the context of 
Turkey. On the policy dimension, on the other hand, the realist approach takes the 
middle way in the recent debate between the ‘neo-populist small-farm orthodoxy’ 
and the agro-pessimist ‘rethinking rural development’ schools.
As for the transfer of surplus labour from agriculture, the approach developed in this 
thesis departs from the Lewis’s thesis on the supply elasticity of rural labour force 
and ‘disguised’ unemployment in the agricultural sector. It argues that the 
agricultural sector still offers a perfectly elastic labour supply to the non-agricultural 
sector. This is mainly due to the fact that the size of rural labour force has been 
increasing and the level of labour productivity is extremely low in the agricultural 
sector. Similarly, since there is a huge room to improve productivity in the 
agricultural sector, Lewis’s concept of ‘disguised’ unemployment -  suggesting that if 
a part of the labour force was removed from the agricultural to the non-agricultural 
sector, the total agricultural output would not change -  retains its relevance.
However, this thesis’s position differs from the ‘Lewisians’ by arguing that the 
supply elasticity of agricultural labour is no longer relevant so as to drive non- 
agricultural growth.1 Given the growing size of urban labour force, and the high 
levels of unemployment and underemployment in urban labour markets, the urban 
labour supply has become highly elastic too. The abundance of urban labour supply 
has diminished the importance of cheap labour force for the urban non-agricultural 
sectors. Hence, the agro-realist approach can be considered as ‘neo-Lewisian’ in 
acknowledging the existence of perfectly elastic labour supply and the ‘disguised’
1 For contemporary interpretations o f Lewis’s model, see, for instance, Fields (2004) and Tignor 
(2004).
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unemployment in the agricultural sector, however, it argues that the linkage between 
the rural labour supply and urban non-agricultural growth no longer exists.
This thesis also questions the ‘conventional wisdom’ on the role of agriculture in 
overall economic development in Turkey. The importance of the backward and 
forward linkages of agriculture specified by Johnston and Mellor (1961) in the 1960s 
has been diminishing, not necessarily only as a normal outcome of the country’s 
economic development. First, as is dealt with above, the agricultural sector as a 
supplier of cheap labour is no longer important although it still retains a large labour 
surplus. Second, its function as a domestic supplier of food can now be bypassed by 
international trade. Since global market prices for major staple food are consistently 
lower than domestic prices -  almost two times as low in some periods in the 1990s -  
importing food can alternatively serve to the duel-purpose of feeding populations and 
keeping real wages down. Third, agriculture’s contribution to foreign exchange 
earnings is no longer significant -  given the declining terms of trade and the share of 
agricultural exports in total over the last three decades.
Fourth, the agricultural sector is no longer in a position to provide capital for 
investments in the non-agricultural sector, given the ‘low price-low margin-low 
capital investment trap’ in itself. It is rather in a position to receive capital and 
welfare transfers from the non-agricultural sector in the form of direct and indirect 
subsidies. Finally, rapid urbanisation has diminished the relative importance of the 
rural consumer-base providing a market for urban goods, although the size of rural 
population has remained almost the same over the last three decades. Moreover, 
since the level of labour productivity and thus disposable incomes are relatively low
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in rural areas, the average purchasing power of a rural consumer is substantially 
lower than that of an urban consumer, which further reduces the relative importance 
of the size of rural consumer demand for the urban sector.
Therefore, this thesis suggests that agriculture no longer plays the roles in overall 
economic development which it attributed with in the 1960s and 1970s. It argues that 
a new role for agriculture needs to be defined within the boundaries of its functions 
in rural economic development and poverty alleviation. It is still the major source of 
employment for the vast majority of rural populations that have been left behind the 
process of economic development. It provides food security for the rural poor, 
functioning as a livelihood resource of last resort. Finally, through its ‘upstream’ and 
‘downstream’ linkages it stimulates the development of non-farm activities within 
rural economies. Hence, this thesis argues that although agriculture ‘has had its day’ 
in industrialisation as a source of labour, and in overall economic development 
through its production, expenditure and investment linkages, its role in rural 
economic development and poverty alleviation is still crucial for billions of people 
living and working in rural areas around the world.
6.4.1 The new debate
This thesis also takes a position in the new debate between the neo-populists and the 
agro-pessimists on the role of agriculture and small-scale farming in poverty 
alleviation and economic development in the context of globalization. It distances 
itself from the neo-populist paradigm of small-farm efficiency envisaging that small- 
scale farming can still play a major role in economic development. Similarly, it 
positions itself away from the deterministically pessimistic view of the ‘rethinking
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rural development’ school on the future viability of small farms. Hence, rather than 
subscribing fully to either school’s line of argument on major issues such as the 
importance of non-agricultural activities, the impact of prices, land inequality, and 
the future of small farms, the agro realist approach aims at synthesising their strong 
points.
The transition to non-farm activities in rural areas in general, and in providing 
alternatives to small-scale farming in particular is very relevant for the debate 
between the neo-populists and the agro-pessimists. Neo-populists address the 
importance of non-farm activities mainly in the case of strong production linkages 
derived from growth in the agricultural sector (Lipton, 2005, p. 9). They argue that 
income diversification is a demand-driven process occurring as a natural 
consequences of economic development in general, agricultural growth in particular 
(Hazell and Diao, 2005, p. 27).2 In that respect, they imply that non-farm activities 
are beneficial if they came as a consequence of agricultural growth, rather than as an 
outcome of ‘distress diversification’ (Lipton, 2005, p. 9). However, as the case of 
Sakai has illustrated, even ‘distress diversification’ can be vital in providing 
alternative source of income to farmers in unfavourable agro-ecological zones. 
Without relying on non-agricultural sources and circular migration, many villagers in 
Sakai would have faced severe poverty over the last 50 years, given the level of their 
agricultural productivity. In such zones and high population densities, diversification 
to non-farm activities, whether it is distress or not, permanent and circular migration 
are major alternatives to agricultural activities.
2 Also in (Diao, et al., 2005).
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On the other hand, agro-pessimists suggest that ‘agriculture has had its day’, and 
diversification from agricultural to the non-agricultural activities, which has already 
been underway in many rural areas, is the way forward (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, 
p. 404).3 However, they seem to underestimate the fact that non-agricultural 
activities may suffer from severe productivity problems and face competition from 
urban areas. As the case of Sakai has illustrated, they face severe sectoral and 
locational competition, which may even lead to their disappearance. Furthermore, 
some of these activities are of very low productivity encountering significant present 
and future viability problems that are similar to those faced by the small-scale farms. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that since the demand for rural labour from urban non- 
agricultural sector is shrinking, the transition to non-farm activities within rural areas 
now provides a major alternative way of transformation from agriculture. However, 
their significance should not be overestimated given their low level of productivity 
and competitiveness.
The neo-populist school seems to ignore, rather romantically, how badly the 
agricultural sector dominated by small farms has been performing over the last 25 
years. Productivity growth in the sector has been sluggish, and its contribution to 
over-all economic growth has been falling steadily. In particular, their position does 
not offer much explanation on the fact that margins are under immense pressure 
because of commodity price declines and rising costs. This in turn leaves many small 
farms with profits too small to generate decent incomes. Neopopulists focus almost 
exclusively on farm size and productivity related operational advantages of small- 
scale family production, while they pay little attention to profitability and farm
3 This is also a fundamental position of the ‘livelihood approach’ arguing for the diversification away 
from small farms, among others, see (Ellis, 2000).
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incomes. The ‘rethinking rural development’ school, on the other hand, stresses that 
agricultural commodity prices have dropped substantially over the past 30 years. The 
removal of input subsidies has increased the cost of inputs, which has shrunk 
margins in the sector as a whole (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, p. 404). As the case of 
Tuz has shown, the declining prices and profitability has affected even the world’s 
most efficient small farms. Hence, this thesis takes the pessimistic approach in 
acknowledging the ‘profitability crisis’ in agriculture.
As for inequality, neo-populists have always argued that promoting more equal 
distribution of land is essential for agricultural growth in regions of high inequality. 
For example, Lipton argues that ‘ascribed’ inequality is a ‘deadweight tax’ on 
agricultural growth, since it harms efficiency and competition (Eastwood and Lipton, 
2000, p. 50). It reduces the full utilization of labour resources in areas where it is 
abundant. In such areas, small-scale production is cost effective (in labour-intensive 
crops), and it generates higher net value added per hectare (Eastwood and Lipton, 
2000, p. 55). Therefore, neo-populists argue that shifting towards more equal 
landholdings is vital for poverty alleviation in regions of high land inequality 
(Lipton, 2005, p. 17). Agro pessimists on the other hand, do not seem to be as 
sensitive on the issue of inequality, and its impact on poverty. With their rather 
apolitical position, they pay little attention to the political and social factors and 
related asymmetries of power within rural societies denying peasants to have access 
to income generating assets. Their argument is based on the conviction that small- 
scale farming is not efficient. Therefore, they generally oppose the idea of land 
reform.
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Departing from the case of Sinan, this thesis argues that the neo-populist position in 
inequality is entirely legitimate. Historically ‘ascribed’ inequality in land and water 
has proved to be the biggest obstacle to agricultural growth by preventing the 
efficient allocation of resources and by hindering production, spending and 
investment linkages to generate growth. It has constituted a major cause of rural 
poverty by denying peasants sufficient income, and by preventing them from using 
their labour assets and skills. The asymmetrical power relations between the landlord 
and the peasants have created an agricultural development path determined by the 
landlord’s rent-seeking activities. The case has also suggested that ascribed 
inequality is a major factor causing political conflict. Therefore, this thesis 
acknowledges that having access to land enhances rural livelihoods through 
providing peasants with income and food security, and through guaranteeing social 
security in different stages of their household cycle (de Janvry, et al., 2001a, 5-6). 
Hence, it takes the positions of the neo-populists and argues for more equal 
distribution of land and water in areas of high ascribed inequality.
On the question of the dominance of small farms, the position that this thesis takes 
differs from the fundamental proposition of the ‘neo-populist’ school led by Lipton, 
suggesting that since small farms dominate the rural space in terms of the proportion 
of agricultural value-added, area and workforce, their resilience and persistence can 
be taken as an indication of their present and future viability (Lipton, 2005, p.l). The 
‘inverse relationship between farms size and productivity’ still constitutes the 
theoretical foundation of this argument. However, this thesis suggests that neo­
populists, since Chayanov, relied too heavily on the relationship between farm size 
and productivity as their main explanatory factor while categorically neglecting
labour productivity and the processes of labour transition away from agriculture. 
Although, they acknowledged the obvious trend of increasing farm size with 
economic development (Eastwood, et al., 2004, p.3), they seem to ignore increasing 
land productivity that come along with it. This thesis argues that the so called inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity does not hold if the rural 
transformation is progressing towards completion.
By the same token, agro-populists’ strong emphasis on small farm efficiency based 
on their low-cost advantage in labour supervision (since they usually rely on family 
labour) seems to be problematic too.4 In the light of the village studies, it appears that 
such an advantage is significant, with some qualifications, in the first village, totally 
irrelevant in the second, and captured also by the large landlord in the third. In Tuz, 
although the supervision costs of labour was higher for large farms, even some small 
farms (around two ha) had to rely on external labour during the peak times of 
harvest. The extent of labour supervision costs was also affected significantly by the 
origin of hired labour (whether from the village itself, neighbouring villages, from 
the Aegean region or from eastern Anatolia) and by the nature and the time-span of 
the relationship between the labourer and the farmer.5 In the case of Sakai, hiring an 
external labourer was not a practice at all, regardless of farm size. Even the largest 
farms (around 25 ha) did not hire external labour, making supervision costs 
irrelevant. On the other hand, in Sinan, the landlord who used to undertake capital­
4 While the term small farm and family farm often used interchangeably (given the fact the vast 
majority of small farms operated by families labour), the term large farm are rarely used in the context 
o f family farms. The natural outcome of this is that the supervision cost advantage of family farms are 
considered only for small farms, not for large family farms. Therefore, the neo-populist approach 
intrinsically ignores the possibility of small-farm differentiation into larger family farms with higher 
labour productivity.
5 The introduction o f the mechanical cotton harvester can change these labour relations radically, 
making the cost o f supervision less significant.
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intensive large-scale cereal production has captured the benefits of the managerial 
advantages of small farms after irrigation made his land convenient for labour- 
intensive cotton production. He rented-out his land and successfully passed on the 
extra cost of supervision (arising from the transition to labour intensive cotton 
production) to peasant families. Therefore, advantages of small farms in relation to 
supervision costs are not universal, only arising in certain contexts with significance 
of certain limitations.
Agro-pessimists on the other hand are sceptical about the future viability of small 
farms, and they propose that the farm size will increase (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, 
p. 401). In the terminology that has been used in the thesis, they argue for the process 
of small-farm differentiation. However, this thesis suggests that without experiencing 
the right combination of rapid growth (with high employment-elasticity) in non- 
agricultural activities in both rural and urban areas, and high growth in agriculture, 
small farms cannot go through the process of scale differentiation. If the trends over 
the past 25 years continue, in contrast to the agro-pessimists’ argument, small farms 
will continue to dominate the agricultural sector, however not due to their superior 
efficiency as the neo-populists argue but as a result of the lack of rural 
transformation.
Turkey at the macro-level and three different case studies at the micro level have 
proven that there is no ground for determinism in explaining the process of scale 
differentiation in agriculture. Neither Chayanovian neo-populism attributing small 
farm an a-historical potential to persist, nor Kautsky’s approach arguing for their 
ultimate disappearance, were sufficient to explain the process. Similarly, the old
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debate in Turkey, between those along the lines of the neo-populist school, such as 
Keyder, and those following the leftist tradition, such as Cinar and Silier, seems to 
have been futile. At the country level, the land censuses have shown that there has 
not been a significant extent of scale differentiation in Turkish agriculture. Both the 
distribution of land and the average farms size have not seen significant change since 
1980. At the village level, on the other hand, the cases of Tuz, Sakai and Sinan 
illustrated that the scale-differentiation process can take totally different forms. 
Therefore, rather than relying on deterministic explanations, this thesis relies on 
factors affecting the rural transformation at the local level to explain the process of 
scale differentiation in agriculture.
In order for scale differentiation to take place, high levels of agricultural growth 
should raise the accumulation potential of farms while an increasing labour demand 
from the non-agricultural sector (both rural and urban) increasing the opportunity 
cost of staying in agriculture which would then encourage the labour transition. 
Ideally, the opportunity cost of staying in agriculture should increase quicker than the 
opportunity cost of leaving, which would encourage the differentiation process 
through land concentration. That was what the majority of today’s developed 
countries experienced with their rural transformations. It was achieved by high levels 
of non-agricultural growth with high employment elasticity -  the pull factor that 
increased the opportunity cost of staying in agriculture.6 At the same time, the 
opportunity cost of leaving agriculture also rose through technological and 
infrastructural development allowing competitive farms to accumulate surplus and 
expand their operation. However, the former increased relatively faster than the
6 It was also supported by an increased skill-base of the rural labour force through higher education (in 
the cases o f the Asian Tigers)
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latter, which enabled the ‘completion’ of the structural transformation. Therefore, a 
simultaneous process of high agricultural growth and even higher level of non- 
agricultural growth with high employment elasticity is necessary in order to achieve 
scale-differentiation in agriculture - the disappearance of inefficient farms and land 
concentration leading to increasing labour productivity.7
6.5 The future of small farms
Although the overall picture of rural transformation over the last three decades is to a 
large extent pessimistic, there are now new opportunities for making progress in the 
age of globalization. Non-farm activities within rural areas, higher education, and 
new calls for free international movement of labour may offer some new 
opportunities for the process of labour transition from agriculture. On the other hand, 
revolutionary biotechnological innovations, new market opportunities for labour- 
intensive high-value agricultural commodities, emerging developing country 
coalitions pursuing a fairer global trade regime, a new wave of community-based 
land reforms, and recent calls for new policy frameworks, such as the new social 
democracy, providing an alternative to the ‘Washington Consensus’ are some of the 
major opportunities that may facilitate the transformation within agriculture. Hence, 
despite the current situation, there is some room for cautious optimism for making 
progress in the rural transformation in the age of globalization.
7 This does not suggest that all small family farms would disappear. Some family farms, those which 
are competitive will remain small (high-value commodity producers with already high land and labour 
productivity), some family farms will be larger but remain as family farms relying exclusively on 
family labour.
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However, making significant progress requires new and efficient public institutions 
and rural development strategies that are capable of incorporating immense 
variations in rural areas. The trajectories of the three cases provide some insight as to 
the extent of variation at the local level. It is hard to envisage a policy approach that 
is designed for one case to work effectively in another. Nevertheless, there is a need 
for broader strategic choices too. This entails promoting labour transition from 
agriculture in areas of low productivity low-value cereal production, and encouraging 
diversification to high-value markets in rural areas of high potential. It also involves 
adopting a proactive trade policy where a country’s comparative advantages can 
effectively be utilised. Yet this is not to suggest that old public institutions should 
resume their previous role of providing services which were usually ineffective, 
inefficient and often corrupt. Developing new institutional frameworks that are 
capable of designing macro-level strategies and micro-level policy interventions is 
urgently needed.
6.5.1 Labour mobility
The declining share of agriculture in GDP, while retaining large share in labour force 
means that agricultural growth (even if at relatively high levels) will not be adequate 
to bridge the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural productivity. Hence, the 
transition of labour out of agriculture to more productive sectors should be the 
primary aim of any transformation strategy. There are four major ways that the 
process may be stimulated. First, the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas needs to be promoted especially in areas where the potential 
for agricultural development is ecologically low. As in the case of Sakai, new 
communication and transportation infrastructure stimulates the development of the
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non-agricultural sector by eradicating the physical boundaries between the rural and 
urban spaces. Second, providing higher education in rural areas would ease the 
process of labour transition through rural-to-urban migration. As is indicated above, 
the demand elasticity of non-agricultural growth for workforce with higher education 
is substantially high. Thus, having higher education would enable rural labourers to 
enter into lucrative urban labour markets.
Third, the growth in both the domestic and export-oriented services sector offers a 
big opportunity. At the local level, non-agricultural activities in rural areas are 
predominantly service oriented. At the national level too, the growth in the services 
sector absorb substantially larger amount of labour as compared to the manufacturing 
sector. Since the income elasticity of demand for services is relatively higher than for 
manufactured commodities, increasing disposable income in urban areas stimulates 
the services sector with higher labour absorption capacity, creating stimulus for 
labour transition out of agriculture. At the global level, since developed countries 
have a high-income consumer base with increasing demand for services, promoting 
the export-oriented services sector, such as rural tourism (Ashley, 2006), can make a 
substantial contribution to the labour transition process in developing countries.
Fourth, the missing dimension of economic globalization -  free movement of labour 
-  can stimulate the labour transition. Although, currently it is not a part of 
multilateral trade negotiations (apart from those regulating temporary movement of 
natural persons, ‘Mode 4’ -  a technical subgroup of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services of the World Trade Organization), the demographic trends in the majority 
of developed countries (shrinking labour force and mounting problems of social
247
security services due to aging populations) and readily available labour supply in 
many developing countries is pushing the issue into the agenda of international 
development. A freer movement of semi-skilled and unskilled labour from 
developing to developed countries would not only generate economic gains (larger 
than those created by liberalisation in other factors of production) for both developed 
and developing countries (Rodrik, 2002, pp. 19-23), it would also reduce 
unemployment and underemployment in developing countries. This in turn would 
increase the domestic demand for labour and thus the transition of labour from 
agriculture.
6.5.2 Ecological dependency vs. biotechnology
As for the transformation within agriculture, the biggest obstacle, ecological 
dependency, may now be partly overcome through the revolutionary progress that 
has been taken place in agricultural biotechnology, including genetic engineering. 
New technology goes beyond the boundaries of Mendel's revolutionary discoveries 
in plant breeding in the late 19th century. It makes it possible to breed transgenic 
crops by using desirable genes from radically wider range of donor species. It has 
been used to develop new varieties with features that have been outside the realm of 
conventional breeding, such as herbicide tolerant cotton, insect resistant com and 
drought tolerant wheat. What the new biotechnology potentially offers is raising 
agricultural productivity in general, but particularly in ecologically unfavourable 
areas where that has not been possible/feasible by using conventional technology.
However, biotechnology, especially some applications of genetic engineering, and its 
potential impact on the environment have become an issue of fierce public debate.
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The opponents of the technology argue that genetically modified crops threaten 
biodiversity -  as new varieties may lead to the genetic contamination of wild species. 
They are also concerned about the possible health risk in relation to the consumption 
of genetically modified organisms. On the other hand, the proponents argue that it is 
good for resource sustainability, since new types would reduce the pressure on land 
(by offering higher yields), on water (by higher water efficiency), and pollution (by 
reducing the use of chemical pesticides and fertilisers). They also argue that some 
new types could reduce the greenhouse impact of agriculture -  as they do not require 
tillage. As such, the debate is between those seeing this technology from a risk 
perspective and those who see it as a historic step in human capacities to overcome 
ecological constraints.
The public perception and preferences of risk about the new biotechnology is a major 
factor affecting the whole debate. Whether peoples’ attitudes towards GM food 
affected more by their risk perception or by their risk preferences depend on the 
social context (Lusk and Coble, 2005, p. 404).8 Nevertheless, the future direction of 
the new technology is likely to be affected by risk attitudes shaped by a combination 
of cultural, political (politics of information) and psychological factors.9
The debate also reflects the economic interests of major parties involved. There have 
been major trade disputes in the WTO between countries that have a comparative
8 While risk behaviour is more about inherent individual/cultural domain which is relatively static, 
risk perception is more dynamic as it is shaped by education, information and the medium through 
which the individual interacts with information. For instance, a recent study conducted in Germany 
and Sweden shows that individuals’ perception is strongly linked with the source of information that 
they rely on (journals, TVs etc.) and their perception about the source itself (i.e. whether they ‘trust’ 
the source or not) (Kohring, et al., 2006). However, it should also be noted that the process o f  
individual’s risk perception is not necessarily a ‘rational’ one, influenced by popular cultural images, 
primordial fears and fiction etc. (Gaskell, et al., 2006, p. 204).
This also raises philosophical questions about the role o f science in society.
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advantage in genetically modified crops, such as the US, Argentina, Canada and 
countries that want to restrict its trade, such as the EU (Anderson, et al., 2004, 
p. 18).10 There are also concerns about possible monopolistic tendencies and market 
failures in the diffusion of knowledge to producers in developing countries. A couple 
of multinational companies in developed countries have dominated the research, 
development and marketing of the new biotechnology. This raises questions about 
the economic risks in relation to the existence of monopoly powers and the potential 
risks that a profitability driven sector would pose to environment and food safety. 
However, the extent of public research in developing countries is gaining momentum 
too. Public institutions also engage in partnerships with the private sector in 
identifying, transferring and adapting technology from developed countries. For 
instance, India, Brazil and China have been investing heavily in public-driven 
biotechnology research and technology transfer, making the new knowledge directly 
available to the farmers of developing countries. 11
As for the potential benefits of the new biotechnology to small farms in developing 
countries there are competing views too. The agro-pessimists argue that the new 
technology is capital biased and designed for large-scale farmers in the North. Small- 
scale farmers in the South lack the managerial skills to benefit from the new 
technology (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, p. 407). They also claim that small farms 
may not afford the package of new technology inputs (Kydd, 2002, p. 3). On the 
other hand, the protagonists of small farms take a progressive approach, and argue
10 In 2003, the US, Canada and Argentina opened a case in the WTO against the EU’s de facto 
moratorium against the commercial exploitation of GM products in Europe.
11 This also enables a better public accountability in terms o f the ethical aspects of the research and its 
application.
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for the promotion of pro-smal 1-farm crop science and appropriate GM technology. 
For instance, Lipton argues that genetically modified plants can improve stagnating 
yields in food staples especially in areas of water scarcity. Provided that necessary 
institutional innovations are in place in relation to both combining public and private 
research and improving health and environmental regulations, he argues that the new 
technology can offer effective ways of dealing with poverty and malnutrition 
(Lipton, 2001, p.824). It should also be noted that as the technology progresses and 
the related knowledge accumulates, the marginal cost of research and development 
activities will fall. This will reduce entry costs and stimulate competition which is 
likely to benefit farmers in developing countries.
6.5.3 Globalizing markets
Global trade offers an opportunity to developing countries that are capable of finding 
new export markets and re-adjusting food policies at the domestic level. Turkey, for 
instance, could improve its export performance in high-value commodities, such as 
horticulture products, that have an absolute comparative advantage in high-income 
OECD markets. Increasing exports would by-pass the income elasticity obstacle in 
domestic markets -  as developed countries provide a high-income consumer-base for 
high value commodities. It would also increase the employment elasticity of the 
agricultural sector, since these commodities often require labour intensive production 
on small-scale farms (Eastwood and Lipton, 2004, p. 43). On the other hand, the fact 
that world prices for low-value staple foods are lower than domestic prices, provides 
an opportunity to import staple foods cheaply. This would first reduce the pressure 
on land devoted to staple food production and thus ease the transition to higher value 
cropping patterns. Second, given that both rural and urban populations with low-
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income spend the bulk of their income for basic food, lowering food prices would 
raise their real income, which in turn stimulates the domestic demand for higher 
value agricultural commodities too. Therefore, a simultaneous process of increasing 
exports in high-value crops while gradually liberalising imports -  exclusively for 
low-value food crops -  would encourage the process of transformation within 
agriculture.
Emerging developing country coalitions pursuing a fairer global trade regime is an 
important step which would enable developing countries to benefit from trade with
19fewer obstacles. In the Doha Round, the Group of 20 (G20), the new alliance of 
developing countries including Brazil, India and China emerged in the run up to 
Cancun in September 2003 and raised hopes of shifting asymmetries in the balance 
of power within the WTO. The group successfully stood up against the US and the 
EU that had always imposed multilateral trade rules in agriculture. In particular, they 
proposed radical cuts in high levels of trade distorting domestic support and export 
subsidies used by developed countries (Narlikar and Tussie, 2004, p. 952). Since the 
collapse of negotiations in Cancun, the Doha ‘development round’ has encountered 
increasingly active engagement of developing countries forming issue-based 
coalitions such as the G-33, G15 and Like-Minded Group (LMG). Hence, although 
there are conflicting interests between and within different groups, the emergence of 
developing country coalitions in multilateral trade negotiations is a major step 
towards achieving fair and more democratically governed global trade in the benefit 
of developing countries.13
12 The group is also known as G22 or G20+.
13 On the concept of fairness in international trade negotiations, see (Narlikar, 2006).
252
On the marketing side of the sector, increasing demand, especially from developed 
countries, for high quality differentiated products offers lucrative market 
opportunities for developing countries. Niche markets such as cut flowers, organic 
vegetables and fruits have been growing rapidly over the recent decades. Developing 
countries enjoy advantages because of their lower labour costs and greater ecological 
variations allowing for a broad range of product differentiation. Yet the level of 
competition and quality standards in these new markets are tougher than those in 
traditional ones. Being competitive requires technological improvements reducing 
costs, good transportation infrastructure, post-harvest storage and processing 
facilities, good coordination among producers (especially among small farms), a 
conducive economic climate for domestic and foreign investment, efficient market 
links and good marketing strategies (Diao and Hazell, 2004, p. 6).
Multinational retailers and supermarkets now play an increasingly important role in 
providing new market opportunities for small farmers. Boosted by both domestic and 
foreign direct investments, they dominate middle-income urban markets in both 
developed and developing countries.14 Their increased sourcing of fresh fruits and 
vegetables has brought about new dimensions to both the marketing and production 
of food crops. In many developing countries, they have moved the structure of 
traditional wholesale markets towards specialised wholesalers and contract farming 
that requires stringent quality, quantity and delivery-timing standards (Reardon, et 
al., 2003, p. 1145). This, on the one hand, raises questions about whether small-scale 
farmers are capable of meeting these technical and organisational requirements
14 In Latin America, the share of supermarkets in food retail is between 50 -60 per cent, in South Asia, 
more than 60 per cent in East Asia, rapidly increasing in countries like China, South Africa (Reardon, 
et al., 2003, p. 1142 ).
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(Ashley and Maxwell, 2001, p. 407).15 It also brings up some ‘power asymmetry’ 
issues in relation to the ‘buying power’ of these large retailers, increasingly 
demanding more services from their contractors at lower prices, which may also 
exclude small farms from participating in these new marketing chains (Gibbon, 2003, 
p. 615).16 Nevertheless, governments can play an important role to overcome these 
problems by facilitating linkages between producers, wholesalers and supermarkets, 
supporting farmer associations and cooperatives, investing in logistics, extension, 
market information and financial services (Shepherd, 2005, pp. 13-15).
6.5.4 ‘Market-friendly’ land reform
In dealing with the ‘ascribed’ inequality in land distribution, promoting equality 
through direct political intervention by carrying out a redistributive land reform is no 
longer considered to be a feasible policy option. However, there have been some 
alternative examples of land reform in developing countries, such as Brazil, 
Colombia, Nicaragua and El Salvador (de Janvry, et al., 2001b, pp. 290-3). In these 
types of marked-led land reform, the government acts as an initiator and a mediator 
between landowners and peasant organizations. It provides peasants with access to 
long-term credit markets (or facilitates their relations with financial institutions), 
which allow them to buy land. On the other hand, landlords are encouraged to sell 
their land at market prices. As the land transaction takes place between the willing 
seller and the willing buyer, this type of ‘de-politicized’ intervention is often called 
‘market friendly’ land reform. Both its effectiveness in alleviating inequality and its
15 Shepherd (2005, pp. 6-11 ) analyses supermarket-farm linkages and some o f the difficulties that 
small farms face in developing countries such as India, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, China and 
others.
J6 Lang (2003, pp. 558-559) also analyses the concentration o f power in food supply chains and 
retailers.
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contributions to growth are highly contested;17 however, it offers a policy alternative 
in cases of high historical inequality.
6.5.5 New social democracy: a better framework for rural transformation
Benefiting from these new opportunities requires enlarging public capacities and 
creating new institutions. Providing modem telecommunication and transportation 
facilities, offering widespread higher education to rural populations require large- 
scale investment and institutional capacity. Similarly, research in new biotechnology 
is expensive and necessitates public-private partnerships. The potential contribution 
of international trade depends on the country’s position in multilateral and bilateral 
trade negotiations, and more importantly, its institutional and organizational capacity 
at the domestic level. Increasingly stringent quality and delivery standards set by 
multinational retailers require an advanced organizational infrastructure in 
developing countries where the sector is dominated by large number of small-scale 
producers. Given the fact that the existing institutions have not been effective, and 
that ‘structural adjustment’ has further weakened their policy capacities (Kydd, 2002, 
p. 1; Held, 2005, p. 7), there is an urgent need for developing a new policy 
framework that would address the question of rural transformation in the era of 
globalization.
The new ideology of social democratic globalization is a promising alternative to this 
end. It argues for sound macro-economic policies conducive for economic growth, 
while being at the same time conducive for addressing inequality and social justice.
17 For a technical analysis and the practical implementations of ‘market-friendly’ land reform, see 
(Deininger, 2001); for its criticism, see (Borras, 2003).
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It advocates strengthening the public sector and for a greater state capacity to play a 
major role in strategizing investments and implementing differentiated development 
policies. It argues for sequencing market integration by taking into account power 
and access asymmetries, while acknowledging that it is indispensable for welfare 
growth (Held, 2005, p. 30). It envisages a fair trade environment for developing 
countries democratically supervized by a multilateral regime. The new social 
democracy framework prioritizes reducing poverty and investing in human 
development (Held, 2005, p. 35).
The cosmopolitan school advocating social democratic globalization positions itself 
against the neo-liberalism that has dominated the world economic order over the last 
two decades. This new ideology recognises the opportunities that the global economy 
is offering through increasing productivity, growth and technological diffusion. It 
argues for more egalitarian distribution of the benefits while strongly emphasising 
eradication of poverty and the importance of environmental sustainability (Held, 
2005, p. 5). The cosmopolitans champion traditional social democratic concepts and 
values such as ‘the rule of law, political equality, democratic politics, social justice 
and social solidarity’ while recognizing the need for reconstructing their meanings in 
line with the new realities and challenges of the global political economy (Held, 
2005, p. 26-28).18
The social democracy school claims to offer a new framework that would encourage 
economic growth while addressing equality and social justice, poverty and 
sustainable environment. At the local level, the state is envisaged as enlarging its
18 For a similar interpretation of modern social democracy in Turkey, see (Dervis, et al., 2006).
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policy capacity, and playing a major role in strategizing investments and 
implementing development policies. Investing in human and social capital should be 
prioritized. At the global level, the new social democracy framework envisages a 
successful and fair conclusion to WTO negotiations, debt cancellation and increased 
financial aid for poor countries. It also advocates developing a fair regime for 
transnational migration. What the new social democracy school is calling for, 
therefore, is a globalization process that serves human development.
The new social democracy framework proposed by the cosmopolitan school has been 
criticized on different grounds. First, its analysis of the crises of globalization and its 
critique of the ‘Washington Consensus’ has been attacked for being faulty and 
illusionary (Wolf, 2005, p. 40).19 Second, its conception of the role of the state was 
argued to be ‘statist’ at the local level (Desai, 2005, p. 69),20 and utopian at the 
international level, on the grounds that it underestimates the sovereignty of the nation 
state (Thompson, 2005, p. 53). Third, its emphasis on equality and social justice was 
of particular concern for its implied treatment of the two concepts on an equal basis 
(Scruton, 2005, pp. 48-49).21 Finally, it has been severely criticized for lacking 
adequate sophistication in relation to proposing politically and practically feasible 
solutions to tackle the problems it raises (Slaughter and Hale, 2005, p. 127). As such, 
there is a clear need for the new social democracy school to go beyond its diagnostic
19 The neo-liberal school argues that the principles of the ‘Washington Consensus’ were widely 
accepted conventions in macroeconomic management, which has not weakened the institutional 
capacity of developing countries. According to this view, perceiving the consensus as an evil was an 
imaginary construction in the minds of the cosmopolitans (Wolf, 2005, pp. 39-40).
20 This criticism reflects the old perception of social democracy as an ideology incapable of 
decentralizing the control of the state (Desai, 2005, pp. 68-69).
21 In this context, it has been argued that inequality is natural and it does not necessarily mean 
injustice. Following the same line of argument, trying to curb inequality in the name of social justice 
is claimed to be counterproductive (Scruton, 2005, pp. 48-50).
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vision and develop creative, effective and efficient solutions to deal with the 
challenges it identifies.
This thesis argues that a realistic and pragmatic policy approach could be 
incorporated into the new ideology of social democracy in a mutually beneficial way. 
On the one hand, the social democracy school needs to have a theoretical and an 
operational framework addressing rural and agricultural development. Since the 
major global crises the school identifies -  namely achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), realizing a fair trade environment through multilateral 
trade negotiations under the WTO regime and environmental sustainability -  are 
directly related to the rural space in general, and the agricultural sector in particular. 
On the other hand, the agro-realist approach arguing for the process of rural 
transformation requires a favourable policy framework like the one advocated by the 
social democratic globalization school. Therefore, this thesis argues that if this 
incorporation between the favourable ideology and a realistic policy framework for 
rural and agricultural development is achieved, the rural transformation can be 
envisaged as a feasible objective for today’s developing countries.
This incorporation provides a redefinition of the role of the state which would play a 
significant role in stimulating the rural transformation. A new social democratic state 
should have an extended policy capacity, but not as a dominant player creating 
market distortions but as a developmental state strategizing investments and focusing 
on human development.22 It should also be able to develop institutional capacity to
22 For similar arguments assigning the state a strategic role in industrial development which goes 
beyond ensuring macro-economic stability, while acknowledging that market mechanisms and private 
entrepreneurship should still be the engine of economic development, see (Rodrik, 2004).
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invest in large scale higher education programmes, provide advanced transportation, 
communication and energy infrastructure, invest in technological research and 
knowledge diffusion, encourage the development of organizational (coordination) 
capacities among small farms, provide institutional support for them to explore new 
markets, and also politically intervene to address the problem of ‘ascribed’ inequality 
to promote social justice in rural areas. Hence, replacing the existing ‘Washington 
Consensus’ with a renewed doctrine of social democracy combined with a realistic 
policy approach to rural and agricultural development would be a major step in the 
process of rural transformation.
6.6 Conclusion
The process of rural transformation has taken different historical paths in countries 
where it has been completed. For those societies that have achieved the stage of 
being ‘developed,’ the question ceases to exist; however, it still remains to be 
completed for the vast majority of societies that are still considered to be 
‘developing.’ Since the first example of England till the last ones of South Korea and 
Taiwan, all examples of completed rural transformations were distinct from each 
other, reflecting the political economic circumstances of the eras in which they took 
place. Having analysed the reasons why there has not been any completed rural 
transformation over the past three decades, the big question that this thesis has 
attempted to illuminate is whether such a successful transformation could take place 
in today’s developing countries living in the era of economic globalization.
The approach that has been developed here argues that the rural transformation can
move in the direction of completion if/when there is a simultaneous transformation
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both from agriculture -  a continuous decline in the actual size of rural labour force -  
and within agriculture -  rapid increase in land productivity. Investing in human 
development, especially through higher education, in rural areas, providing new 
communication and transportation infrastructure, focusing on the domestic and 
export-oriented services sector and promoting freer international labour mobility can 
stimulate the labour transition from the agricultural sector. Investing in research and 
development in new biotechnology, promoting the transition to high-value cropping 
patterns through taking more active part in global trade, attracting big retailers and 
supermarkets bringing investment, technological innovations and new market 
opportunities are some of the most important policy options that can stimulate the 
transformation within agriculture.
The thesis has argued for a new policy framework of social democracy in the context 
of developing countries with large proportions of labour force working in the 
agricultural sector. It involves a radical change in the role of the state. Through 
enhancing its institutional capacity at the macro level and its operational efficiency at 
the local level, the state should play a major role in rural economic development 
while at the same time addressing inequality and social justice. It needs to strategize 
investments and implement differentiated development policies that are flexible 
enough to cope with immense variations at the local level. The new approach should 
also adopt itself to the irreversible trend towards further global economic integration, 
which will eventually include the agricultural sector. Yet it should stand for a fair 
trade system, democratically supervised by a multilateral regime.
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The thesis argues that the new ideology of social democracy combined with realism 
can provide a hope for developing countries to complete their rural transformations 
in the age of globalization. If it takes place, this would mean that billions of rural 
labourers would be saved from the underproductive agricultural activities they have 
been trapped into, so that they can utilize their human potentials more effectively. It 
would also mean that the vast majority of the world’s poor who engage in small 
farming can be included in the process of economic globalization. A combination of 
social democratic development framework and a realistic policy approach to rural 
and agricultural development which is committed to human development, 
technological innovation and infrastructural investment; which is institutionally 
equipped to take advantage of new opportunities arising from economic 
globalization, while at the same time being socially egalitarian, environmentally 
conscious and politically democratic can facilitate the transformation process from 
being developing to becoming developed.
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